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Message-ID: <CAGXu5j+Khz+HH3QvfNWa3FdUspTEf-xLchBMLyCC_QN42xpLZA@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 24 Jun 2014 12:46:01 -0700
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...mgrid.com>,
"Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)" <mtk.manpages@...il.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@...hat.com>,
Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>,
Julien Tinnes <jln@...omium.org>,
David Drysdale <drysdale@...gle.com>,
Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
"x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>,
"linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org"
<linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>, linux-mips@...ux-mips.org,
linux-arch <linux-arch@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-security-module <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 3/9] seccomp: introduce writer locking
On Tue, Jun 24, 2014 at 11:30 AM, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com> wrote:
> I am puzzled by the usage of smp_load_acquire(),
It was recommended by Andy Lutomirski in preference to ACCESS_ONCE().
> On 06/23, Kees Cook wrote:
>>
>> static u32 seccomp_run_filters(int syscall)
>> {
>> - struct seccomp_filter *f;
>> + struct seccomp_filter *f = smp_load_acquire(¤t->seccomp.filter);
>> struct seccomp_data sd;
>> u32 ret = SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW;
>>
>> /* Ensure unexpected behavior doesn't result in failing open. */
>> - if (WARN_ON(current->seccomp.filter == NULL))
>> + if (WARN_ON(f == NULL))
>> return SECCOMP_RET_KILL;
>>
>> populate_seccomp_data(&sd);
>> @@ -186,9 +186,8 @@ static u32 seccomp_run_filters(int syscall)
>> * All filters in the list are evaluated and the lowest BPF return
>> * value always takes priority (ignoring the DATA).
>> */
>> - for (f = current->seccomp.filter; f; f = f->prev) {
>> + for (; f; f = smp_load_acquire(&f->prev)) {
>> u32 cur_ret = SK_RUN_FILTER(f->prog, (void *)&sd);
>> -
>> if ((cur_ret & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION) < (ret & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION))
>> ret = cur_ret;
>
> OK, in this case the 1st one is probably fine, altgough it is not
> clear to me why it is better than read_barrier_depends().
>
> But why do we need a 2nd one inside the loop? And if we actually need
> it (I don't think so) then why it is safe to use f->prog without
> load_acquire ?
You're right -- it should not be possible for for any of the ->prev
pointers to change.
>> void get_seccomp_filter(struct task_struct *tsk)
>> {
>> - struct seccomp_filter *orig = tsk->seccomp.filter;
>> + struct seccomp_filter *orig = smp_load_acquire(&tsk->seccomp.filter);
>> if (!orig)
>> return;
>
> This one looks unneeded.
>
> First of all, afaics atomic_inc() should work correctly without any barriers,
> otherwise it is buggy. But even this doesn't matter.
>
> With this changes get_seccomp_filter() must be called under ->siglock, it can't
> race with add-filter and thus tsk->seccomp.filter should be stable.
Excellent point, yes. I'll remove that.
>> /* Reference count is bounded by the number of total processes. */
>> @@ -361,7 +364,7 @@ void put_seccomp_filter(struct task_struct *tsk)
>> /* Clean up single-reference branches iteratively. */
>> while (orig && atomic_dec_and_test(&orig->usage)) {
>> struct seccomp_filter *freeme = orig;
>> - orig = orig->prev;
>> + orig = smp_load_acquire(&orig->prev);
>> seccomp_filter_free(freeme);
>> }
>
> This one looks unneeded too. And note that this patch does not add
> smp_load_acquire() to read tsk->seccomp.filter.
Hrm, yes, that should get added.
> atomic_dec_and_test() adds mb(), we do not need more barriers to access
> ->prev ?
Right, same situation as the run_filters loop. Thanks!
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security
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