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Date: Wed, 28 May 2014 21:55:43 +0300
From: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com>
To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: linux-security-module <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@...sung.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
Josh Boyer <jwboyer@...hat.com>,
keyrings <keyrings@...ux-nfs.org>,
linux-kernel <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v4 3/4] ima: define '.ima' as a builtin 'trusted' keyring
On 28 May 2014 18:09, Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:
> Require all keys added to the IMA keyring be signed by an
> existing trusted key on the system trusted keyring.
>
> Changelog v1:
> - don't link IMA trusted keyring to user keyring
>
> Changelog:
> - define stub integrity_init_keyring() function (reported-by Fengguang Wu)
> - differentiate between regular and trusted keyring names.
> - replace printk with pr_info (D. Kasatkin)
> - only make the IMA keyring a trusted keyring (reported-by D. Kastatkin)
> - define stub integrity_init_keyring() definition based on
> CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE, not CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS.
> (reported-by Jim Davis)
>
> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar<zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
> ---
> security/integrity/digsig.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 8 ++++++++
> security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 11 +++++++++++
> security/integrity/integrity.h | 5 +++++
> 4 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c
> index b4af4eb..7da5f9c 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/digsig.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c
> @@ -13,7 +13,9 @@
> #define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
>
> #include <linux/err.h>
> +#include <linux/sched.h>
> #include <linux/rbtree.h>
> +#include <linux/cred.h>
> #include <linux/key-type.h>
> #include <linux/digsig.h>
>
> @@ -24,7 +26,11 @@ static struct key *keyring[INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX];
> static const char *keyring_name[INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX] = {
> "_evm",
> "_module",
> +#ifndef CONFIG_IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING
> "_ima",
> +#else
> + ".ima",
> +#endif
> };
>
> int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
> @@ -35,7 +41,7 @@ int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
>
> if (!keyring[id]) {
> keyring[id] =
> - request_key(&key_type_keyring, keyring_name[id], NULL);
> + request_key(&key_type_keyring, keyring_name[id], NULL);
> if (IS_ERR(keyring[id])) {
> int err = PTR_ERR(keyring[id]);
> pr_err("no %s keyring: %d\n", keyring_name[id], err);
> @@ -56,3 +62,21 @@ int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
>
> return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> }
> +
> +int integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id)
> +{
> + const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
> +
> + keyring[id] = keyring_alloc(keyring_name[id], KUIDT_INIT(0),
> + KGIDT_INIT(0), cred,
> + ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
> + KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ |
> + KEY_USR_WRITE | KEY_USR_SEARCH),
> + KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
Last parameter "destination" is NULL. It makes keyring "unsearchable"
from user space.
It prevents loading trusted keys from user-space, e.g. initramfs...
Should it be "cred->user->uid_keyring"??
> + if (!IS_ERR(keyring[id]))
> + set_bit(KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, &keyring[id]->flags);
> + else
> + pr_info("Can't allocate %s keyring (%ld)\n",
> + keyring_name[id], PTR_ERR(keyring[id]));
keyring[id] should be set "back" to NULL. Otherwise bad value might be
used in other places.
> + return 0;
> +}
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
> index 81a2797..dad8d4c 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
> @@ -123,3 +123,11 @@ config IMA_APPRAISE
> For more information on integrity appraisal refer to:
> <http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net>
> If unsure, say N.
> +
> +config IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING
> + bool "Require all keys on the _ima keyring be signed"
> + depends on IMA_APPRAISE && SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
> + default y
> + help
> + This option requires that all keys added to the _ima
> + keyring be signed by a key on the system trusted keyring.
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> index d3113d4..003ff46 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> @@ -385,3 +385,14 @@ int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name)
> }
> return result;
> }
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING
> +static int __init init_ima_keyring(void)
> +{
> + int ret;
> +
> + ret = integrity_init_keyring(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA);
> + return 0;
> +}
> +late_initcall(init_ima_keyring);
late_initcall(init_ima_keyring) ordering competes with late_initcall(init_ima);
but we want keyring to be initialized before IMA might use it.
In the case when we would load keys from ima kernel initialization
code, order is important.
we already have init_ima() and ima_init calls().
Why not call integrity_init_keyring() from there?
Indeed, we have one late_initcall(init_evm) for EVM, and one
late_initcall(init_ima) for IMA.
It's enough...
- Dmitry
> +#endif
> diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
> index 33c0a70..09c440d 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
> +++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
> @@ -124,6 +124,7 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_find(struct inode *inode);
> int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
> const char *digest, int digestlen);
>
> +int integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id);
> #else
>
> static inline int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id,
> @@ -133,6 +134,10 @@ static inline int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id,
> return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> }
>
> +static inline int integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id)
> +{
> + return 0;
> +}
> #endif /* CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE */
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
> --
> 1.8.1.4
>
> --
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--
Thanks,
Dmitry
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