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Message-Id: <1401110850-3552-10-git-send-email-tixxdz@opendz.org>
Date: Mon, 26 May 2014 14:27:30 +0100
From: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@...il.com>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>
Subject: [PATCH 9/9] procfs: improve /proc/<pid>/stack protection
Convert stack from an INF entry to a REG one. This way we can perform
and cache the permission checks during ->open(). We make sure that
/proc/<pid>/stack will continue to use sequence iterators.
The ptrace capability is only cached, it will be re-checked during
->read(). If the opener did not have enough privileges then fail.
Signed-off-by: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>
---
fs/proc/base.c | 59 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
1 file changed, 54 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index d98ce15..6786878 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -387,14 +387,19 @@ static void unlock_trace(struct task_struct *task)
#define MAX_STACK_TRACE_DEPTH 64
-static int proc_pid_stack(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns,
- struct pid *pid, struct task_struct *task)
+static int proc_show_pid_stack(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns,
+ struct pid *pid, struct task_struct *task)
{
struct stack_trace trace;
unsigned long *entries;
- int err;
+ struct pid_seq_private *priv = m->private;
+ int permitted = priv->permitted;
+ int err = -EPERM;
int i;
+ if (!permitted)
+ return err;
+
entries = kmalloc(MAX_STACK_TRACE_DEPTH * sizeof(*entries), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!entries)
return -ENOMEM;
@@ -418,6 +423,50 @@ static int proc_pid_stack(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns,
return err;
}
+
+static int proc_pid_stack(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
+{
+ return pid_entry_show(m, proc_show_pid_stack);
+}
+
+static int stack_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
+{
+ int ret = -ENOMEM;
+ struct pid_seq_private *priv;
+
+ priv = kzalloc(sizeof(*priv), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!priv)
+ return ret;
+
+ priv->inode = inode;
+ if (pid_entry_access(filp, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH))
+ priv->permitted = PID_ENTRY_DENY;
+ else
+ priv->permitted = PID_ENTRY_ALLOW;
+
+ ret = single_open(filp, proc_pid_stack, priv);
+ if (ret)
+ kfree(priv);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int stack_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
+{
+ struct seq_file *seq = filp->private_data;
+
+ kfree(seq->private);
+ seq->private = NULL;
+
+ return single_release(inode, filp);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations proc_pid_stack_operations = {
+ .open = stack_open,
+ .read = seq_read,
+ .llseek = seq_lseek,
+ .release = stack_release,
+};
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_SCHEDSTATS
@@ -2746,7 +2795,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry tgid_base_stuff[] = {
REG("wchan", S_IRUGO, proc_pid_wchan_operations),
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_STACKTRACE
- ONE("stack", S_IRUSR, proc_pid_stack),
+ REG("stack", S_IRUSR, proc_pid_stack_operations),
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_SCHEDSTATS
INF("schedstat", S_IRUGO, proc_pid_schedstat),
@@ -3082,7 +3131,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry tid_base_stuff[] = {
REG("wchan", S_IRUGO, proc_pid_wchan_operations),
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_STACKTRACE
- ONE("stack", S_IRUSR, proc_pid_stack),
+ REG("stack", S_IRUSR, proc_pid_stack_operations),
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_SCHEDSTATS
INF("schedstat", S_IRUGO, proc_pid_schedstat),
--
1.7.11.7
--
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