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Message-ID: <5321B006.9070608@citrix.com>
Date: Thu, 13 Mar 2014 13:17:58 +0000
From: Zoltan Kiss <zoltan.kiss@...rix.com>
To: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@...rix.com>
CC: <wei.liu2@...rix.com>, <xen-devel@...ts.xenproject.org>,
<netdev@...r.kernel.org>, <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
<jonathan.davies@...rix.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH net-next v7 4/9] xen-netback: Introduce TX grant mapping
On 13/03/14 10:33, Ian Campbell wrote:
> On Thu, 2014-03-06 at 21:48 +0000, Zoltan Kiss wrote:
>> @@ -135,13 +146,31 @@ struct xenvif {
>> pending_ring_idx_t pending_cons;
>> u16 pending_ring[MAX_PENDING_REQS];
>> struct pending_tx_info pending_tx_info[MAX_PENDING_REQS];
>> + grant_handle_t grant_tx_handle[MAX_PENDING_REQS];
>>
>> /* Coalescing tx requests before copying makes number of grant
>> * copy ops greater or equal to number of slots required. In
>> * worst case a tx request consumes 2 gnttab_copy.
>> */
>> struct gnttab_copy tx_copy_ops[2*MAX_PENDING_REQS];
>> -
>> + struct gnttab_map_grant_ref tx_map_ops[MAX_PENDING_REQS];
>> + struct gnttab_unmap_grant_ref tx_unmap_ops[MAX_PENDING_REQS];
>
> I wonder if we should break some of these arrays into separate
> allocations? Wasn't there a problem with sizeof(struct xenvif) at one
> point?
tx_copy_ops will be removed in the next patch. Yes, for grant_copy_op we
allocate it separately, because it has MAX_SKB_FRAGS *
XEN_NETIF_RX_RING_SIZE elements, but that's for the RX thread
>
>> diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netback/interface.c b/drivers/net/xen-netback/interface.c
>> index bc32627..1fe9fe5 100644
>> --- a/drivers/net/xen-netback/interface.c
>> +++ b/drivers/net/xen-netback/interface.c
>> @@ -493,6 +533,23 @@ void xenvif_disconnect(struct xenvif *vif)
>>
>> void xenvif_free(struct xenvif *vif)
>> {
>> + int i, unmap_timeout = 0;
>> +
>> + for (i = 0; i < MAX_PENDING_REQS; ++i) {
>> + if (vif->grant_tx_handle[i] != NETBACK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
>> + unmap_timeout++;
>> + schedule_timeout(msecs_to_jiffies(1000));
>> + if (unmap_timeout > 9 &&
>> + net_ratelimit())
>
> Does this really reach 80 columns when unwrapped?
Not here, but in a later patch 9 will be replaced with
worst_case_skb_lifetime.
>
> (there seems to my eye to be a lot of overaggressive wrapping in this
> patch, but nevermind)
I tried to fix every warning and error noticed by checkpatch.pl, however
there are still a few lines longer than 80, just because I couldn't
reasonably wrap them.
>
>> + netdev_err(vif->dev,
>> + "Page still granted! Index: %x\n",
>> + i);
>> + i = -1;
>
> Should there not be a break here? Otherwise don't we restart the for
> loop from 0 again? If that is intentional then a comment would be very
> useful.
Yes, that's intentional, we shouldn't exit this loop until everything is
unmapped. An i-- would be fine as well. I will put a comment there.
>
>> @@ -919,11 +873,38 @@ err:
>> return NULL;
>> }
>>
>> +static inline void xenvif_grant_handle_set(struct xenvif *vif,
>> + u16 pending_idx,
>> + grant_handle_t handle)
>> +{
>> + if (unlikely(vif->grant_tx_handle[pending_idx] !=
>> + NETBACK_INVALID_HANDLE)) {
>> + netdev_err(vif->dev,
>
> Is this in any way guest triggerable? Needs to be ratelimited in that
> case (and arguably even if not?)
It shouldn't be guest triggerable. It only means netback really screwed
up the accounting of granted pages. There is a BUG right after it, and
the kernel should panic here. David suggested to replace this whole
stuff with a BUG_ON. One counterargument is that there is a slight
chance printing pending_idx can provide some useful info. At least back
in the beginning when I tried to fix some basic mistakes it was useful.
>
>> + "Trying to overwrite active handle! pending_idx: %x\n",
>> + pending_idx);
>> + BUG();
>> + }
>> + vif->grant_tx_handle[pending_idx] = handle;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static inline void xenvif_grant_handle_reset(struct xenvif *vif,
>> + u16 pending_idx)
>> +{
>> + if (unlikely(vif->grant_tx_handle[pending_idx] ==
>> + NETBACK_INVALID_HANDLE)) {
>> + netdev_err(vif->dev,
>
> Likewise.
>
>> + "Trying to unmap invalid handle! pending_idx: %x\n",
>> + pending_idx);
>> + BUG();
>> + }
>> + vif->grant_tx_handle[pending_idx] = NETBACK_INVALID_HANDLE;
>> +}
>> +
>> @@ -1001,6 +982,17 @@ static void xenvif_fill_frags(struct xenvif *vif, struct sk_buff *skb)
>>
>> pending_idx = frag_get_pending_idx(frag);
>>
>> + /* If this is not the first frag, chain it to the previous*/
>> + if (unlikely(prev_pending_idx == INVALID_PENDING_IDX))
>> + skb_shinfo(skb)->destructor_arg =
>> + &vif->pending_tx_info[pending_idx].callback_struct;
>> + else if (likely(pending_idx != prev_pending_idx))
>> + vif->pending_tx_info[prev_pending_idx].callback_struct.ctx =
>> + &(vif->pending_tx_info[pending_idx].callback_struct);
>
> #define callback_for(vif, pending_idx) .... would make this and a bunch
> of other places a lot less verbose IMHO.
Yeah, I was thinking about that, but it's really used here and 2 places
in tx_submit, so I didn't bother to do it.
>
>> + index = pending_index(vif->pending_prod);
>> + vif->pending_ring[index] = pending_idx;
>> + /* TX shouldn't use the index before we give it back here */
>
> I hope this comment refers to the pending_prod++ and not the mb(), since
> the barrier only guarantees visibility after that point, but not
> invisibility before this point.
Yes, the NAPI instance will use vif->pending_ring[index] only after
vif->pending_prod++, so the memory barrier makes sure that we set the
element in the ring first and then increase the producer.
>
> [...]
>> + /* Btw. already unmapped? */
>
> What does this comment mean? Is it a fixme? An indicator that
> xenvif_grant_handle_reset is supposed to handle this case or something
> else?
It comes from the time when xenvif_grant_handle_reset was not a
standalone function. Yes, it refers to the check in the beginning of
that function, and it should go there.
>
> I think there was another such comment earlier too.
>
>> + xenvif_grant_handle_reset(vif, pending_idx);
>> +
>> + ret = gnttab_unmap_refs(&tx_unmap_op, NULL,
>> + &vif->mmap_pages[pending_idx], 1);
>> + BUG_ON(ret);
>> +
>> + xenvif_idx_release(vif, pending_idx, XEN_NETIF_RSP_OKAY);
>> +}
>> +
>> static inline int rx_work_todo(struct xenvif *vif)
>> {
>> return !skb_queue_empty(&vif->rx_queue) &&
>
>
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