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Date: Tue, 13 May 2014 14:01:46 -0400 From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com> To: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@...sung.com> Cc: viro@...iv.linux.org.uk, ebiederm@...ssion.com, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, eparis@...hat.com, dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/1] ima: introduce ima_kernel_read() On Thu, 2014-05-08 at 16:16 +0300, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote: > Commit 8aac62706 "move exit_task_namespaces() outside of exit_notify" > introduced the kernel opps since the kernel v3.10, which happens when > Apparmor and IMA-appraisal are enabled at the same time. > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > [ 106.750167] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at > 0000000000000018 > [ 106.750221] IP: [<ffffffff811ec7da>] our_mnt+0x1a/0x30 > [ 106.750241] PGD 0 > [ 106.750254] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP > [ 106.750272] Modules linked in: cuse parport_pc ppdev bnep rfcomm > bluetooth rpcsec_gss_krb5 nfsd auth_rpcgss nfs_acl nfs lockd sunrpc > fscache dm_crypt intel_rapl x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp > kvm_intel snd_hda_codec_hdmi kvm crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul > ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel aes_x86_64 glue_helper lrw gf128mul > ablk_helper cryptd snd_hda_codec_realtek dcdbas snd_hda_intel > snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep snd_pcm snd_page_alloc snd_seq_midi > snd_seq_midi_event snd_rawmidi psmouse snd_seq microcode serio_raw > snd_timer snd_seq_device snd soundcore video lpc_ich coretemp mac_hid lp > parport mei_me mei nbd hid_generic e1000e usbhid ahci ptp hid libahci > pps_core > [ 106.750658] CPU: 6 PID: 1394 Comm: mysqld Not tainted 3.13.0-rc7-kds+ #15 > [ 106.750673] Hardware name: Dell Inc. OptiPlex 9010/0M9KCM, BIOS A08 > 09/19/2012 > [ 106.750689] task: ffff8800de804920 ti: ffff880400fca000 task.ti: > ffff880400fca000 > [ 106.750704] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff811ec7da>] [<ffffffff811ec7da>] > our_mnt+0x1a/0x30 > [ 106.750725] RSP: 0018:ffff880400fcba60 EFLAGS: 00010286 > [ 106.750738] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000100 RCX: > ffff8800d51523e7 > [ 106.750764] RDX: ffffffffffffffea RSI: ffff880400fcba34 RDI: > ffff880402d20020 > [ 106.750791] RBP: ffff880400fcbae0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: > 0000000000000001 > [ 106.750817] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: > ffff8800d5152300 > [ 106.750844] R13: ffff8803eb8df510 R14: ffff880400fcbb28 R15: > ffff8800d51523e7 > [ 106.750871] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88040d200000(0000) > knlGS:0000000000000000 > [ 106.750910] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 > [ 106.750935] CR2: 0000000000000018 CR3: 0000000001c0e000 CR4: > 00000000001407e0 > [ 106.750962] Stack: > [ 106.750981] ffffffff813434eb ffff880400fcbb20 ffff880400fcbb18 > 0000000000000000 > [ 106.751037] ffff8800de804920 ffffffff8101b9b9 0001800000000000 > 0000000000000100 > [ 106.751093] 0000010000000000 0000000000000002 000000000000000e > ffff8803eb8df500 > [ 106.751149] Call Trace: > [ 106.751172] [<ffffffff813434eb>] ? aa_path_name+0x2ab/0x430 > [ 106.751199] [<ffffffff8101b9b9>] ? sched_clock+0x9/0x10 > [ 106.751225] [<ffffffff8134a68d>] aa_path_perm+0x7d/0x170 > [ 106.751250] [<ffffffff8101b945>] ? native_sched_clock+0x15/0x80 > [ 106.751276] [<ffffffff8134aa73>] aa_file_perm+0x33/0x40 > [ 106.751301] [<ffffffff81348c5e>] common_file_perm+0x8e/0xb0 > [ 106.751327] [<ffffffff81348d78>] apparmor_file_permission+0x18/0x20 > [ 106.751355] [<ffffffff8130c853>] security_file_permission+0x23/0xa0 > [ 106.751382] [<ffffffff811c77a2>] rw_verify_area+0x52/0xe0 > [ 106.751407] [<ffffffff811c789d>] vfs_read+0x6d/0x170 > [ 106.751432] [<ffffffff811cda31>] kernel_read+0x41/0x60 > [ 106.751457] [<ffffffff8134fd45>] ima_calc_file_hash+0x225/0x280 > [ 106.751483] [<ffffffff8134fb52>] ? ima_calc_file_hash+0x32/0x280 > [ 106.751509] [<ffffffff8135022d>] ima_collect_measurement+0x9d/0x160 > [ 106.751536] [<ffffffff810b552d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10 > [ 106.751562] [<ffffffff8134f07c>] ? ima_file_free+0x6c/0xd0 > [ 106.751587] [<ffffffff81352824>] ima_update_xattr+0x34/0x60 > [ 106.751612] [<ffffffff8134f0d0>] ima_file_free+0xc0/0xd0 > [ 106.751637] [<ffffffff811c9635>] __fput+0xd5/0x300 > [ 106.751662] [<ffffffff811c98ae>] ____fput+0xe/0x10 > [ 106.751687] [<ffffffff81086774>] task_work_run+0xc4/0xe0 > [ 106.751712] [<ffffffff81066fad>] do_exit+0x2bd/0xa90 > [ 106.751738] [<ffffffff8173c958>] ? retint_swapgs+0x13/0x1b > [ 106.751763] [<ffffffff8106780c>] do_group_exit+0x4c/0xc0 > [ 106.751788] [<ffffffff81067894>] SyS_exit_group+0x14/0x20 > [ 106.751814] [<ffffffff8174522d>] system_call_fastpath+0x1a/0x1f > [ 106.751839] Code: c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 e8 22 fe ff ff 5d c3 > 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 65 48 8b 04 25 c0 c9 00 00 48 8b 80 28 06 00 00 48 89 > e5 5d <48> 8b 40 18 48 39 87 c0 00 00 00 0f 94 c0 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 > [ 106.752185] RIP [<ffffffff811ec7da>] our_mnt+0x1a/0x30 > [ 106.752214] RSP <ffff880400fcba60> > [ 106.752236] CR2: 0000000000000018 > [ 106.752258] ---[ end trace 3c520748b4732721 ]--- > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > The reason for the oops is that IMA-appraisal uses "kernel_read()" when > file is closed. kernel_read() honors LSM security hook which calls > Apparmor handler, which uses current->nsproxy->mnt_ns. The 'guilty' > commit changed the order of cleanup code so that nsproxy->mnt_ns was > not already available for Apparmor. > > Discussion about the issue with Al Viro and Eric W. Biederman suggested > that kernel_read() is too high-level for IMA. Another issue, except > security checking, that was identified is mandatory locking. kernel_read > honors it as well and it might prevent IMA from calculating necessary hash. > It was suggested to use simplified version of the function without security > and locking checks. > > This patch introduces special version ima_kernel_read(), which skips security, > mandatory locking checking and fsnotify. It prevents the kernel oops to happen. > > Suggested-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@...ssion.com> > Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@...sung.com> As there has been no comment on this patch, I'll assume everyone is ok with introducing an IMA specific version of kernel_read(). Mimi > --- > security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- > 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c > index 1612a02..951523e 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c > @@ -27,6 +27,36 @@ > > static struct crypto_shash *ima_shash_tfm; > > +/** > + * ima_kernel_read - read file content > + * > + * This is a function for reading file content instead of kernel_read(). > + * It does not perform locking checks to ensure it cannot be blocked. > + * It does not perform security checks because it is irrelevant for IMA. > + * > + */ > +static int ima_kernel_read(struct file *file, loff_t offset, > + char *addr, unsigned long count) > +{ > + mm_segment_t old_fs; > + char __user *buf = addr; > + ssize_t ret; > + > + if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)) > + return -EBADF; > + if (!file->f_op->read && !file->f_op->aio_read) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + old_fs = get_fs(); > + set_fs(get_ds()); > + if (file->f_op->read) > + ret = file->f_op->read(file, buf, count, &offset); > + else > + ret = do_sync_read(file, buf, count, &offset); > + set_fs(old_fs); > + return ret; > +} > + > int ima_init_crypto(void) > { > long rc; > @@ -104,7 +134,7 @@ static int ima_calc_file_hash_tfm(struct file *file, > while (offset < i_size) { > int rbuf_len; > > - rbuf_len = kernel_read(file, offset, rbuf, PAGE_SIZE); > + rbuf_len = ima_kernel_read(file, offset, rbuf, PAGE_SIZE); > if (rbuf_len < 0) { > rc = rbuf_len; > break; -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
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