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Message-ID: <1394746362.27846.5.camel@x230>
Date: Thu, 13 Mar 2014 21:32:42 +0000
From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@...ula.com>
To: "hpa@...or.com" <hpa@...or.com>
CC: "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"jmorris@...ei.org" <jmorris@...ei.org>,
"keescook@...omium.org" <keescook@...omium.org>,
"linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org"
<linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
"akpm@...ux-foundation.org" <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
"jwboyer@...oraproject.org" <jwboyer@...oraproject.org>,
"gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk" <gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
"linux-efi@...r.kernel.org" <linux-efi@...r.kernel.org>,
"gregkh@...uxfoundation.org" <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: Trusted kernel patchset for Secure Boot lockdown
On Thu, 2014-03-13 at 14:28 -0700, H. Peter Anvin wrote:
> On 03/13/2014 02:24 PM, One Thousand Gnomes wrote:
> >
> > If I have CAP_SYS_RAWIO I can make arbitary ring 0 calls from userspace,
> > trivially and in a fashion well known and documented.
> >
>
> ... and once we eliminate CAP_SYS_RAWIO a bunch of the patches become
> redundant.
We can only drop CAP_SYS_RAWIO if we change a bunch of the existing
CAP_SYS_RAWIO checks to something else. How do we do that without
breaking existing userspace?
--
Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@...ula.com>
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