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Message-ID: <87sip15iy5.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org>
Date: Fri, 25 Apr 2014 12:04:50 -0700
From: ebiederm@...ssion.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@...sung.com>,
linux-security-module <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
john.johansen@...onical.com, Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>, viro@...IV.linux.org.uk,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
kernel-team@...ts.ubuntu.com
Subject: Re: Kernel panic at Ubuntu: IMA + Apparmor
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com> writes:
> On 04/25, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
>>
>> On 25/04/14 16:00, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
>> > Hello,
>> >
>> > I discovered a kernel panic on system running Ubuntu when IMA is enabled.
>> > It happens on reboot.
>> >
>> > ----------------------
>> > [ 106.750100] NSPROXY is NULL: error.log (/var/log/mysql/error.log)
>> > [ 106.750167] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at
>> > 0000000000000018
>> > [ 106.750221] IP: [<ffffffff811ec7da>] our_mnt+0x1a/0x30
> ...
>> > [ 106.751149] Call Trace:
>> > [ 106.751172] [<ffffffff813434eb>] ? aa_path_name+0x2ab/0x430
>> > [ 106.751199] [<ffffffff8101b9b9>] ? sched_clock+0x9/0x10
>> > [ 106.751225] [<ffffffff8134a68d>] aa_path_perm+0x7d/0x170
>> > [ 106.751250] [<ffffffff8101b945>] ? native_sched_clock+0x15/0x80
>> > [ 106.751276] [<ffffffff8134aa73>] aa_file_perm+0x33/0x40
>> > [ 106.751301] [<ffffffff81348c5e>] common_file_perm+0x8e/0xb0
>> > [ 106.751327] [<ffffffff81348d78>] apparmor_file_permission+0x18/0x20
>> > [ 106.751355] [<ffffffff8130c853>] security_file_permission+0x23/0xa0
>> > [ 106.751382] [<ffffffff811c77a2>] rw_verify_area+0x52/0xe0
>> > [ 106.751407] [<ffffffff811c789d>] vfs_read+0x6d/0x170
>> > [ 106.751432] [<ffffffff811cda31>] kernel_read+0x41/0x60
>> > [ 106.751457] [<ffffffff8134fd45>] ima_calc_file_hash+0x225/0x280
>> > [ 106.751483] [<ffffffff8134fb52>] ? ima_calc_file_hash+0x32/0x280
>> > [ 106.751509] [<ffffffff8135022d>] ima_collect_measurement+0x9d/0x160
>> > [ 106.751536] [<ffffffff810b552d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10
>> > [ 106.751562] [<ffffffff8134f07c>] ? ima_file_free+0x6c/0xd0
>> > [ 106.751587] [<ffffffff81352824>] ima_update_xattr+0x34/0x60
>> > [ 106.751612] [<ffffffff8134f0d0>] ima_file_free+0xc0/0xd0
>> > [ 106.751637] [<ffffffff811c9635>] __fput+0xd5/0x300
>
> fantastic ;)
>
>> > [ 106.751662] [<ffffffff811c98ae>] ____fput+0xe/0x10
>> > [ 106.751687] [<ffffffff81086774>] task_work_run+0xc4/0xe0
>> > [ 106.751712] [<ffffffff81066fad>] do_exit+0x2bd/0xa90
>> > [ 106.751738] [<ffffffff8173c958>] ? retint_swapgs+0x13/0x1b
>> > [ 106.751763] [<ffffffff8106780c>] do_group_exit+0x4c/0xc0
> ...
>> It seems the problem is the order of functions in do_exit
>>
>> do_exit()
>> {
>> ...
>> exit_task_namespaces(tsk);
>> exit_task_work(tsk);
>
> Yes.
>
> Eric, this makes me think again that we should do exit_task_namespaces()
> after exit_task_work(). We already discussed this before, but this looks
> like another indication this change makes sense.
I know you mentioned something about that. I haven't actually had much
time to think about it.
> The problem with fput() from free_nsproxy() was hopefully also fixed by
> e7b2c4069252. The main motivation for "move" was "outside of exit_notify".
> Even if we fix the paths above task_work_add() can have another user which
> wants ->nsproxy.
>
> What do you think?
I am scratching my head. Delayed work that depends on current sort of
blows my mind.
As I read this it is coming from __fput. Hmm.
So I think the blinkered thing is having a security_file_permission
inside of kernel_read. That is utter nonsense. At least for a
kernel_read we are doing from ima.
apparmor should not be trying to limit ima.
Show me a legitimate bug caused by the ordering and we can discuss
reordering.
Looking at kernel_read it is used elsewhere by the binfmt routines, and
doing permissions checks there on the part of the user that is doing
exec seems appropriate.
So I think the deep bug here is ima is using kernel_read which is
inappropriate for what it is trying to do. Permission checks on an
integrity mechanism?
Even if we ignore insane the security_file_permission in rw_verify_area
we still have mandatory locks that could cause this to fail. Which
looks like an evil user could bypass ima by simply setting a mandatory
lock on a file and not letting anyone else read it. Which makes
vfs_read and thus kernel_read wildly inappropriate for what ima is
trying to do.
Eric
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