linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 0/6][v2] audit: implement multicast socket for journald

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Message-ID: <1398225475.750.7.camel@localhost>
Date:	Tue, 22 Apr 2014 23:57:55 -0400
From:	Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>
To:	Steve Grubb <sgrubb@...hat.com>
Cc:	Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@...hat.com>, linux-audit@...hat.com,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
	selinux@...ho.nsa.gov, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
	davem@...emloft.net, jamal@...atatu.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/6][v2] audit: implement multicast socket for journald

On Tue, 2014-04-22 at 22:25 -0400, Steve Grubb wrote:
> On Tuesday, April 22, 2014 09:31:52 PM Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
> > This is a patch set Eric Paris and I have been working on to add a
> > restricted capability read-only netlink multicast socket to kernel audit to
> > enable userspace clients such as systemd/journald to receive audit logs, in
> > addition to the bidirectional auditd userspace client.
> 
> Do have the ability to separate of secadm_r and sysadm_r? By allowing this, we 
> will leak to a sysadmin that he is being audited by the security officer. In a 
> lot of cases, they are one in the same person. But for others, they are not. I 
> have a feeling this will cause problems for MLS systems.

Why?  This requires CAP_AUDIT_READ.  Just don't give CAP_AUDIT_READ to
places you don't want to have read permission.  Exactly the same as you
don't give CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL to sysadm_r.  (If we are giving
CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL to sysadm_r and you think that any file protections
on /var/log/audit/audit.log are adequate we are fooling ourselves!)

> Also, shouldn't we have an audit event for every attempt to connect to this 
> socket? We really need to know where this information is getting leaked to.

We certainly can.  What would you like to see in that event?

-Eric

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