linux-kernel - [PATCH 3.14 125/140] net: filter: s390: fix JIT address randomization

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Date:	Wed, 28 May 2014 21:34:24 -0700
From:	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
	stable@...r.kernel.org, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...mgrid.com>,
	Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@...ibm.com>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>
Subject: [PATCH 3.14 125/140] net: filter: s390: fix JIT address randomization

3.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@...ibm.com>

[ Upstream commit e84d2f8d2ae33c8215429824e1ecf24cbca9645e ]

This is the s390 variant of Alexei's JIT bug fix.
(patch description below stolen from Alexei's patch)

bpf_alloc_binary() adds 128 bytes of room to JITed program image
and rounds it up to the nearest page size. If image size is close
to page size (like 4000), it is rounded to two pages:
round_up(4000 + 4 + 128) == 8192
then 'hole' is computed as 8192 - (4000 + 4) = 4188
If prandom_u32() % hole selects a number >= PAGE_SIZE - sizeof(*header)
then kernel will crash during bpf_jit_free():

kernel BUG at arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c:887!
Call Trace:
 [<ffffffff81037285>] change_page_attr_set_clr+0x135/0x460
 [<ffffffff81694cc0>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x30/0x50
 [<ffffffff810378ff>] set_memory_rw+0x2f/0x40
 [<ffffffffa01a0d8d>] bpf_jit_free_deferred+0x2d/0x60
 [<ffffffff8106bf98>] process_one_work+0x1d8/0x6a0
 [<ffffffff8106bf38>] ? process_one_work+0x178/0x6a0
 [<ffffffff8106c90c>] worker_thread+0x11c/0x370

since bpf_jit_free() does:
  unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)fp->bpf_func & PAGE_MASK;
  struct bpf_binary_header *header = (void *)addr;
to compute start address of 'bpf_binary_header'
and header->pages will pass junk to:
  set_memory_rw(addr, header->pages);

Fix it by making sure that &header->image[prandom_u32() % hole] and &header
are in the same page.

Fixes: aa2d2c73c21f2 ("s390/bpf,jit: address randomize and write protect jit code")

Reported-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...mgrid.com>
Cc: <stable@...r.kernel.org> # v3.11+
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@...ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@...emloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/s390/net/bpf_jit_comp.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/s390/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
+++ b/arch/s390/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
@@ -811,7 +811,7 @@ static struct bpf_binary_header *bpf_all
 		return NULL;
 	memset(header, 0, sz);
 	header->pages = sz / PAGE_SIZE;
-	hole = sz - (bpfsize + sizeof(*header));
+	hole = min(sz - (bpfsize + sizeof(*header)), PAGE_SIZE - sizeof(*header));
 	/* Insert random number of illegal instructions before BPF code
 	 * and make sure the first instruction starts at an even address.
 	 */


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