linux-kernel - Re: [RFC PATCH 0/2] kpatch: dynamic kernel patching

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite for Android: free password hash cracker in your pocket

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Date:	Wed, 7 May 2014 23:50:15 -0700 (PDT)
From:	David Lang <david@...g.hm>
To:	Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
cc:	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>,
	Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@...il.com>,
	Seth Jennings <sjenning@...hat.com>,
	Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@...achi.com>,
	Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Jiri Slaby <jslaby@...e.cz>,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@...llo.nl>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 0/2] kpatch: dynamic kernel patching

On Thu, 8 May 2014, Ingo Molnar wrote:

>>>
>>> No!
>>>
>>> A patch to the kernel source is 'safe' if it results in a correctly
>>> patched kernel source. Full stop!
>>>
>>> Live patching does not enter into this question, ever. The correctness
>>> of a patch to the source does not depend on 'live patching'
>>> considerations in any way, shape or form.
>>>
>>> Any mechanism that tries to blur these lines is broken by design.
>>>
>>> My claim is that if a patch is correct/safe in the old fashioned way,
>>> then a fundamental principle is that a live patching subsystem must
>>> either safely apply, or safely reject the live patching attempt,
>>> independently from any user input.
>>>
>>> It's similar to how kprobes (or ftrace) will safely reject or perform
>>> a live patching of the kernel.
>>>
>>> So for example, there's this recent upstream kernel fix:
>>>
>>> 3ca9e5d36afb agp: info leak in agpioc_info_wrap()
>>>
>>> which fixes an information leak. The 'patch' is Git commit
>>> 3ca9e5d36afb (i.e. it patches a very specific incoming kernel source
>>> tree that results in a specific outgoing source tree), and we know
>>> it's safe and correct.
>>>
>>> Any live patching subsystem must make sure that if this patch is
>>> live-patched, that this attempt is either rejected safely or performed
>>> safely.
>>>
>>> "We think/hope it won't blow up in most cases and we automated some
>>> checks halfways" or "the user must know what he is doing" is really
>>> not something that I think is a good concept for something as fragile
>>> as live patching.
>>
>> In that case you will have to reject any kernel patch that changes
>> any memory structure, because it's impossible as a general rule to
>> say that changing memory structures is going to be safe (or even
>> possible) to change.
>>
>> that includes any access to memory that moves around a lock
>
> Initially restricting it to such patches would be a good beginning -
> most of the security fixes are just failed checks, i.e. they don't
> typically even change any external (not on stack) memory structure,
> right?

in terms of hit-patching kernels you are correct.

but that's a far cry from what it sounded like you were demanding (that it must 
handle any kernel patch)

David Lang
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at  http://www.tux.org/lkml/