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Message-ID: <1402449893.612.14.camel@dhcp-9-2-203-236.watson.ibm.com>
Date: Tue, 10 Jun 2014 21:24:53 -0400
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...f.ucam.org>
Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com>,
Josh Boyer <jwboyer@...hat.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@...sung.com>,
keyrings <keyrings@...ux-nfs.org>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-security-module <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/4] KEYS: validate key trust with owner and builtin
keys only
On Tue, 2014-06-10 at 22:40 +0100, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> On Wed, Jun 11, 2014 at 12:34:28AM +0300, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
>
> > My statement is still valid. It is a hole...
> >
> > To prevent the hole it should be explained that one might follow
> > certain instructions
> > to take ownership of your PC. Generate your own keys and remove MS and
> > Vendor ones...
>
> The hole is that the system trusts keys that you don't trust. The
> appropriate thing to do is to remove that trust from the entire system,
> not just one layer of the system. If people gain the impression that
> they can simply pass a kernel parameter and avoid trusting the vendor
> keys, they'll be upset to discover that it's easily circumvented.
Assuming I remove all the keys I don't trust, there are still keys that
are trusted while booting, but are not necessary afterwards. We should
be able to limit the scope of where and when keys are trusted.
Mimi
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