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Message-ID: <20140310204248.GA1958@www.outflux.net>
Date: Mon, 10 Mar 2014 13:42:48 -0700
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, x86@...nel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Andy Honig <ahonig@...gle.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Jianguo Wu <wujianguo@...wei.com>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@...el.com>
Subject: [PATCH] x86, kaslr: fix module lock ordering problem
There was a potential lock ordering problem with the module kASLR patch
("x86, kaslr: randomize module base load address"). This patch removes
the usage of the module_mutex and creates a new mutex to protect the
module base address offset value.
Chain exists of:
text_mutex --> kprobe_insn_slots.mutex --> module_mutex
[ 0.515561] Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[ 0.515561]
[ 0.515561] CPU0 CPU1
[ 0.515561] ---- ----
[ 0.515561] lock(module_mutex);
[ 0.515561] lock(kprobe_insn_slots.mutex);
[ 0.515561] lock(module_mutex);
[ 0.515561] lock(text_mutex);
[ 0.515561]
[ 0.515561] *** DEADLOCK ***
Reported-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@...el.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Honig <ahonig@...gle.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
---
arch/x86/kernel/module.c | 7 +++++--
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/module.c b/arch/x86/kernel/module.c
index 49483137371f..e69f9882bf95 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/module.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/module.c
@@ -48,6 +48,9 @@ do { \
static unsigned long module_load_offset;
static int randomize_modules = 1;
+/* Mutex protects the module_load_offset. */
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(module_kaslr_mutex);
+
static int __init parse_nokaslr(char *p)
{
randomize_modules = 0;
@@ -58,7 +61,7 @@ early_param("nokaslr", parse_nokaslr);
static unsigned long int get_module_load_offset(void)
{
if (randomize_modules) {
- mutex_lock(&module_mutex);
+ mutex_lock(&module_kaslr_mutex);
/*
* Calculate the module_load_offset the first time this
* code is called. Once calculated it stays the same until
@@ -67,7 +70,7 @@ static unsigned long int get_module_load_offset(void)
if (module_load_offset == 0)
module_load_offset =
(get_random_int() % 1024 + 1) * PAGE_SIZE;
- mutex_unlock(&module_mutex);
+ mutex_unlock(&module_kaslr_mutex);
}
return module_load_offset;
}
--
1.7.9.5
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security
--
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