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Message-ID: <1394825094.1286.1.camel@x230>
Date: Fri, 14 Mar 2014 19:24:55 +0000
From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@...ula.com>
To: "gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk" <gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>
CC: "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"jmorris@...ei.org" <jmorris@...ei.org>,
"keescook@...omium.org" <keescook@...omium.org>,
"linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org"
<linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
"akpm@...ux-foundation.org" <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
"hpa@...or.com" <hpa@...or.com>,
"jwboyer@...oraproject.org" <jwboyer@...oraproject.org>,
"linux-efi@...r.kernel.org" <linux-efi@...r.kernel.org>,
"gregkh@...uxfoundation.org" <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: Trusted kernel patchset for Secure Boot lockdown
On Fri, 2014-03-14 at 14:11 -0400, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> The fact that you keep saying measured really does make me suspect that
> you misunderstand the problem. There's no measurement involved, there's
> simply an assertion that the firmware (which you're forced to trust)
> chose, via some policy you may be unaware of, to trust the booted
> kernel.
As an example, imagine a platform with the bootloader and kernel on
read-only media. The platform can assert that the kernel is trusted even
if there's no measurement of the kernel.
--
Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@...ula.com>
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