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Message-id: <b2706d6bb3a8e94277d7136bd15c1ef481fd124f.1398259638.git.d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Date: Wed, 23 Apr 2014 16:30:25 +0300
From: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@...sung.com>
To: zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com, dhowells@...hat.com, jmorris@...ei.org
Cc: roberto.sassu@...ito.it, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@...sung.com>
Subject: [PATCH 07/20] integrity: provide x509 certificate loading from the
kernel
Provide API to load x509 certificates from the kernel into the
integrity kernel keyrings.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@...sung.com>
---
security/integrity/Kconfig | 4 +++
security/integrity/digsig.c | 72 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/integrity/integrity.h | 10 ++++++
3 files changed, 86 insertions(+)
diff --git a/security/integrity/Kconfig b/security/integrity/Kconfig
index 89f226a..8f34b28 100644
--- a/security/integrity/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/Kconfig
@@ -51,6 +51,10 @@ config INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
def_bool n
depends on IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING || EVM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+config INTEGRITY_LOAD_X509
+ def_bool n
+ depends on IMA_LOAD_X509 || EVM_LOAD_X509
+
source security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
source security/integrity/evm/Kconfig
diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c
index 45adc07..cba38e3 100644
--- a/security/integrity/digsig.c
+++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c
@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@
#include <linux/cred.h>
#include <linux/key-type.h>
#include <linux/digsig.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/file.h>
#include "integrity.h"
@@ -59,6 +61,76 @@ int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_LOAD_X509
+int integrity_read_file(const char *path, char **data)
+{
+ struct file *file;
+ loff_t size;
+ char *buf;
+ int rc = -EINVAL;
+
+ file = filp_open(path, O_RDONLY, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(file))
+ return PTR_ERR(file);
+
+ size = i_size_read(file_inode(file));
+ if (size <= 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ buf = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!buf) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ rc = kernel_read(file, 0, buf, size);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ kfree(buf);
+ else if (rc != size)
+ rc = -EIO;
+ else
+ *data = buf;
+out:
+ fput(file);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+int integrity_load_x509(const unsigned int id, char *path)
+{
+ key_ref_t key;
+ char *data;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (!keyring[id])
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ rc = integrity_read_file(path, &data);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ return rc;
+
+ key = key_create_or_update(make_key_ref(keyring[id], 1),
+ "asymmetric",
+ NULL,
+ data,
+ rc,
+ ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
+ KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ),
+ KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA |
+ KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED);
+ if (IS_ERR(key)) {
+ rc = PTR_ERR(key);
+ pr_err("Problem loading X.509 certificate (%d): %s\n",
+ rc, path);
+ } else {
+ pr_notice("Loaded X.509 cert '%s': %s\n",
+ key_ref_to_ptr(key)->description, path);
+ key_ref_put(key);
+ }
+ kfree(data);
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
int integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id)
{
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index dd26ad0..96960fb 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -146,6 +146,16 @@ static inline int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig,
}
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_LOAD_X509
+int integrity_read_file(const char *path, char **data);
+int integrity_load_x509(const unsigned int id, char *path);
+#else
+static inline int integrity_load_x509(const unsigned int id, char *path)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
int integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id);
#else
--
1.8.3.2
--
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