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Message-Id: <1395099390-807-4-git-send-email-hpa@linux.intel.com>
Date:	Mon, 17 Mar 2014 16:36:29 -0700
From:	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...ux.intel.com>
To:	Ted Ts'o <tytso@....edu>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Cc:	Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@...nel.crashing.org>,
	Paul Mackerras <paulus@...ba.org>,
	Michael Ellerman <michael@...erman.id.au>,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...ux.intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 3/4] random: If we have arch_get_random_seed*(), try it before blocking

If we have arch_get_random_seed*(), try to use it for emergency refill
of the entropy pool before giving up and blocking on /dev/random.  It
may or may not work in the moment, but if it does work, it will give
the user better service than blocking will.

Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@...ux.intel.com>
---
 drivers/char/random.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index a4bea77..c35cee2 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -1294,6 +1294,34 @@ void rand_initialize_disk(struct gendisk *disk)
 }
 #endif
 
+/*
+ * Attempt an emergency refill using arch_get_random_seed_long().
+ *
+ * As with add_interrupt_randomness() be paranoid and only
+ * credit the output as 50% entropic.
+ */
+static int arch_random_refill(void)
+{
+	const unsigned int nlongs = 64;	/* Arbitrary number */
+	unsigned int n = 0;
+	unsigned int i;
+	unsigned long buf[nlongs];
+
+	for (i = 0; i < nlongs; i++) {
+		if (arch_get_random_seed_long(&buf[n]))
+			n++;
+	}
+
+	if (n) {
+		unsigned int rand_bytes = n * sizeof(unsigned long);
+
+		mix_pool_bytes(&input_pool, buf, rand_bytes, NULL);
+		credit_entropy_bits(&input_pool, rand_bytes*4);
+	}
+
+	return n;
+}
+
 static ssize_t
 random_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos)
 {
@@ -1312,8 +1340,13 @@ random_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos)
 				  ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool));
 		if (n > 0)
 			return n;
+
 		/* Pool is (near) empty.  Maybe wait and retry. */
 
+		/* First try an emergency refill */
+		if (arch_random_refill())
+			continue;
+
 		if (file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK)
 			return -EAGAIN;
 
-- 
1.8.5.3

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