linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] net: filter: fix upper BPF instruction limit

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Date:	Wed, 18 Jun 2014 16:28:45 -0700
From:	Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To:	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...mgrid.com>
Cc:	LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
	Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@...hat.com>,
	Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>,
	Chema Gonzalez <chema@...gle.com>,
	Network Development <netdev@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] net: filter: fix upper BPF instruction limit

On Wed, Jun 18, 2014 at 4:19 PM, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...mgrid.com> wrote:
> On Wed, Jun 18, 2014 at 3:55 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> wrote:
>> On Wed, Jun 18, 2014 at 3:48 PM, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...mgrid.com> wrote:
>>> On Wed, Jun 18, 2014 at 3:34 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> wrote:
>>>> The original checks (via sk_chk_filter) for instruction count uses ">",
>>>> not ">=", so changing this in sk_convert_filter has the potential to break
>>>> existing seccomp filters that used exactly BPF_MAXINSNS many instructions.
>>>>
>>>> Fixes: bd4cf0ed331a ("net: filter: rework/optimize internal BPF interpreter's instruction set")
>>>> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
>>>> Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org # v3.15+
>>>
>>> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...mgrid.com>
>>>
>>> I wonder how did you catch this? :)
>>> Just code inspection or seccomp actually generating such programs?
>>
>> In the process of merging my seccomp thread-sync series back with
>> mainline, I got uncomfortable that I was moving filter size validation
>> around without actually testing it. When I added it, I was happy that
>> my series was correctly checking size limits, but then discovered my
>> newly added check actually failed on an earlier kernel (3.2). Tracking
>> it down found the corner case under 3.15.
>>
>> Here's the test I added to the seccomp regression tests, if you're interested:
>> https://github.com/kees/seccomp/commit/794d54a340cde70a3bdf7fe0ade1f95d160b2883
>
> Nice. I'm assuming https://github.com/redpig/seccomp is still the main tree
> for seccomp testsuite…

Yes. Will hasn't pulled this most recent set of changes.

>
> btw I've tried to add 'real' test to it (one generated by chrome)
>
> +TEST(chrome_syscalls) {
> +       static struct sock_filter filter[] = {
> +               { 32, 240, 61, 4 },          /* 0:      ld [4] */
> +               { 21, 1, 0, -1073741762 },   /* 1:      jeq #0xc000003e, 3, 2 */
> +               { 5, 0, 0, 271 },            /* 2:      ja 274 */
> +               { 32, 208, 198, 0 },         /* 3:      ld [0] */
> +               { 69, 0, 1, 1073741824 },    /* 4:      jset
> #0x40000000, 5, 6 */
> +               { 6, 0, 0, 196615 },         /* 5:      ret #0x30007 */
> +               { 53, 0, 7, 121 },           /* 6:      jge #0x79, 7, 14 */
> +               { 53, 0, 12, 214 },          /* 7:      jge #0xd6, 8, 20 */
> …
> +               { 6, 0, 0, 2147418112 },     /* 272:    ret #0x7fff0000 */
> +               { 6, 0, 0, 327681 },         /* 273:    ret #0x50001 */
> +               { 6, 0, 0, 196610 },         /* 274:    ret #0x30002 */
> +       };
> ...
> +       for (i = 0; i < MAX_SYSCALLS; i++) {
> +               ch_pid = fork();
> +               ASSERT_LE(0, ch_pid);
> +
> +               if (ch_pid == 0) {
> +                       ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP,
> +                              SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog);
> +                       ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
> +#define MAGIC (-1ll << 2)
> +                       err = syscall(i, MAGIC, MAGIC, MAGIC,
> +                              MAGIC, MAGIC, MAGIC);
> +                       syscall(__NR_exit, 0);
> +               }
> +               wait(&status);
> +               if (status != expected_status[i])
> …
>
> but it's really x64 only and looks ugly. Do you have better ideas
> on how to test all possible paths through auto-generated branch tree?

For testing BPF application filter logic itself, I lean on the test
suite in libseccomp, which does a ton of filter generation and
testing. The seccomp regression tests in the github tree tend to focus
on validating the basic behavioral elements (kill, trace, trap, etc).

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at  http://www.tux.org/lkml/