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Date: Thu, 20 Mar 2014 16:48:30 +0100 From: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@...il.com> To: tytso@....edu, David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@...il.com>, linux-kernel <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, Hugh Dickins <hughd@...gle.com>, Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>, Karol Lewandowski <k.lewandowsk@...sung.com>, Kay Sievers <kay@...y.org>, Daniel Mack <zonque@...il.com>, Lennart Poettering <lennart@...ttering.net>, John Stultz <john.stultz@...aro.org>, Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@...ah.com>, Tejun Heo <tj@...nel.org>, Johannes Weiner <hannes@...xchg.org>, "dri-devel@...ts.freedesktop.org" <dri-devel@...ts.freedesktop.org>, linux-fsdevel <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>, linux-mm <linux-mm@...ck.org>, Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>, Ryan Lortie <desrt@...rt.ca>, "Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)" <mtk.manpages@...il.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/6] File Sealing & memfd_create() Hi On Thu, Mar 20, 2014 at 4:32 PM, <tytso@....edu> wrote: > Why not make sealing an attribute of the "struct file", and enforce it > at the VFS layer? That way all file system objects would have access > to sealing interface, and for memfd_shmem, you can't get another > struct file pointing at the object, the security properties would be > identical. Sealing as introduced here is an inode-attribute, not "struct file". This is intentional. For instance, a gfx-client can get a read-only FD via /proc/self/fd/ and pass it to the compositor so it can never overwrite the contents (unless the compositor has write-access to the inode itself, in which case it can just re-open it read-write). Furthermore, I don't see any use-case besides memfd for sealing, so I purposely avoided changing core VFS interfaces. Protecting page-allocation/access for SEAL_WRITE like I do in shmem.c is not that easy to do generically. So if we moved this interface to "struct inode", all that would change is moving "u32 seals;" from one struct to the other. Ok, some protections might get easily implemented generically, but I without proper insight in the underlying implemenation, I couldn't verify all paths and possible races. Isn't keeping the API generic enough so far? Changing the underlying implementation can be done once we know what we want. Thanks David -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
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