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Message-ID: <1393898578.10148.20.camel@dhcp-9-2-203-236.watson.ibm.com>
Date: Mon, 03 Mar 2014 21:02:58 -0500
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@...sung.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, jmorris@...ei.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, casey.schaufler@...el.com,
dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/8] integrity: fix checkpatch errors
On Mon, 2014-03-03 at 08:41 -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> On Fri, 2014-02-28 at 16:59 +0200, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
> > Unfixed checkpatch errors make it difficult to see new errors..
> > This patch fix them.
Between checkpatch changes (eg. sizeof) and inconsistencies between
Lindent and checkpatch, unfixed checkpatch errors make it difficult to
see new errors. This patch fixes them.
checkpatch doesn't complain about 'evm.h'. Please include the reason
for the change in the patch description.
> > Some lines with over 80 chars remained unchanged to improve
> > code readability.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@...sung.com>
>
> This patch doesn't apply cleanly to either linux-integrity/next-fixes or
> to linux-security/next.
Thanks for rebasing against linux-integrity/next-fixes.
Mimi
>
> > ---
> > security/integrity/evm/evm.h | 28 +++++++-------
> > security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c | 4 +-
> > security/integrity/iint.c | 2 +-
> > security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 8 ++--
> > security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c | 2 +-
> > security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 6 +--
> > security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 4 +-
> > security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 69 +++++++++++++++++------------------
> > security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c | 4 +-
> > security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c | 14 +++----
> > security/integrity/integrity_audit.c | 4 +-
> > 11 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 73 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h
> > index 30bd1ec..37c88dd 100644
> > --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h
> > +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h
> > @@ -32,19 +32,19 @@ extern struct crypto_shash *hash_tfm;
> > /* List of EVM protected security xattrs */
> > extern char *evm_config_xattrnames[];
> >
> > -extern int evm_init_key(void);
> > -extern int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
> > - const char *req_xattr_name,
> > - const char *req_xattr_value,
> > - size_t req_xattr_value_len);
> > -extern int evm_calc_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
> > - const char *req_xattr_value,
> > - size_t req_xattr_value_len, char *digest);
> > -extern int evm_calc_hash(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
> > - const char *req_xattr_value,
> > - size_t req_xattr_value_len, char *digest);
> > -extern int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *xattr,
> > - char *hmac_val);
> > -extern int evm_init_secfs(void);
> > +int evm_init_key(void);
> > +int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
> > + const char *req_xattr_name,
> > + const char *req_xattr_value,
> > + size_t req_xattr_value_len);
> > +int evm_calc_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
> > + const char *req_xattr_value,
> > + size_t req_xattr_value_len, char *digest);
> > +int evm_calc_hash(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
> > + const char *req_xattr_value,
> > + size_t req_xattr_value_len, char *digest);
> > +int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *xattr,
> > + char *hmac_val);
> > +int evm_init_secfs(void);
> >
> > #endif
> > diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
> > index 9bd329f..babd862 100644
> > --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
> > +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
> > @@ -105,13 +105,13 @@ static void hmac_add_misc(struct shash_desc *desc, struct inode *inode,
> > umode_t mode;
> > } hmac_misc;
> >
> > - memset(&hmac_misc, 0, sizeof hmac_misc);
> > + memset(&hmac_misc, 0, sizeof(hmac_misc));
> > hmac_misc.ino = inode->i_ino;
> > hmac_misc.generation = inode->i_generation;
> > hmac_misc.uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, inode->i_uid);
> > hmac_misc.gid = from_kgid(&init_user_ns, inode->i_gid);
> > hmac_misc.mode = inode->i_mode;
> > - crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)&hmac_misc, sizeof hmac_misc);
> > + crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)&hmac_misc, sizeof(hmac_misc));
> > if (evm_hmac_version > 1)
> > crypto_shash_update(desc, inode->i_sb->s_uuid,
> > sizeof(inode->i_sb->s_uuid));
> > diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c
> > index c49d3f1..a521edf 100644
> > --- a/security/integrity/iint.c
> > +++ b/security/integrity/iint.c
> > @@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ static void init_once(void *foo)
> > {
> > struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = foo;
> >
> > - memset(iint, 0, sizeof *iint);
> > + memset(iint, 0, sizeof(*iint));
> > iint->version = 0;
> > iint->flags = 0UL;
> > iint->ima_file_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
> > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
> > index 393b9d4..c6b4a73 100644
> > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
> > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
> > @@ -160,10 +160,10 @@ err_out:
> > * @function: calling function (FILE_CHECK, BPRM_CHECK, MMAP_CHECK, MODULE_CHECK)
> > *
> > * The policy is defined in terms of keypairs:
> > - * subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic=
> > + * subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic=
> > * subj,obj, and type: are LSM specific.
> > - * func: FILE_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | MMAP_CHECK | MODULE_CHECK
> > - * mask: contains the permission mask
> > + * func: FILE_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | MMAP_CHECK | MODULE_CHECK
> > + * mask: contains the permission mask
> > * fsmagic: hex value
> > *
> > * Returns IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE mask.
> > @@ -248,7 +248,7 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
> > *
> > * We only get here if the inode has not already been measured,
> > * but the measurement could already exist:
> > - * - multiple copies of the same file on either the same or
> > + * - multiple copies of the same file on either the same or
> > * different filesystems.
> > * - the inode was previously flushed as well as the iint info,
> > * containing the hashing info.
> > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
> > index 9999057..d257e36 100644
> > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
> > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
> > @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
> > * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
> > *
> > * File: ima_crypto.c
> > - * Calculates md5/sha1 file hash, template hash, boot-aggreate hash
> > + * Calculates md5/sha1 file hash, template hash, boot-aggreate hash
> > */
> >
> > #define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
> > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
> > index 468a3ba..da92fcc 100644
> > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
> > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
> > @@ -133,14 +133,14 @@ static int ima_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
> > * PCR used is always the same (config option) in
> > * little-endian format
> > */
> > - ima_putc(m, &pcr, sizeof pcr);
> > + ima_putc(m, &pcr, sizeof(pcr));
> >
> > /* 2nd: template digest */
> > ima_putc(m, e->digest, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
> >
> > /* 3rd: template name size */
> > namelen = strlen(e->template_desc->name);
> > - ima_putc(m, &namelen, sizeof namelen);
> > + ima_putc(m, &namelen, sizeof(namelen));
> >
> > /* 4th: template name */
> > ima_putc(m, e->template_desc->name, namelen);
> > @@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ static atomic_t policy_opencount = ATOMIC_INIT(1);
> > /*
> > * ima_open_policy: sequentialize access to the policy file
> > */
> > -static int ima_open_policy(struct inode * inode, struct file * filp)
> > +static int ima_open_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
> > {
> > /* No point in being allowed to open it if you aren't going to write */
> > if (!(filp->f_flags & O_WRONLY))
> > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> > index 149ee11..50413d0 100644
> > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> > @@ -71,10 +71,10 @@ __setup("ima_hash=", hash_setup);
> > * ima_rdwr_violation_check
> > *
> > * Only invalidate the PCR for measured files:
> > - * - Opening a file for write when already open for read,
> > + * - Opening a file for write when already open for read,
> > * results in a time of measure, time of use (ToMToU) error.
> > * - Opening a file for read when already open for write,
> > - * could result in a file measurement error.
> > + * could result in a file measurement error.
> > *
> > */
> > static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file)
> > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> > index 947cdbe..41021b4 100644
> > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> > @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
> > * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
> > *
> > * ima_policy.c
> > - * - initialize default measure policy rules
> > + * - initialize default measure policy rules
> > *
> > */
> > #include <linux/module.h>
> > @@ -21,8 +21,8 @@
> > #include "ima.h"
> >
> > /* flags definitions */
> > -#define IMA_FUNC 0x0001
> > -#define IMA_MASK 0x0002
> > +#define IMA_FUNC 0x0001
> > +#define IMA_MASK 0x0002
> > #define IMA_FSMAGIC 0x0004
> > #define IMA_UID 0x0008
> > #define IMA_FOWNER 0x0010
> > @@ -69,35 +69,35 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {
> > * and running executables.
> > */
> > static struct ima_rule_entry default_rules[] = {
> > - {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
> > - {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
> > - {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
> > - {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
> > - {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
> > - {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
> > - {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
> > - {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
> > - {.action = MEASURE,.func = MMAP_CHECK,.mask = MAY_EXEC,
> > + {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
> > + {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
> > + {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
> > + {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
> > + {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
> > + {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
> > + {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
> > + {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
> > + {.action = MEASURE, .func = MMAP_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC,
> > .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
> > - {.action = MEASURE,.func = BPRM_CHECK,.mask = MAY_EXEC,
> > + {.action = MEASURE, .func = BPRM_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC,
> > .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
> > - {.action = MEASURE,.func = FILE_CHECK,.mask = MAY_READ,.uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
> > + {.action = MEASURE, .func = FILE_CHECK, .mask = MAY_READ, .uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
> > .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_UID},
> > - {.action = MEASURE,.func = MODULE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
> > + {.action = MEASURE, .func = MODULE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
> > };
> >
> > static struct ima_rule_entry default_appraise_rules[] = {
> > - {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
> > - {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
> > - {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
> > - {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
> > - {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = RAMFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
> > - {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
> > - {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
> > - {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
> > - {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
> > - {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
> > - {.action = APPRAISE,.fowner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,.flags = IMA_FOWNER},
> > + {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
> > + {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
> > + {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
> > + {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
> > + {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = RAMFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
> > + {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
> > + {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
> > + {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
> > + {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
> > + {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
> > + {.action = APPRAISE, .fowner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .flags = IMA_FOWNER},
> > };
> >
> > static LIST_HEAD(ima_default_rules);
> > @@ -122,12 +122,12 @@ static int __init default_appraise_policy_setup(char *str)
> > }
> > __setup("ima_appraise_tcb", default_appraise_policy_setup);
> >
> > -/*
> > +/*
> > * Although the IMA policy does not change, the LSM policy can be
> > * reloaded, leaving the IMA LSM based rules referring to the old,
> > * stale LSM policy.
> > *
> > - * Update the IMA LSM based rules to reflect the reloaded LSM policy.
> > + * Update the IMA LSM based rules to reflect the reloaded LSM policy.
> > * We assume the rules still exist; and BUG_ON() if they don't.
> > */
> > static void ima_lsm_update_rules(void)
> > @@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ retry:
> > retried = 1;
> > ima_lsm_update_rules();
> > goto retry;
> > - }
> > + }
> > if (!rc)
> > return false;
> > }
> > @@ -234,7 +234,7 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, int func)
> > if (!(rule->flags & IMA_FUNC))
> > return IMA_FILE_APPRAISE;
> >
> > - switch(func) {
> > + switch (func) {
> > case MMAP_CHECK:
> > return IMA_MMAP_APPRAISE;
> > case BPRM_CHECK:
> > @@ -306,7 +306,7 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void)
> > measure_entries = ima_use_tcb ? ARRAY_SIZE(default_rules) : 0;
> > appraise_entries = ima_use_appraise_tcb ?
> > ARRAY_SIZE(default_appraise_rules) : 0;
> > -
> > +
> > for (i = 0; i < measure_entries + appraise_entries; i++) {
> > if (i < measure_entries)
> > list_add_tail(&default_rules[i].list,
> > @@ -522,8 +522,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
> > break;
> > }
> >
> > - result = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 16,
> > - &entry->fsmagic);
> > + result = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 16, &entry->fsmagic);
> > if (!result)
> > entry->flags |= IMA_FSMAGIC;
> > break;
> > @@ -549,7 +548,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
> > break;
> > }
> >
> > - result = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum);
> > + result = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum);
> > if (!result) {
> > entry->uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), (uid_t)lnum);
> > if (!uid_valid(entry->uid) || (((uid_t)lnum) != lnum))
> > @@ -566,7 +565,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
> > break;
> > }
> >
> > - result = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum);
> > + result = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum);
> > if (!result) {
> > entry->fowner = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), (uid_t)lnum);
> > if (!uid_valid(entry->fowner) || (((uid_t)lnum) != lnum))
> > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
> > index 91128b4..552705d 100644
> > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
> > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
> > @@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
> >
> > mutex_lock(&ima_extend_list_mutex);
> > if (!violation) {
> > - memcpy(digest, entry->digest, sizeof digest);
> > + memcpy(digest, entry->digest, sizeof(digest));
> > if (ima_lookup_digest_entry(digest)) {
> > audit_cause = "hash_exists";
> > result = -EEXIST;
> > @@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
> > }
> >
> > if (violation) /* invalidate pcr */
> > - memset(digest, 0xff, sizeof digest);
> > + memset(digest, 0xff, sizeof(digest));
> >
> > tpmresult = ima_pcr_extend(digest);
> > if (tpmresult != 0) {
> > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
> > index 9a4a0d1..a076a96 100644
> > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
> > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
> > @@ -22,20 +22,20 @@
> >
> > static struct ima_template_desc defined_templates[] = {
> > {.name = IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME, .fmt = IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_FMT},
> > - {.name = "ima-ng",.fmt = "d-ng|n-ng"},
> > - {.name = "ima-sig",.fmt = "d-ng|n-ng|sig"},
> > + {.name = "ima-ng", .fmt = "d-ng|n-ng"},
> > + {.name = "ima-sig", .fmt = "d-ng|n-ng|sig"},
> > };
> >
> > static struct ima_template_field supported_fields[] = {
> > - {.field_id = "d",.field_init = ima_eventdigest_init,
> > + {.field_id = "d", .field_init = ima_eventdigest_init,
> > .field_show = ima_show_template_digest},
> > - {.field_id = "n",.field_init = ima_eventname_init,
> > + {.field_id = "n", .field_init = ima_eventname_init,
> > .field_show = ima_show_template_string},
> > - {.field_id = "d-ng",.field_init = ima_eventdigest_ng_init,
> > + {.field_id = "d-ng", .field_init = ima_eventdigest_ng_init,
> > .field_show = ima_show_template_digest_ng},
> > - {.field_id = "n-ng",.field_init = ima_eventname_ng_init,
> > + {.field_id = "n-ng", .field_init = ima_eventname_ng_init,
> > .field_show = ima_show_template_string},
> > - {.field_id = "sig",.field_init = ima_eventsig_init,
> > + {.field_id = "sig", .field_init = ima_eventsig_init,
> > .field_show = ima_show_template_sig},
> > };
> >
> > diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c b/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c
> > index 793d7be..aab9fa5 100644
> > --- a/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c
> > +++ b/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c
> > @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
> > * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
> > *
> > * File: integrity_audit.c
> > - * Audit calls for the integrity subsystem
> > + * Audit calls for the integrity subsystem
> > */
> >
> > #include <linux/fs.h>
> > @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ static int __init integrity_audit_setup(char *str)
> > {
> > unsigned long audit;
> >
> > - if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &audit))
> > + if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &audit))
> > integrity_audit_info = audit ? 1 : 0;
> > return 1;
> > }
>
>
> --
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