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Message-Id: <1398615293-22931-9-git-send-email-aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Date: Sun, 27 Apr 2014 21:44:39 +0530
From: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: agruen@...nel.org, bfields@...ldses.org, akpm@...ux-foundation.org,
viro@...iv.linux.org.uk, dhowells@...hat.com
Cc: aneesh.kumar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-nfs@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH -V1 08/22] vfs: Add permission flags for setting file attributes
From: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@...nel.org>
Some permission models can allow processes to take ownership of a file,
change the file permissions, and set the file timestamps. Introduce new
permission mask flags and check for those permissions in
inode_change_ok().
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@...nel.org>
Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
fs/attr.c | 68 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
fs/namei.c | 2 +-
include/linux/fs.h | 4 ++++
3 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/attr.c b/fs/attr.c
index 1d158c972442..e468d4f2dca8 100644
--- a/fs/attr.c
+++ b/fs/attr.c
@@ -16,6 +16,54 @@
#include <linux/evm.h>
#include <linux/ima.h>
+static int richacl_change_ok(struct inode *inode, int mask)
+{
+ if (!IS_RICHACL(inode))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ if (inode->i_op->permission)
+ return inode->i_op->permission(inode, mask);
+
+ return check_acl(inode, mask);
+}
+
+static bool inode_uid_change_ok(struct inode *inode, kuid_t ia_uid)
+{
+ if (uid_eq(current_fsuid(), inode->i_uid) &&
+ uid_eq(ia_uid, inode->i_uid))
+ return true;
+ if (uid_eq(current_fsuid(), ia_uid) &&
+ richacl_change_ok(inode, MAY_TAKE_OWNERSHIP) == 0)
+ return true;
+ if (capable(CAP_CHOWN))
+ return true;
+ return false;
+}
+
+static bool inode_gid_change_ok(struct inode *inode, kgid_t ia_gid)
+{
+ int in_group = in_group_p(ia_gid);
+ if (uid_eq(current_fsuid(), inode->i_uid) &&
+ (in_group || gid_eq(ia_gid, inode->i_gid)))
+ return true;
+ if (in_group && richacl_change_ok(inode, MAY_TAKE_OWNERSHIP) == 0)
+ return true;
+ if (capable(CAP_CHOWN))
+ return true;
+ return false;
+}
+
+static bool inode_owner_permitted_or_capable(struct inode *inode, int mask)
+{
+ if (uid_eq(current_fsuid(), inode->i_uid))
+ return true;
+ if (richacl_change_ok(inode, mask) == 0)
+ return true;
+ if (inode_capable(inode, CAP_FOWNER))
+ return true;
+ return false;
+}
+
/**
* inode_change_ok - check if attribute changes to an inode are allowed
* @inode: inode to check
@@ -47,22 +95,18 @@ int inode_change_ok(struct inode *inode, struct iattr *attr)
return 0;
/* Make sure a caller can chown. */
- if ((ia_valid & ATTR_UID) &&
- (!uid_eq(current_fsuid(), inode->i_uid) ||
- !uid_eq(attr->ia_uid, inode->i_uid)) &&
- !inode_capable(inode, CAP_CHOWN))
- return -EPERM;
+ if (ia_valid & ATTR_UID)
+ if (!inode_uid_change_ok(inode, attr->ia_uid))
+ return -EPERM;
/* Make sure caller can chgrp. */
- if ((ia_valid & ATTR_GID) &&
- (!uid_eq(current_fsuid(), inode->i_uid) ||
- (!in_group_p(attr->ia_gid) && !gid_eq(attr->ia_gid, inode->i_gid))) &&
- !inode_capable(inode, CAP_CHOWN))
- return -EPERM;
+ if (ia_valid & ATTR_GID)
+ if (!inode_gid_change_ok(inode, attr->ia_gid))
+ return -EPERM;
/* Make sure a caller can chmod. */
if (ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) {
- if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
+ if (!inode_owner_permitted_or_capable(inode, MAY_CHMOD))
return -EPERM;
/* Also check the setgid bit! */
if (!in_group_p((ia_valid & ATTR_GID) ? attr->ia_gid :
@@ -73,7 +117,7 @@ int inode_change_ok(struct inode *inode, struct iattr *attr)
/* Check for setting the inode time. */
if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET)) {
- if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
+ if (!inode_owner_permitted_or_capable(inode, MAY_SET_TIMES))
return -EPERM;
}
diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index 56ac7613fbca..26b9a8212837 100644
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -249,7 +249,7 @@ void putname(struct filename *name)
}
#endif
-static int check_acl(struct inode *inode, int mask)
+int check_acl(struct inode *inode, int mask)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_FS_POSIX_ACL
struct posix_acl *acl;
diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
index 33da154dd27d..22d85798b520 100644
--- a/include/linux/fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/fs.h
@@ -81,6 +81,9 @@ typedef void (dio_iodone_t)(struct kiocb *iocb, loff_t offset,
#define MAY_CREATE_DIR 0x00000200
#define MAY_DELETE_CHILD 0x00000400
#define MAY_DELETE_SELF 0x00000800
+#define MAY_TAKE_OWNERSHIP 0x00001000
+#define MAY_CHMOD 0x00002000
+#define MAY_SET_TIMES 0x00004000
/*
* flags in file.f_mode. Note that FMODE_READ and FMODE_WRITE must correspond
@@ -2248,6 +2251,7 @@ extern sector_t bmap(struct inode *, sector_t);
extern int notify_change(struct dentry *, struct iattr *, struct inode **);
extern int inode_permission(struct inode *, int);
extern int generic_permission(struct inode *, int);
+extern int check_acl(struct inode *, int);
static inline bool execute_ok(struct inode *inode)
{
--
1.9.1
--
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