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Date: Fri, 11 Apr 2014 14:51:11 -0700
From: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
To: Lukasz Pawelczyk <l.pawelczyk@...tner.samsung.com>,
James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
CC: r.krypa@...sung.com, t.swierczek@...sung.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/3] Smack: unify all ptrace accesses in the smack
On 3/11/2014 9:07 AM, Lukasz Pawelczyk wrote:
> The decision whether we can trace a process is made in the following
> functions:
> smack_ptrace_traceme()
> smack_ptrace_access_check()
> smack_bprm_set_creds() (in case the proces is traced)
>
> This patch unifies all those decisions by introducing one function that
> checks whether ptrace is allowed: smk_ptrace_rule_check().
>
> This makes possible to actually trace with TRACEME where first the
> TRACEME itself must be allowed and then exec() on a traced process.
>
> Additional bugs fixed:
> - The decision is made according to the mode parameter that is now correctly
> translated from PTRACE_MODE_* to MAY_* instead of being treated 1:1.
> PTRACE_MODE_READ requires MAY_READ.
> PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH requires MAY_READWRITE.
> - Add a smack audit log in case of exec() refused by bprm_set_creds().
> - Honor the PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT flag and don't put smack audit info
> in case this flag is set.
>
> Signed-off-by: Lukasz Pawelczyk <l.pawelczyk@...tner.samsung.com>
> Signed-off-by: Rafal Krypa <r.krypa@...sung.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
Applied to git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git smack-for-3.16
> ---
> security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 84 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
> 1 file changed, 71 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> index 48d61f6..3da13fd 100644
> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> @@ -157,6 +157,54 @@ static int smk_copy_rules(struct list_head *nhead, struct list_head *ohead,
> return rc;
> }
>
> +/**
> + * smk_ptrace_mode - helper function for converting PTRACE_MODE_* into MAY_*
> + * @mode - input mode in form of PTRACE_MODE_*
> + *
> + * Returns a converted MAY_* mode usable by smack rules
> + */
> +static inline unsigned int smk_ptrace_mode(unsigned int mode)
> +{
> + switch (mode) {
> + case PTRACE_MODE_READ:
> + return MAY_READ;
> + case PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH:
> + return MAY_READWRITE;
> + }
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * smk_ptrace_rule_check - helper for ptrace access
> + * @tracer: tracer process
> + * @tracee_label: label of the process that's about to be traced
> + * @mode: ptrace attachment mode (PTRACE_MODE_*)
> + * @func: name of the function that called us, used for audit
> + *
> + * Returns 0 on access granted, -error on error
> + */
> +static int smk_ptrace_rule_check(struct task_struct *tracer, char *tracee_label,
> + unsigned int mode, const char *func)
> +{
> + int rc;
> + struct smk_audit_info ad, *saip = NULL;
> + struct task_smack *tsp;
> + struct smack_known *skp;
> +
> + if ((mode & PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT) == 0) {
> + smk_ad_init(&ad, func, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
> + smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, tracer);
> + saip = &ad;
> + }
> +
> + tsp = task_security(tracer);
> + skp = smk_of_task(tsp);
> +
> + rc = smk_tskacc(tsp, tracee_label, smk_ptrace_mode(mode), saip);
> + return rc;
> +}
> +
> /*
> * LSM hooks.
> * We he, that is fun!
> @@ -165,16 +213,15 @@ static int smk_copy_rules(struct list_head *nhead, struct list_head *ohead,
> /**
> * smack_ptrace_access_check - Smack approval on PTRACE_ATTACH
> * @ctp: child task pointer
> - * @mode: ptrace attachment mode
> + * @mode: ptrace attachment mode (PTRACE_MODE_*)
> *
> * Returns 0 if access is OK, an error code otherwise
> *
> - * Do the capability checks, and require read and write.
> + * Do the capability checks.
> */
> static int smack_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode)
> {
> int rc;
> - struct smk_audit_info ad;
> struct smack_known *skp;
>
> rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(ctp, mode);
> @@ -182,10 +229,8 @@ static int smack_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode)
> return rc;
>
> skp = smk_of_task(task_security(ctp));
> - smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
> - smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, ctp);
>
> - rc = smk_curacc(skp->smk_known, mode, &ad);
> + rc = smk_ptrace_rule_check(current, skp->smk_known, mode, __func__);
> return rc;
> }
>
> @@ -195,12 +240,11 @@ static int smack_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode)
> *
> * Returns 0 if access is OK, an error code otherwise
> *
> - * Do the capability checks, and require read and write.
> + * Do the capability checks, and require PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH.
> */
> static int smack_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *ptp)
> {
> int rc;
> - struct smk_audit_info ad;
> struct smack_known *skp;
>
> rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(ptp);
> @@ -208,10 +252,9 @@ static int smack_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *ptp)
> return rc;
>
> skp = smk_of_task(current_security());
> - smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
> - smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, ptp);
>
> - rc = smk_tskacc(ptp, skp->smk_known, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
> + rc = smk_ptrace_rule_check(ptp, skp->smk_known,
> + PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH, __func__);
> return rc;
> }
>
> @@ -453,7 +496,7 @@ static int smack_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
> * smack_bprm_set_creds - set creds for exec
> * @bprm: the exec information
> *
> - * Returns 0 if it gets a blob, -ENOMEM otherwise
> + * Returns 0 if it gets a blob, -EPERM if exec forbidden and -ENOMEM otherwise
> */
> static int smack_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
> {
> @@ -473,7 +516,22 @@ static int smack_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
> if (isp->smk_task == NULL || isp->smk_task == bsp->smk_task)
> return 0;
>
> - if (bprm->unsafe)
> + if (bprm->unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
> + struct task_struct *tracer;
> + rc = 0;
> +
> + rcu_read_lock();
> + tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
> + if (likely(tracer != NULL))
> + rc = smk_ptrace_rule_check(tracer,
> + isp->smk_task->smk_known,
> + PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH,
> + __func__);
> + rcu_read_unlock();
> +
> + if (rc != 0)
> + return rc;
> + } else if (bprm->unsafe)
> return -EPERM;
>
> bsp->smk_task = isp->smk_task;
--
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