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Message-ID: <20140313141422.GB18914@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 13 Mar 2014 10:14:22 -0400
From: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@...hat.com>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
Cc: "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
cgroups@...r.kernel.org,
Network Development <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>, Tejun Heo <tj@...nel.org>,
ssorce@...hat.com, jkaluza@...hat.com, lpoetter@...hat.com,
kay@...hat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] net: Implement SO_PEERCGROUP
On Wed, Mar 12, 2014 at 02:12:33PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Wed, Mar 12, 2014 at 2:00 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net> wrote:
> > On 03/12/2014 01:46 PM, Vivek Goyal wrote:
> >> Implement SO_PEERCGROUP along the lines of SO_PEERCRED. This returns the
> >> cgroup of first mounted hierarchy of the task. For the case of client,
> >> it represents the cgroup of client at the time of opening the connection.
> >> After that client cgroup might change.
> >
> > Even if people decide that sending cgroups over a unix socket is a good
> > idea, this API has my NAK in the strongest possible sense, for whatever
> > my NAK is worth.
> >
> > IMO SO_PEERCRED is a disaster. Calling send(2) or write(2) should
> > *never* imply the use of a credential. A program should always have to
> > *explicitly* request use of a credential. What you want is SCM_CGROUP.
> >
> > (I've found privilege escalations before based on this observation, and
> > I suspect I'll find them again.)
> >
> >
> > Note that I think that you really want SCM_SOMETHING_ELSE and not
> > SCM_CGROUP, but I don't know what the use case is yet.
>
> This might not be quite as awful as I thought. At least you're
> looking up the cgroup at connection time instead of at send time.
>
> OTOH, this is still racy -- the socket could easily outlive the cgroup
> that created it.
That's a good point. What guarantees that previous cgroup was not
reassigned to a different container.
What if a process A opens the connection with sssd. Process A passes the
file descriptor to a different process B in a differnt container.
Process A exits. Container gets removed from system and new one gets
launched which uses same cgroup as old one. Now process B sends a new
request and SSSD will serve it based on policy of newly launched
container.
This sounds very similar to pid race where socket/connection will outlive
the pid.
Thanks
Vivek
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