| lists.openwall.net | lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC | |
|
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
| ||
|
Date: Mon, 14 Apr 2014 14:20:24 -0700
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org
Cc: Rabin Vincent <rabin@....in>, Laura Abbott <lauraa@...eaurora.org>,
Alexander Holler <holler@...oftware.de>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>,
Russell King <linux@....linux.org.uk>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Subject: [PATCH v2 2/2] ARM: mm: allow text and rodata sections to be read-only
This introduces CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA, making kernel text and rodata
read-only. Additionally, this splits rodata from text so that rodata can
also be NX, which may lead to wasted memory when aligning to SECTION_SIZE.
The read-only areas are made writable during ftrace updates. Additional
work is needed for kprobes and kexec, so the feature is temporarily
marked as unavailable in Kconfig when those options are selected.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
---
v2:
- added additional TLB flush; Rabin Vincent.
---
arch/arm/include/asm/cacheflush.h | 9 ++++++++
arch/arm/kernel/ftrace.c | 19 +++++++++++++++
arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 3 +++
arch/arm/mm/Kconfig | 12 ++++++++++
arch/arm/mm/init.c | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
5 files changed, 89 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/cacheflush.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/cacheflush.h
index 8b8b61685a34..b6fea0a1a88b 100644
--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/cacheflush.h
+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/cacheflush.h
@@ -487,4 +487,13 @@ int set_memory_rw(unsigned long addr, int numpages);
int set_memory_x(unsigned long addr, int numpages);
int set_memory_nx(unsigned long addr, int numpages);
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
+void mark_rodata_ro(void);
+void set_kernel_text_rw(void);
+void set_kernel_text_ro(void);
+#else
+static inline void set_kernel_text_rw(void) { }
+static inline void set_kernel_text_ro(void) { }
+#endif
+
#endif
diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/ftrace.c b/arch/arm/kernel/ftrace.c
index af9a8a927a4e..b8c75e45a950 100644
--- a/arch/arm/kernel/ftrace.c
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/ftrace.c
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
#include <linux/ftrace.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/stop_machine.h>
#include <asm/cacheflush.h>
#include <asm/opcodes.h>
@@ -35,6 +36,22 @@
#define OLD_NOP 0xe1a00000 /* mov r0, r0 */
+static int __ftrace_modify_code(void *data)
+{
+ int *command = data;
+
+ set_kernel_text_rw();
+ ftrace_modify_all_code(*command);
+ set_kernel_text_ro();
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void arch_ftrace_update_code(int command)
+{
+ stop_machine(__ftrace_modify_code, &command, NULL);
+}
+
static unsigned long ftrace_nop_replace(struct dyn_ftrace *rec)
{
return rec->arch.old_mcount ? OLD_NOP : NOP;
@@ -73,6 +90,8 @@ int ftrace_arch_code_modify_prepare(void)
int ftrace_arch_code_modify_post_process(void)
{
set_all_modules_text_ro();
+ /* Make sure any TLB misses during machine stop are cleared. */
+ flush_tlb_all();
return 0;
}
diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S b/arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
index 08fa667ef2f1..ec79e7268e09 100644
--- a/arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
@@ -120,6 +120,9 @@ SECTIONS
ARM_CPU_KEEP(PROC_INFO)
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
+ . = ALIGN(1<<SECTION_SHIFT);
+#endif
RO_DATA(PAGE_SIZE)
. = ALIGN(4);
diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/Kconfig b/arch/arm/mm/Kconfig
index b484fb04cf6f..e767ab6e1c27 100644
--- a/arch/arm/mm/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm/mm/Kconfig
@@ -966,3 +966,15 @@ config ARM_KERNMEM_PERMS
padded to section-size (1MiB) boundaries (because their permissions
are different and splitting the 1M pages into 4K ones causes TLB
performance problems), wasting memory.
+
+config DEBUG_RODATA
+ bool "Make kernel text and rodata read-only"
+ depends on ARM_KERNMEM_PERMS && KEXEC=n && KPROBES=n
+ default y
+ help
+ If this is set, kernel text and rodata will be made read-only. This
+ is to help catch accidental or malicious attempts to change the
+ kernel's executable code. Additionally splits rodata from kernel
+ text so it can be made explicitly non-executable. This creates
+ another section-size padded region, so it can waste more memory
+ space while gaining the read-only protections.
diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/init.c b/arch/arm/mm/init.c
index 66a7283583cd..74647a4f1af4 100644
--- a/arch/arm/mm/init.c
+++ b/arch/arm/mm/init.c
@@ -634,6 +634,7 @@ struct section_perm {
unsigned long end;
pmdval_t mask;
pmdval_t prot;
+ pmdval_t clear;
};
struct section_perm nx_perms[] = {
@@ -651,8 +652,35 @@ struct section_perm nx_perms[] = {
.mask = ~PMD_SECT_XN,
.prot = PMD_SECT_XN,
},
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
+ /* Make rodata NX (set RO in ro_perms below). */
+ {
+ .start = (unsigned long)__start_rodata,
+ .end = (unsigned long)__init_begin,
+ .mask = ~PMD_SECT_XN,
+ .prot = PMD_SECT_XN,
+ },
+#endif
};
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
+struct section_perm ro_perms[] = {
+ /* Make kernel code and rodata RX (set RO). */
+ {
+ .start = (unsigned long)_stext,
+ .end = (unsigned long)__init_begin,
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARM_LPAE
+ .mask = ~PMD_SECT_RDONLY,
+ .prot = PMD_SECT_RDONLY,
+#else
+ .mask = ~(PMD_SECT_APX | PMD_SECT_AP_WRITE),
+ .prot = PMD_SECT_APX | PMD_SECT_AP_WRITE,
+ .clear = PMD_SECT_AP_WRITE,
+#endif
+ },
+};
+#endif
+
/*
* Updates section permissions only for the current mm (sections are
* copied into each mm). During startup, this is the init_mm.
@@ -721,6 +749,24 @@ static inline void fix_kernmem_perms(void)
{
set_section_perms(nx_perms, prot);
}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
+void mark_rodata_ro(void)
+{
+ set_section_perms(ro_perms, prot);
+}
+
+void set_kernel_text_rw(void)
+{
+ set_section_perms(ro_perms, clear);
+}
+
+void set_kernel_text_ro(void)
+{
+ set_section_perms(ro_perms, prot);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA */
+
#else
static inline void fix_kernmem_perms(void) { }
#endif /* CONFIG_ARM_KERNMEM_PERMS */
--
1.7.9.5
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Powered by blists - more mailing lists