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Message-ID: <1394746248.27846.3.camel@x230>
Date: Thu, 13 Mar 2014 21:30:48 +0000
From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@...ula.com>
To: "gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk" <gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>
CC: "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"jmorris@...ei.org" <jmorris@...ei.org>,
"keescook@...omium.org" <keescook@...omium.org>,
"linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org"
<linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
"akpm@...ux-foundation.org" <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
"hpa@...or.com" <hpa@...or.com>,
"jwboyer@...oraproject.org" <jwboyer@...oraproject.org>,
"linux-efi@...r.kernel.org" <linux-efi@...r.kernel.org>,
"gregkh@...uxfoundation.org" <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: Trusted kernel patchset for Secure Boot lockdown
On Thu, 2014-03-13 at 21:24 +0000, One Thousand Gnomes wrote:
> If I have CAP_SYS_RAWIO I can make arbitary ring 0 calls from userspace,
> trivially and in a fashion well known and documented.
How?
> You've missed a few others too - mem= (especially with exactmap) for
> example.
/dev/mem access is restricted, so what would this buy you? The potential
to have the kernel hand over a region belonging to hardware in response
to a userspace allocation?
--
Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@...ula.com>
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