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Message-ID: <20140612004259.14821.qmail@ns.horizon.com>
Date: 11 Jun 2014 20:42:59 -0400
From: "George Spelvin" <linux@...izon.com>
To: linux@...izon.com, tytso@....edu
Cc: hpa@...ux.intel.com, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
mingo@...nel.org, price@....edu
Subject: Re: drivers/char/random.c: more ruminations
> It's not something where if the changes required massive changes, that
> I'd necessarily feel the need to backport them to stable. It's a
> certificational weakness, but it's a not disaster.
Agreed! It's been there for years, and I'm not too worried. It takes
a pretty tight race to cause the problem in the first place.
As you note, it only happens with a full pool (already a very secure
situation), and the magnitude is limited by the size of entropy additions,
which are normally small.
I'm just never happy with bugs in security-critical code. "I don't
think that bug is exploitable" is almost as ominous a phrase as "Y'all
watch this!"
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