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Message-ID: <20140625172410.GA17133@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 25 Jun 2014 19:24:10 +0200
From: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
"Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)" <mtk.manpages@...il.com>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...mgrid.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@...hat.com>,
Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>,
Julien Tinnes <jln@...omium.org>,
David Drysdale <drysdale@...gle.com>,
Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
"x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>,
"linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org"
<linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>, linux-mips@...ux-mips.org,
linux-arch <linux-arch@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-security-module <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 9/9] seccomp: implement SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC
On 06/25, Kees Cook wrote:
>
> On Wed, Jun 25, 2014 at 9:52 AM, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com> wrote:
> >
> > Yes, at least this should close the race with suid-exec. And there are no
> > other users. Except apparmor, and I hope you will check it because I simply
> > do not know what it does ;)
> >
> >> I wonder if changes to nnp need to "flushed" during syscall entry
> >> instead of getting updated externally/asynchronously? That way it
> >> won't be out of sync with the seccomp mode/filters.
> >>
> >> Perhaps secure computing needs to check some (maybe seccomp-only)
> >> atomic flags and flip on the "real" nnp if found?
> >
> > Not sure I understand you, could you clarify?
>
> Instead of having TSYNC change the nnp bit, it can set a new flag, say:
>
> task->seccomp.flags |= SECCOMP_NEEDS_NNP;
>
> This would be set along with seccomp.mode, seccomp.filter, and
> TIF_SECCOMP. Then, during the next secure_computing() call that thread
> makes, it would check the flag:
>
> if (task->seccomp.flags & SECCOMP_NEEDS_NNP)
> task->nnp = 1;
>
> This means that nnp couldn't change in the middle of a running syscall.
Aha, so you were worried about the same thing. Not sure we need this,
but at least I understand you and...
> Hmmm. Perhaps this doesn't solve anything, though? Perhaps my proposal
> above would actually make things worse, since now we'd have a thread
> with seccomp set up, and no nnp. If it was in the middle of exec,
> we're still causing a problem.
Yes ;)
> I think we'd also need a way to either delay the seccomp changes, or
> to notice this condition during exec. Bleh.
Hmm. confused again,
> What actually happens with a multi-threaded process calls exec? I
> assume all the other threads are destroyed?
Yes. But this is the point-of-no-return, de_thread() is called after the execing
thared has already passed (say) check_unsafe_exec().
However, do_execve() takes cred_guard_mutex at the start in prepare_bprm_creds()
and drops it in install_exec_creds(), so it should solve the problem?
Oleg.
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