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Message-ID: <CAGXu5j+ZW9f8gW71_r5gRsEZoO_2fC3F4YXh_J1CwxRY6Vfx1Q@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 18 Jun 2014 16:28:45 -0700
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...mgrid.com>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@...hat.com>,
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>,
Chema Gonzalez <chema@...gle.com>,
Network Development <netdev@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] net: filter: fix upper BPF instruction limit
On Wed, Jun 18, 2014 at 4:19 PM, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...mgrid.com> wrote:
> On Wed, Jun 18, 2014 at 3:55 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> wrote:
>> On Wed, Jun 18, 2014 at 3:48 PM, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...mgrid.com> wrote:
>>> On Wed, Jun 18, 2014 at 3:34 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> wrote:
>>>> The original checks (via sk_chk_filter) for instruction count uses ">",
>>>> not ">=", so changing this in sk_convert_filter has the potential to break
>>>> existing seccomp filters that used exactly BPF_MAXINSNS many instructions.
>>>>
>>>> Fixes: bd4cf0ed331a ("net: filter: rework/optimize internal BPF interpreter's instruction set")
>>>> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
>>>> Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org # v3.15+
>>>
>>> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...mgrid.com>
>>>
>>> I wonder how did you catch this? :)
>>> Just code inspection or seccomp actually generating such programs?
>>
>> In the process of merging my seccomp thread-sync series back with
>> mainline, I got uncomfortable that I was moving filter size validation
>> around without actually testing it. When I added it, I was happy that
>> my series was correctly checking size limits, but then discovered my
>> newly added check actually failed on an earlier kernel (3.2). Tracking
>> it down found the corner case under 3.15.
>>
>> Here's the test I added to the seccomp regression tests, if you're interested:
>> https://github.com/kees/seccomp/commit/794d54a340cde70a3bdf7fe0ade1f95d160b2883
>
> Nice. I'm assuming https://github.com/redpig/seccomp is still the main tree
> for seccomp testsuite…
Yes. Will hasn't pulled this most recent set of changes.
>
> btw I've tried to add 'real' test to it (one generated by chrome)
>
> +TEST(chrome_syscalls) {
> + static struct sock_filter filter[] = {
> + { 32, 240, 61, 4 }, /* 0: ld [4] */
> + { 21, 1, 0, -1073741762 }, /* 1: jeq #0xc000003e, 3, 2 */
> + { 5, 0, 0, 271 }, /* 2: ja 274 */
> + { 32, 208, 198, 0 }, /* 3: ld [0] */
> + { 69, 0, 1, 1073741824 }, /* 4: jset
> #0x40000000, 5, 6 */
> + { 6, 0, 0, 196615 }, /* 5: ret #0x30007 */
> + { 53, 0, 7, 121 }, /* 6: jge #0x79, 7, 14 */
> + { 53, 0, 12, 214 }, /* 7: jge #0xd6, 8, 20 */
> …
> + { 6, 0, 0, 2147418112 }, /* 272: ret #0x7fff0000 */
> + { 6, 0, 0, 327681 }, /* 273: ret #0x50001 */
> + { 6, 0, 0, 196610 }, /* 274: ret #0x30002 */
> + };
> ...
> + for (i = 0; i < MAX_SYSCALLS; i++) {
> + ch_pid = fork();
> + ASSERT_LE(0, ch_pid);
> +
> + if (ch_pid == 0) {
> + ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP,
> + SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog);
> + ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
> +#define MAGIC (-1ll << 2)
> + err = syscall(i, MAGIC, MAGIC, MAGIC,
> + MAGIC, MAGIC, MAGIC);
> + syscall(__NR_exit, 0);
> + }
> + wait(&status);
> + if (status != expected_status[i])
> …
>
> but it's really x64 only and looks ugly. Do you have better ideas
> on how to test all possible paths through auto-generated branch tree?
For testing BPF application filter logic itself, I lean on the test
suite in libseccomp, which does a ton of filter generation and
testing. The seccomp regression tests in the github tree tend to focus
on validating the basic behavioral elements (kill, trace, trap, etc).
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security
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