Date:	Thu, 24 Apr 2014 17:03:59 -0400
From:	Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
To:	Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@...sung.com>
Cc:	dhowells@...hat.com, jmorris@...ei.org, roberto.sassu@...ito.it,
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 15/20] ima: path based policy loading interface

On Wed, 2014-04-23 at 16:30 +0300, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote: 
> Currently policy is loaded by writing policy content to
> '<securityfs>/ima/policy' file.
> 
> This patch extends policy loading meachanism with possibility
> to load signed policy using a path to the policy.
> Policy signature must be available in the <policy>.sig file.

Assuming (big assumption) you're permitted to open the policy file from
the kernel, why are you verifying the signature inline based on a .sig?
Shouldn't this be a new integrity/security hook?

thanks,

Mimi

> 
> Policy can be loaded like:
> echo /etc/ima/ima_policy > /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy
> 
> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@...sung.com>
> ---
>  security/integrity/ima/Kconfig      | 13 +++++++
>  security/integrity/ima/ima.h        |  9 +++++
>  security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c     |  2 +-
>  security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 74 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  4 files changed, 97 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
> index 5474c47..465cef4 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
> @@ -140,3 +140,16 @@ config IMA_LOAD_X509
>  	help
>  	   This option enables X509 certificate loading from the kernel
>  	   to the '_ima' trusted keyring.
> +
> +config IMA_POLICY_LOADER
> +	bool "Path based policy loading interface"
> +	depends on IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING
> +	default n
> +	help
> +	  This option enables path based signed policy loading interface.
> +	  Policy signature must be provided in the <policy>.sig file
> +	  along with the policy. When this option is enabled, kernel
> +	  tries to load default policy from /etc/ima_policy.
> +
> +	  Loading policy is like:
> +	  echo /etc/ima/ima_policy > /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> index 3b90b60..f2722bb 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> @@ -170,6 +170,15 @@ bool ima_default_policy(void);
>  ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *);
>  void ima_delete_rules(void);
> 
> +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_POLICY_LOADER
> +ssize_t ima_read_policy(char *path);
> +#else
> +static inline ssize_t ima_read_policy(char *data)
> +{
> +	return ima_parse_add_rule(data);
> +}
> +#endif
> +
>  /* Appraise integrity measurements */
>  #define IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE	0x01
>  #define IMA_APPRAISE_FIX	0x02
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
> index 34ae5f2..bde7a0e 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
> @@ -273,7 +273,7 @@ static ssize_t ima_write_policy(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
>  	if (copy_from_user(data, buf, datalen))
>  		goto out;
> 
> -	result = ima_parse_add_rule(data);
> +	result = ima_read_policy(data);
>  out:
>  	if (result < 0)
>  		valid_policy = 0;
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> index b24e7d1..c6da801 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> @@ -17,6 +17,9 @@
>  #include <linux/parser.h>
>  #include <linux/slab.h>
>  #include <linux/genhd.h>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_POLICY_LOADER
> +#include <linux/file.h>
> +#endif
> 
>  #include "ima.h"
> 
> @@ -747,3 +750,74 @@ void ima_delete_rules(void)
>  	}
>  	mutex_unlock(&ima_rules_mutex);
>  }
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_POLICY_LOADER
> +
> +ssize_t ima_read_policy(char *path)
> +{
> +	char *data, *datap, *sig;
> +	int rc, psize, pathlen = strlen(path);
> +	char *p, *sigpath;
> +	struct {
> +		struct ima_digest_data hdr;
> +		char digest[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
> +	} hash;
> +
> +	if (path[0] != '/')
> +		return ima_parse_add_rule(path);
> +
> +	/* remove \n */
> +	datap = path;
> +	strsep(&datap, "\n");
> +
> +	/* we always want signature? */
> +	sigpath = __getname();
> +	if (!sigpath)
> +		return -ENOMEM;
> +
> +	rc = integrity_read_file(path, &data);
> +	if (rc < 0)
> +		goto free_path;
> +
> +	psize = rc;
> +	datap = data;
> +
> +	sprintf(sigpath, "%s.sig", path);
> +	/* we always want signature? */
> +	rc = integrity_read_file(sigpath, &sig);
> +	if (rc < 0)
> +		goto free_data;
> +
> +	hash.hdr.algo = ima_hash_algo;
> +	ima_get_hash_algo((void *)sig, rc, &hash.hdr);
> +	ima_calc_buffer_hash(data, psize, &hash.hdr);
> +	rc = integrity_digsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA,
> +				     (const char *)sig, rc,
> +				     hash.hdr.digest, hash.hdr.length);
> +	if (rc) {
> +		pr_err("integrity_digsig_verify() = %d\n", rc);
> +		goto free_sig;
> +	}
> +
> +	while (psize > 0 && (p = strsep(&datap, "\n"))) {
> +		pr_debug("rule: %s\n", p);
> +		rc = ima_parse_add_rule(p);
> +		if (rc < 0)
> +			break;
> +		psize -= rc;
> +	}
> +free_sig:
> +	kfree(sig);
> +free_data:
> +	kfree(data);
> +free_path:
> +	__putname(sigpath);
> +	if (rc < 0)
> +		return rc;
> +	else if (psize)
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +	else
> +		return pathlen;
> +}
> +
> +#endif


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