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Message-id: <f793666712900a3d339371a54cb2fc1e24f48827.1398259638.git.d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Date: Wed, 23 Apr 2014 16:30:27 +0300
From: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@...sung.com>
To: zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com, dhowells@...hat.com, jmorris@...ei.org
Cc: roberto.sassu@...ito.it, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@...sung.com>
Subject: [PATCH 09/20] evm: create '_evm' as a builtin 'trusted' keyring
Require all keys added to the EVM keyring be signed by an
existing trusted key on the system trusted keyring.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@...sung.com>
---
security/integrity/evm/Kconfig | 8 ++++++++
security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 2 ++
2 files changed, 10 insertions(+)
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig b/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig
index df20a2f..3f9098c6 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig
@@ -43,3 +43,11 @@ config EVM_EXTRA_SMACK_XATTRS
additional info to the calculation, requires existing EVM
labeled file systems to be relabeled.
+config EVM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+ bool "Require all keys on the _evm keyring be signed"
+ depends on EVM && SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+ select INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+ default n
+ help
+ This option requires that all keys added to the _evm
+ keyring be signed by a key on the system trusted keyring.
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index 4c00adb..8a11920 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -447,6 +447,8 @@ static int __init init_evm(void)
evm_init_config();
+ integrity_init_keyring(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_EVM);
+
error = evm_init_secfs();
if (error < 0) {
pr_info("Error registering secfs\n");
--
1.8.3.2
--
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