lists.openwall.net   lists  /  announce  owl-users  owl-dev  john-users  john-dev  passwdqc-users  yescrypt  popa3d-users  /  oss-security  kernel-hardening  musl  sabotage  tlsify  passwords  /  crypt-dev  xvendor  /  Bugtraq  Full-Disclosure  linux-kernel  linux-netdev  linux-ext4  linux-hardening  linux-cve-announce  PHC 
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
 
Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <20140616211930.GB2075@kroah.com>
Date:	Mon, 16 Jun 2014 14:19:30 -0700
From:	Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
	torvalds@...ux-foundation.org, stable@...r.kernel.org
Cc:	lwn@....net, Jiri Slaby <jslaby@...e.cz>
Subject: Re: Linux 3.15.1

diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index 6d1e304943a3..e2846acd2841 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 VERSION = 3
 PATCHLEVEL = 15
-SUBLEVEL = 0
+SUBLEVEL = 1
 EXTRAVERSION =
 NAME = Shuffling Zombie Juror
 
diff --git a/drivers/ata/ahci.c b/drivers/ata/ahci.c
index 60707814a84b..dae5607e1115 100644
--- a/drivers/ata/ahci.c
+++ b/drivers/ata/ahci.c
@@ -445,10 +445,14 @@ static const struct pci_device_id ahci_pci_tbl[] = {
 	  .driver_data = board_ahci_yes_fbs },			/* 88se9172 */
 	{ PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_MARVELL_EXT, 0x9192),
 	  .driver_data = board_ahci_yes_fbs },			/* 88se9172 on some Gigabyte */
+	{ PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_MARVELL_EXT, 0x91a0),
+	  .driver_data = board_ahci_yes_fbs },
 	{ PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_MARVELL_EXT, 0x91a3),
 	  .driver_data = board_ahci_yes_fbs },
 	{ PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_MARVELL_EXT, 0x9230),
 	  .driver_data = board_ahci_yes_fbs },
+	{ PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_TTI, 0x0642),
+	  .driver_data = board_ahci_yes_fbs },
 
 	/* Promise */
 	{ PCI_VDEVICE(PROMISE, 0x3f20), board_ahci },	/* PDC42819 */
diff --git a/drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb-usb-ids.h b/drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb-usb-ids.h
index 1bdc0e7e8b79..80643ef9183f 100644
--- a/drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb-usb-ids.h
+++ b/drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb-usb-ids.h
@@ -361,6 +361,7 @@
 #define USB_PID_FRIIO_WHITE				0x0001
 #define USB_PID_TVWAY_PLUS				0x0002
 #define USB_PID_SVEON_STV20				0xe39d
+#define USB_PID_SVEON_STV20_RTL2832U			0xd39d
 #define USB_PID_SVEON_STV22				0xe401
 #define USB_PID_SVEON_STV22_IT9137			0xe411
 #define USB_PID_AZUREWAVE_AZ6027			0x3275
@@ -375,4 +376,5 @@
 #define USB_PID_CTVDIGDUAL_V2				0xe410
 #define USB_PID_PCTV_2002E                              0x025c
 #define USB_PID_PCTV_2002E_SE                           0x025d
+#define USB_PID_SVEON_STV27                             0xd3af
 #endif
diff --git a/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/rtl28xxu.c b/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/rtl28xxu.c
index dcbd392e6efc..a676e4452847 100644
--- a/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/rtl28xxu.c
+++ b/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/rtl28xxu.c
@@ -1537,6 +1537,12 @@ static const struct usb_device_id rtl28xxu_id_table[] = {
 		&rtl2832u_props, "Crypto ReDi PC 50 A", NULL) },
 	{ DVB_USB_DEVICE(USB_VID_KYE, 0x707f,
 		&rtl2832u_props, "Genius TVGo DVB-T03", NULL) },
+	{ DVB_USB_DEVICE(USB_VID_KWORLD_2, 0xd395,
+		&rtl2832u_props, "Peak DVB-T USB", NULL) },
+	{ DVB_USB_DEVICE(USB_VID_KWORLD_2, USB_PID_SVEON_STV20_RTL2832U,
+		&rtl2832u_props, "Sveon STV20", NULL) },
+	{ DVB_USB_DEVICE(USB_VID_KWORLD_2, USB_PID_SVEON_STV27,
+		&rtl2832u_props, "Sveon STV27", NULL) },
 
 	/* RTL2832P devices: */
 	{ DVB_USB_DEVICE(USB_VID_HANFTEK, 0x0131,
diff --git a/drivers/misc/mei/hw-me.c b/drivers/misc/mei/hw-me.c
index 8dbdaaef1af5..bdcebfa30fc8 100644
--- a/drivers/misc/mei/hw-me.c
+++ b/drivers/misc/mei/hw-me.c
@@ -164,6 +164,9 @@ static void mei_me_hw_reset_release(struct mei_device *dev)
 	hcsr |= H_IG;
 	hcsr &= ~H_RST;
 	mei_hcsr_set(hw, hcsr);
+
+	/* complete this write before we set host ready on another CPU */
+	mmiowb();
 }
 /**
  * mei_me_hw_reset - resets fw via mei csr register.
@@ -183,8 +186,21 @@ static int mei_me_hw_reset(struct mei_device *dev, bool intr_enable)
 	else
 		hcsr &= ~H_IE;
 
+	dev->recvd_hw_ready = false;
 	mei_me_reg_write(hw, H_CSR, hcsr);
 
+	/*
+	 * Host reads the H_CSR once to ensure that the
+	 * posted write to H_CSR completes.
+	 */
+	hcsr = mei_hcsr_read(hw);
+
+	if ((hcsr & H_RST) == 0)
+		dev_warn(&dev->pdev->dev, "H_RST is not set = 0x%08X", hcsr);
+
+	if ((hcsr & H_RDY) == H_RDY)
+		dev_warn(&dev->pdev->dev, "H_RDY is not cleared 0x%08X", hcsr);
+
 	if (intr_enable == false)
 		mei_me_hw_reset_release(dev);
 
@@ -201,6 +217,7 @@ static int mei_me_hw_reset(struct mei_device *dev, bool intr_enable)
 static void mei_me_host_set_ready(struct mei_device *dev)
 {
 	struct mei_me_hw *hw = to_me_hw(dev);
+	hw->host_hw_state = mei_hcsr_read(hw);
 	hw->host_hw_state |= H_IE | H_IG | H_RDY;
 	mei_hcsr_set(hw, hw->host_hw_state);
 }
@@ -233,10 +250,7 @@ static bool mei_me_hw_is_ready(struct mei_device *dev)
 static int mei_me_hw_ready_wait(struct mei_device *dev)
 {
 	int err;
-	if (mei_me_hw_is_ready(dev))
-		return 0;
 
-	dev->recvd_hw_ready = false;
 	mutex_unlock(&dev->device_lock);
 	err = wait_event_interruptible_timeout(dev->wait_hw_ready,
 			dev->recvd_hw_ready,
@@ -491,14 +505,13 @@ irqreturn_t mei_me_irq_thread_handler(int irq, void *dev_id)
 	/*  check if we need to start the dev */
 	if (!mei_host_is_ready(dev)) {
 		if (mei_hw_is_ready(dev)) {
+			mei_me_hw_reset_release(dev);
 			dev_dbg(&dev->pdev->dev, "we need to start the dev.\n");
 
 			dev->recvd_hw_ready = true;
 			wake_up_interruptible(&dev->wait_hw_ready);
 		} else {
-
-			dev_dbg(&dev->pdev->dev, "Reset Completed.\n");
-			mei_me_hw_reset_release(dev);
+			dev_dbg(&dev->pdev->dev, "Spurious Interrupt\n");
 		}
 		goto end;
 	}
diff --git a/drivers/pci/msi.c b/drivers/pci/msi.c
index 955ab7990c5b..fb02fc2fb034 100644
--- a/drivers/pci/msi.c
+++ b/drivers/pci/msi.c
@@ -414,7 +414,7 @@ static void free_msi_irqs(struct pci_dev *dev)
 	if (dev->msi_irq_groups) {
 		sysfs_remove_groups(&dev->dev.kobj, dev->msi_irq_groups);
 		msi_attrs = dev->msi_irq_groups[0]->attrs;
-		list_for_each_entry(entry, &dev->msi_list, list) {
+		while (msi_attrs[count]) {
 			dev_attr = container_of(msi_attrs[count],
 						struct device_attribute, attr);
 			kfree(dev_attr->attr.name);
diff --git a/fs/attr.c b/fs/attr.c
index 5d4e59d56e85..6530ced19697 100644
--- a/fs/attr.c
+++ b/fs/attr.c
@@ -50,14 +50,14 @@ int inode_change_ok(const struct inode *inode, struct iattr *attr)
 	if ((ia_valid & ATTR_UID) &&
 	    (!uid_eq(current_fsuid(), inode->i_uid) ||
 	     !uid_eq(attr->ia_uid, inode->i_uid)) &&
-	    !inode_capable(inode, CAP_CHOWN))
+	    !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_CHOWN))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	/* Make sure caller can chgrp. */
 	if ((ia_valid & ATTR_GID) &&
 	    (!uid_eq(current_fsuid(), inode->i_uid) ||
 	    (!in_group_p(attr->ia_gid) && !gid_eq(attr->ia_gid, inode->i_gid))) &&
-	    !inode_capable(inode, CAP_CHOWN))
+	    !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_CHOWN))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	/* Make sure a caller can chmod. */
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ int inode_change_ok(const struct inode *inode, struct iattr *attr)
 		/* Also check the setgid bit! */
 		if (!in_group_p((ia_valid & ATTR_GID) ? attr->ia_gid :
 				inode->i_gid) &&
-		    !inode_capable(inode, CAP_FSETID))
+		    !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_FSETID))
 			attr->ia_mode &= ~S_ISGID;
 	}
 
@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ void setattr_copy(struct inode *inode, const struct iattr *attr)
 		umode_t mode = attr->ia_mode;
 
 		if (!in_group_p(inode->i_gid) &&
-		    !inode_capable(inode, CAP_FSETID))
+		    !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_FSETID))
 			mode &= ~S_ISGID;
 		inode->i_mode = mode;
 	}
diff --git a/fs/dcache.c b/fs/dcache.c
index be2bea834bf4..e99c6f529ba8 100644
--- a/fs/dcache.c
+++ b/fs/dcache.c
@@ -532,10 +532,12 @@ static inline struct dentry *lock_parent(struct dentry *dentry)
 	struct dentry *parent = dentry->d_parent;
 	if (IS_ROOT(dentry))
 		return NULL;
+	if (unlikely((int)dentry->d_lockref.count < 0))
+		return NULL;
 	if (likely(spin_trylock(&parent->d_lock)))
 		return parent;
-	spin_unlock(&dentry->d_lock);
 	rcu_read_lock();
+	spin_unlock(&dentry->d_lock);
 again:
 	parent = ACCESS_ONCE(dentry->d_parent);
 	spin_lock(&parent->d_lock);
diff --git a/fs/inode.c b/fs/inode.c
index f96d2a6f88cc..d2fb2f282fca 100644
--- a/fs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/inode.c
@@ -1839,14 +1839,18 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(inode_init_owner);
  * inode_owner_or_capable - check current task permissions to inode
  * @inode: inode being checked
  *
- * Return true if current either has CAP_FOWNER to the inode, or
- * owns the file.
+ * Return true if current either has CAP_FOWNER in a namespace with the
+ * inode owner uid mapped, or owns the file.
  */
 bool inode_owner_or_capable(const struct inode *inode)
 {
+	struct user_namespace *ns;
+
 	if (uid_eq(current_fsuid(), inode->i_uid))
 		return true;
-	if (inode_capable(inode, CAP_FOWNER))
+
+	ns = current_user_ns();
+	if (ns_capable(ns, CAP_FOWNER) && kuid_has_mapping(ns, inode->i_uid))
 		return true;
 	return false;
 }
diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index 80168273396b..985c6f368485 100644
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -332,10 +332,11 @@ int generic_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
 
 	if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) {
 		/* DACs are overridable for directories */
-		if (inode_capable(inode, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))
+		if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))
 			return 0;
 		if (!(mask & MAY_WRITE))
-			if (inode_capable(inode, CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
+			if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode,
+						     CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
 				return 0;
 		return -EACCES;
 	}
@@ -345,7 +346,7 @@ int generic_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
 	 * at least one exec bit set.
 	 */
 	if (!(mask & MAY_EXEC) || (inode->i_mode & S_IXUGO))
-		if (inode_capable(inode, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))
+		if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))
 			return 0;
 
 	/*
@@ -353,7 +354,7 @@ int generic_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
 	 */
 	mask &= MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC;
 	if (mask == MAY_READ)
-		if (inode_capable(inode, CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
+		if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
 			return 0;
 
 	return -EACCES;
@@ -2379,7 +2380,7 @@ static inline int check_sticky(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode)
 		return 0;
 	if (uid_eq(dir->i_uid, fsuid))
 		return 0;
-	return !inode_capable(inode, CAP_FOWNER);
+	return !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_FOWNER);
 }
 
 /*
diff --git a/fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl.c b/fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl.c
index 0b18776b075e..6152cbe353e8 100644
--- a/fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl.c
+++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl.c
@@ -1215,7 +1215,7 @@ xfs_ioctl_setattr(
 		 * cleared upon successful return from chown()
 		 */
 		if ((ip->i_d.di_mode & (S_ISUID|S_ISGID)) &&
-		    !inode_capable(VFS_I(ip), CAP_FSETID))
+		    !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(VFS_I(ip), CAP_FSETID))
 			ip->i_d.di_mode &= ~(S_ISUID|S_ISGID);
 
 		/*
diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
index a6ee1f9a5018..84b13ad67c1c 100644
--- a/include/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/linux/capability.h
@@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ extern bool has_ns_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t,
 				      struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
 extern bool capable(int cap);
 extern bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
-extern bool inode_capable(const struct inode *inode, int cap);
+extern bool capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(const struct inode *inode, int cap);
 extern bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
 
 /* audit system wants to get cap info from files as well */
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index f251a5e8d17a..21eae3c05ec0 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -728,6 +728,22 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk, char **key)
 	return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
 }
 
+static int audit_in_mask(const struct audit_krule *rule, unsigned long val)
+{
+	int word, bit;
+
+	if (val > 0xffffffff)
+		return false;
+
+	word = AUDIT_WORD(val);
+	if (word >= AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE)
+		return false;
+
+	bit = AUDIT_BIT(val);
+
+	return rule->mask[word] & bit;
+}
+
 /* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the
  * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is
  * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit
@@ -745,11 +761,8 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
 
 	rcu_read_lock();
 	if (!list_empty(list)) {
-		int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
-		int bit  = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
-
 		list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
-			if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
+			if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) &&
 			    audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL,
 					       &state, false)) {
 				rcu_read_unlock();
@@ -769,20 +782,16 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
 static int audit_filter_inode_name(struct task_struct *tsk,
 				   struct audit_names *n,
 				   struct audit_context *ctx) {
-	int word, bit;
 	int h = audit_hash_ino((u32)n->ino);
 	struct list_head *list = &audit_inode_hash[h];
 	struct audit_entry *e;
 	enum audit_state state;
 
-	word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
-	bit  = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
-
 	if (list_empty(list))
 		return 0;
 
 	list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
-		if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
+		if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) &&
 		    audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state, false)) {
 			ctx->current_state = state;
 			return 1;
diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c
index a8d63df0c322..24663b3e0635 100644
--- a/kernel/capability.c
+++ b/kernel/capability.c
@@ -424,23 +424,19 @@ bool capable(int cap)
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable);
 
 /**
- * inode_capable - Check superior capability over inode
+ * capable_wrt_inode_uidgid - Check nsown_capable and uid and gid mapped
  * @inode: The inode in question
  * @cap: The capability in question
  *
- * Return true if the current task has the given superior capability
- * targeted at it's own user namespace and that the given inode is owned
- * by the current user namespace or a child namespace.
- *
- * Currently we check to see if an inode is owned by the current
- * user namespace by seeing if the inode's owner maps into the
- * current user namespace.
- *
+ * Return true if the current task has the given capability targeted at
+ * its own user namespace and that the given inode's uid and gid are
+ * mapped into the current user namespace.
  */
-bool inode_capable(const struct inode *inode, int cap)
+bool capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(const struct inode *inode, int cap)
 {
 	struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns();
 
-	return ns_capable(ns, cap) && kuid_has_mapping(ns, inode->i_uid);
+	return ns_capable(ns, cap) && kuid_has_mapping(ns, inode->i_uid) &&
+		kgid_has_mapping(ns, inode->i_gid);
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(inode_capable);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable_wrt_inode_uidgid);
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at  http://www.tux.org/lkml/

Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Powered by Openwall GNU/*/Linux Powered by OpenVZ