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Message-ID: <1400004106.2925.34.camel@dhcp-9-2-203-236.watson.ibm.com>
Date: Tue, 13 May 2014 14:01:46 -0400
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@...sung.com>
Cc: viro@...iv.linux.org.uk, ebiederm@...ssion.com,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, eparis@...hat.com,
dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/1] ima: introduce ima_kernel_read()
On Thu, 2014-05-08 at 16:16 +0300, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
> Commit 8aac62706 "move exit_task_namespaces() outside of exit_notify"
> introduced the kernel opps since the kernel v3.10, which happens when
> Apparmor and IMA-appraisal are enabled at the same time.
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> [ 106.750167] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at
> 0000000000000018
> [ 106.750221] IP: [<ffffffff811ec7da>] our_mnt+0x1a/0x30
> [ 106.750241] PGD 0
> [ 106.750254] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
> [ 106.750272] Modules linked in: cuse parport_pc ppdev bnep rfcomm
> bluetooth rpcsec_gss_krb5 nfsd auth_rpcgss nfs_acl nfs lockd sunrpc
> fscache dm_crypt intel_rapl x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp
> kvm_intel snd_hda_codec_hdmi kvm crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul
> ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel aes_x86_64 glue_helper lrw gf128mul
> ablk_helper cryptd snd_hda_codec_realtek dcdbas snd_hda_intel
> snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep snd_pcm snd_page_alloc snd_seq_midi
> snd_seq_midi_event snd_rawmidi psmouse snd_seq microcode serio_raw
> snd_timer snd_seq_device snd soundcore video lpc_ich coretemp mac_hid lp
> parport mei_me mei nbd hid_generic e1000e usbhid ahci ptp hid libahci
> pps_core
> [ 106.750658] CPU: 6 PID: 1394 Comm: mysqld Not tainted 3.13.0-rc7-kds+ #15
> [ 106.750673] Hardware name: Dell Inc. OptiPlex 9010/0M9KCM, BIOS A08
> 09/19/2012
> [ 106.750689] task: ffff8800de804920 ti: ffff880400fca000 task.ti:
> ffff880400fca000
> [ 106.750704] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff811ec7da>] [<ffffffff811ec7da>]
> our_mnt+0x1a/0x30
> [ 106.750725] RSP: 0018:ffff880400fcba60 EFLAGS: 00010286
> [ 106.750738] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000100 RCX:
> ffff8800d51523e7
> [ 106.750764] RDX: ffffffffffffffea RSI: ffff880400fcba34 RDI:
> ffff880402d20020
> [ 106.750791] RBP: ffff880400fcbae0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09:
> 0000000000000001
> [ 106.750817] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12:
> ffff8800d5152300
> [ 106.750844] R13: ffff8803eb8df510 R14: ffff880400fcbb28 R15:
> ffff8800d51523e7
> [ 106.750871] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88040d200000(0000)
> knlGS:0000000000000000
> [ 106.750910] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
> [ 106.750935] CR2: 0000000000000018 CR3: 0000000001c0e000 CR4:
> 00000000001407e0
> [ 106.750962] Stack:
> [ 106.750981] ffffffff813434eb ffff880400fcbb20 ffff880400fcbb18
> 0000000000000000
> [ 106.751037] ffff8800de804920 ffffffff8101b9b9 0001800000000000
> 0000000000000100
> [ 106.751093] 0000010000000000 0000000000000002 000000000000000e
> ffff8803eb8df500
> [ 106.751149] Call Trace:
> [ 106.751172] [<ffffffff813434eb>] ? aa_path_name+0x2ab/0x430
> [ 106.751199] [<ffffffff8101b9b9>] ? sched_clock+0x9/0x10
> [ 106.751225] [<ffffffff8134a68d>] aa_path_perm+0x7d/0x170
> [ 106.751250] [<ffffffff8101b945>] ? native_sched_clock+0x15/0x80
> [ 106.751276] [<ffffffff8134aa73>] aa_file_perm+0x33/0x40
> [ 106.751301] [<ffffffff81348c5e>] common_file_perm+0x8e/0xb0
> [ 106.751327] [<ffffffff81348d78>] apparmor_file_permission+0x18/0x20
> [ 106.751355] [<ffffffff8130c853>] security_file_permission+0x23/0xa0
> [ 106.751382] [<ffffffff811c77a2>] rw_verify_area+0x52/0xe0
> [ 106.751407] [<ffffffff811c789d>] vfs_read+0x6d/0x170
> [ 106.751432] [<ffffffff811cda31>] kernel_read+0x41/0x60
> [ 106.751457] [<ffffffff8134fd45>] ima_calc_file_hash+0x225/0x280
> [ 106.751483] [<ffffffff8134fb52>] ? ima_calc_file_hash+0x32/0x280
> [ 106.751509] [<ffffffff8135022d>] ima_collect_measurement+0x9d/0x160
> [ 106.751536] [<ffffffff810b552d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10
> [ 106.751562] [<ffffffff8134f07c>] ? ima_file_free+0x6c/0xd0
> [ 106.751587] [<ffffffff81352824>] ima_update_xattr+0x34/0x60
> [ 106.751612] [<ffffffff8134f0d0>] ima_file_free+0xc0/0xd0
> [ 106.751637] [<ffffffff811c9635>] __fput+0xd5/0x300
> [ 106.751662] [<ffffffff811c98ae>] ____fput+0xe/0x10
> [ 106.751687] [<ffffffff81086774>] task_work_run+0xc4/0xe0
> [ 106.751712] [<ffffffff81066fad>] do_exit+0x2bd/0xa90
> [ 106.751738] [<ffffffff8173c958>] ? retint_swapgs+0x13/0x1b
> [ 106.751763] [<ffffffff8106780c>] do_group_exit+0x4c/0xc0
> [ 106.751788] [<ffffffff81067894>] SyS_exit_group+0x14/0x20
> [ 106.751814] [<ffffffff8174522d>] system_call_fastpath+0x1a/0x1f
> [ 106.751839] Code: c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 e8 22 fe ff ff 5d c3
> 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 65 48 8b 04 25 c0 c9 00 00 48 8b 80 28 06 00 00 48 89
> e5 5d <48> 8b 40 18 48 39 87 c0 00 00 00 0f 94 c0 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00
> [ 106.752185] RIP [<ffffffff811ec7da>] our_mnt+0x1a/0x30
> [ 106.752214] RSP <ffff880400fcba60>
> [ 106.752236] CR2: 0000000000000018
> [ 106.752258] ---[ end trace 3c520748b4732721 ]---
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> The reason for the oops is that IMA-appraisal uses "kernel_read()" when
> file is closed. kernel_read() honors LSM security hook which calls
> Apparmor handler, which uses current->nsproxy->mnt_ns. The 'guilty'
> commit changed the order of cleanup code so that nsproxy->mnt_ns was
> not already available for Apparmor.
>
> Discussion about the issue with Al Viro and Eric W. Biederman suggested
> that kernel_read() is too high-level for IMA. Another issue, except
> security checking, that was identified is mandatory locking. kernel_read
> honors it as well and it might prevent IMA from calculating necessary hash.
> It was suggested to use simplified version of the function without security
> and locking checks.
>
> This patch introduces special version ima_kernel_read(), which skips security,
> mandatory locking checking and fsnotify. It prevents the kernel oops to happen.
>
> Suggested-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@...sung.com>
As there has been no comment on this patch, I'll assume everyone is ok
with introducing an IMA specific version of kernel_read().
Mimi
> ---
> security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
> index 1612a02..951523e 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
> @@ -27,6 +27,36 @@
>
> static struct crypto_shash *ima_shash_tfm;
>
> +/**
> + * ima_kernel_read - read file content
> + *
> + * This is a function for reading file content instead of kernel_read().
> + * It does not perform locking checks to ensure it cannot be blocked.
> + * It does not perform security checks because it is irrelevant for IMA.
> + *
> + */
> +static int ima_kernel_read(struct file *file, loff_t offset,
> + char *addr, unsigned long count)
> +{
> + mm_segment_t old_fs;
> + char __user *buf = addr;
> + ssize_t ret;
> +
> + if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_READ))
> + return -EBADF;
> + if (!file->f_op->read && !file->f_op->aio_read)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + old_fs = get_fs();
> + set_fs(get_ds());
> + if (file->f_op->read)
> + ret = file->f_op->read(file, buf, count, &offset);
> + else
> + ret = do_sync_read(file, buf, count, &offset);
> + set_fs(old_fs);
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> int ima_init_crypto(void)
> {
> long rc;
> @@ -104,7 +134,7 @@ static int ima_calc_file_hash_tfm(struct file *file,
> while (offset < i_size) {
> int rbuf_len;
>
> - rbuf_len = kernel_read(file, offset, rbuf, PAGE_SIZE);
> + rbuf_len = ima_kernel_read(file, offset, rbuf, PAGE_SIZE);
> if (rbuf_len < 0) {
> rc = rbuf_len;
> break;
--
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