[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <1394812682.26846.5.camel@x230.mview.int.nebula.com>
Date: Fri, 14 Mar 2014 15:58:02 +0000
From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@...ula.com>
To: "keescook@...omium.org" <keescook@...omium.org>
CC: "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"jmorris@...ei.org" <jmorris@...ei.org>,
"linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org"
<linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
"akpm@...ux-foundation.org" <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
"hpa@...or.com" <hpa@...or.com>,
"jwboyer@...oraproject.org" <jwboyer@...oraproject.org>,
"gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk" <gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
"linux-efi@...r.kernel.org" <linux-efi@...r.kernel.org>,
"gregkh@...uxfoundation.org" <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: Trusted kernel patchset for Secure Boot lockdown
On Fri, 2014-03-14 at 08:54 -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> All the more reason to ignore command line at this point. For Chrome
> OS, it's part of our boot state, so we don't care about it. For
> generic Secure Boot, we can add checks for dangerous stuff as we go
> forward. That's why I like this interface -- we can add to it as we
> identify bad stuff, and it stay separate from other semantics.
Sure, it's just another reason not to want to use a capability-based
interface - not all the policy we want to impose is related to
processes, so capabilities really don't make sense. The current patchset
adds a restriction to the acpi_rsdp argument, and I've no objection to
adding one to limit the use of mem=.
--
Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@...ula.com>
Powered by blists - more mailing lists