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Message-ID: <20140607104232.GC23815@amd.pavel.ucw.cz>
Date: Sat, 7 Jun 2014 12:42:32 +0200
From: Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>
To: Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Bin Wang <binw@...vell.com>,
Nobuhiro Iwamatsu <nobuhiro.iwamatsu.yj@...esas.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Norbert Ciosek <norbertciosek@...il.com>
Subject: Re: [GIT PULL] char/misc driver patches for 3.16-rc1
On Tue 2014-06-03 11:25:55, Greg KH wrote:
> On Tue, Jun 03, 2014 at 10:14:41AM -0700, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> > On Tue, Jun 3, 2014 at 10:02 AM, Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org> wrote:
> > >
> > > Hm, I got two different bug reports, and this same patch from two
> > > different people insisting that we broke their drivers with the above
> > > patches, and asked for this patch to be applied.
> >
> > So I do think that we might be able to apply this patch, but I think
> > it needs a *lot* more thought than was obviously spent on it so far.
> >
> > For example, right now it's actively insecure. Do we care? Maybe we
> > don't. The user-space uio side presumably is root-owned, and hopefully
> > trusted.
>
> It better be trusted, as userspace has access to the "raw" hardware
> here, and is getting notified about every irq that happens to the
> device.
At the very least, we have (CAP_SYS_ADMIN?) should be required before
allowing root to compromise kernel, no?
--
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