| lists.openwall.net | lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC | |
|
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
| ||
|
Date: Thu, 24 Apr 2014 23:07:35 +0300
From: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com>
To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@...sung.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...ito.it>,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 01/20] KEYS: verify a certificate is signed by a 'trusted' key
On 24 April 2014 19:53, Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:
> On Wed, 2014-04-23 at 16:30 +0300, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
>> From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
>>
>> Only public keys, with certificates signed by an existing
>> 'trusted' key on the system trusted keyring, should be added
>> to a trusted keyring. This patch adds support for verifying
>> a certificate's signature.
>>
>> This is derived from David Howells pkcs7_request_asymmetric_key() patch.
>>
>> Changes:
>> - Flaged out the code to prevent build break if system keyring
>> is not enabled (Dmitry).
>
> An updated version of this patch was posted, which resolves the Kconfig
> issues. There are a number of other issues which need to be addressed,
> before this patch can be upstreamed. Please refer to the patch
> description for more details -
> http://marc.info/?l=linux-security-module&m=138672063109662&w=2
>
Oh. I was using this patch from your public tree..
Updated version is missing there and I missed it out.
Will rebase on the top of it as soon as it is available.
> Reminder, as per Documentation/SubmittingPatches: "#ifdefs are ugly",
> please no ifdefs in C code.
>
Right, we know it.
Making separate C file for one function isn't ugly?
- Dmitry
> thanks,
>
> Mimi
>
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
>> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@...sung.com>
>> ---
>> crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c | 85 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
>> 1 file changed, 84 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
>> index 382ef0d..d279f43 100644
>> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
>> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
>> @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
>> #include <linux/asn1_decoder.h>
>> #include <keys/asymmetric-subtype.h>
>> #include <keys/asymmetric-parser.h>
>> +#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
>> #include <crypto/hash.h>
>> #include "asymmetric_keys.h"
>> #include "public_key.h"
>> @@ -102,6 +103,82 @@ int x509_check_signature(const struct public_key *pub,
>> }
>> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x509_check_signature);
>>
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
>> +/*
>> + * Find a key in the given keyring by issuer and authority.
>> + */
>> +static struct key *x509_request_asymmetric_key(
>> + struct key *keyring,
>> + const char *signer, size_t signer_len,
>> + const char *authority, size_t auth_len)
>> +{
>> + key_ref_t key;
>> + char *id;
>> +
>> + /* Construct an identifier. */
>> + id = kmalloc(signer_len + 2 + auth_len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
>> + if (!id)
>> + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
>> +
>> + memcpy(id, signer, signer_len);
>> + id[signer_len + 0] = ':';
>> + id[signer_len + 1] = ' ';
>> + memcpy(id + signer_len + 2, authority, auth_len);
>> + id[signer_len + 2 + auth_len] = 0;
>> +
>> + pr_debug("Look up: \"%s\"\n", id);
>> +
>> + key = keyring_search(make_key_ref(keyring, 1),
>> + &key_type_asymmetric, id);
>> + if (IS_ERR(key))
>> + pr_debug("Request for module key '%s' err %ld\n",
>> + id, PTR_ERR(key));
>> + kfree(id);
>> +
>> + if (IS_ERR(key)) {
>> + switch (PTR_ERR(key)) {
>> + /* Hide some search errors */
>> + case -EACCES:
>> + case -ENOTDIR:
>> + case -EAGAIN:
>> + return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
>> + default:
>> + return ERR_CAST(key);
>> + }
>> + }
>> +
>> + pr_devel("<==%s() = 0 [%x]\n", __func__, key_serial(key_ref_to_ptr(key)));
>> + return key_ref_to_ptr(key);
>> +}
>> +
>> +/*
>> + * Check the new certificate against the ones in the trust keyring. If one of
>> + * those is the signing key and validates the new certificate, then mark the
>> + * new certificate as being trusted.
>> + *
>> + * Return 0 if the new certificate was successfully validated, 1 if we couldn't
>> + * find a matching parent certificate in the trusted list and an error if there
>> + * is a matching certificate but the signature check fails.
>> + */
>> +static int x509_validate_trust(struct x509_certificate *cert,
>> + struct key *trust_keyring)
>> +{
>> + const struct public_key *pk;
>> + struct key *key;
>> + int ret = 1;
>> +
>> + key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring,
>> + cert->issuer, strlen(cert->issuer),
>> + cert->authority,
>> + strlen(cert->authority));
>> + if (!IS_ERR(key)) {
>> + pk = key->payload.data;
>> + ret = x509_check_signature(pk, cert);
>> + }
>> + return ret;
>> +}
>> +#endif
>> +
>> /*
>> * Attempt to parse a data blob for a key as an X509 certificate.
>> */
>> @@ -155,9 +232,15 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
>> /* Check the signature on the key if it appears to be self-signed */
>> if (!cert->authority ||
>> strcmp(cert->fingerprint, cert->authority) == 0) {
>> - ret = x509_check_signature(cert->pub, cert);
>> + ret = x509_check_signature(cert->pub, cert); /* self-signed */
>> if (ret < 0)
>> goto error_free_cert;
>> + } else {
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
>> + ret = x509_validate_trust(cert, system_trusted_keyring);
>> + if (!ret)
>> + prep->trusted = 1;
>> +#endif
>> }
>>
>> /* Propose a description */
>
>
> --
> To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in
> the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
> More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
--
Thanks,
Dmitry
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Powered by blists - more mailing lists