linux-kernel - [PATCH 3.15 06/61] evm: prohibit userspace writing security.evm HMAC value

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Message-Id: <20140624154953.059964259@linuxfoundation.org>
Date:	Tue, 24 Jun 2014 11:50:49 -0400
From:	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
	stable@...r.kernel.org, Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
Subject: [PATCH 3.15 06/61] evm: prohibit userspace writing security.evm HMAC value

3.15-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>

commit 2fb1c9a4f2dbc2f0bd2431c7fa64d0b5483864e4 upstream.

Calculating the 'security.evm' HMAC value requires access to the
EVM encrypted key.  Only the kernel should have access to it.  This
patch prevents userspace tools(eg. setfattr, cp --preserve=xattr)
from setting/modifying the 'security.evm' HMAC value directly.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>

---
 security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c |   12 ++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -287,12 +287,20 @@ out:
  * @xattr_value: pointer to the new extended attribute value
  * @xattr_value_len: pointer to the new extended attribute value length
  *
- * Updating 'security.evm' requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges and that
- * the current value is valid.
+ * Before allowing the 'security.evm' protected xattr to be updated,
+ * verify the existing value is valid.  As only the kernel should have
+ * access to the EVM encrypted key needed to calculate the HMAC, prevent
+ * userspace from writing HMAC value.  Writing 'security.evm' requires
+ * requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges.
  */
 int evm_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
 		       const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
 {
+	const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = xattr_value;
+
+	if ((strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM) == 0)
+	    && (xattr_data->type == EVM_XATTR_HMAC))
+		return -EPERM;
 	return evm_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
 				 xattr_value_len);
 }


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