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Message-ID: <CAGXu5j+wPvAuo6pVc_XoJqv7CvW6yDf3YE6P7tFwtO9hfcUUsg@mail.gmail.com> Date: Fri, 27 Jun 2014 11:52:31 -0700 From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, "Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)" <mtk.manpages@...il.com>, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...mgrid.com>, Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@...hat.com>, Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>, Julien Tinnes <jln@...omium.org>, David Drysdale <drysdale@...gle.com>, Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>, "x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>, "linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org" <linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>, linux-mips@...ux-mips.org, linux-arch <linux-arch@...r.kernel.org>, linux-security-module <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org> Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 5/9] seccomp: split mode set routines On Fri, Jun 27, 2014 at 11:39 AM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net> wrote: > On Fri, Jun 27, 2014 at 11:33 AM, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> wrote: >> On Wed, Jun 25, 2014 at 11:07 AM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net> wrote: >>> On Wed, Jun 25, 2014 at 11:00 AM, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> wrote: >>>> On Wed, Jun 25, 2014 at 10:51 AM, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com> wrote: >>>>> On 06/25, Andy Lutomirski wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> On Wed, Jun 25, 2014 at 10:32 AM, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com> wrote: >>>>>> > On 06/25, Andy Lutomirski wrote: >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> Write the filter, then smp_mb (or maybe a weaker barrier is okay), >>>>>> >> then set the bit. >>>>>> > >>>>>> > Yes, exactly, this is what I meant. Plas rmb() in __secure_computing(). >>>>>> > >>>>>> > But I still can't understand the rest of your discussion about the >>>>>> > ordering we need ;) >>>>>> >>>>>> Let me try again from scratch. >>>>>> >>>>>> Currently there are three relevant variables: TIF_SECCOMP, >>>>>> seccomp.mode, and seccomp.filter. __secure_computing needs >>>>>> seccomp.mode and seccomp.filter to be in sync, and it wants (but >>>>>> doesn't really need) TIF_SECCOMP to be in sync as well. >>>>>> >>>>>> My suggestion is to rearrange it a bit. Move mode into seccomp.filter >>>>>> (so that filter == NULL implies no seccomp) and don't check >>>> >>>> This would require that we reimplement mode 1 seccomp via mode 2 >>>> filters. Which isn't too hard, but may add complexity. >>>> >>>>>> TIF_SECCOMP in secure_computing. Then turning on seccomp is entirely >>>>>> atomic except for the fact that the seccomp hooks won't be called if >>>>>> filter != NULL but !TIF_SECCOMP. This removes all ordering >>>>>> requirements. >>>>> >>>>> Ah, got it, thanks. Perhaps I missed somehing, but to me this looks like >>>>> unnecessary complication at first glance. >>>>> >>>>> We alredy have TIF_SECCOMP, we need it anyway, and we should only care >>>>> about the case when this bit is actually set, so that we can race with >>>>> the 1st call of __secure_computing(). >>>>> >>>>> Otherwise we are fine: we can miss the new filter anyway, ->mode can't >>>>> be changed it is already nonzero. >>>>> >>>>>> Alternatively, __secure_computing could still BUG_ON(!seccomp.filter). >>>>>> In that case, filter needs to be set before TIF_SECCOMP is set, but >>>>>> that's straightforward. >>>>> >>>>> Yep. And this is how seccomp_assign_mode() already works? It is called >>>>> after we change ->filter chain, it changes ->mode before set(TIF_SECCOMP) >>>>> just it lacks a barrier. >>>> >>>> Right, I think the best solution is to add the barrier. I was >>>> concerned that adding the read barrier in secure_computing would have >>>> a performance impact, though. >>>> >>> >>> I can't speak for ARM, but I think that all of the read barriers are >>> essentially free on x86. (smp_mb is a very different story, but that >>> shouldn't be needed here.) >> >> It looks like SMP ARM issues dsb for rmb, which seems a bit expensive. >> http://infocenter.arm.com/help/index.jsp?topic=/com.arm.doc.dui0204g/CIHJFGFE.html >> >> If I skip the rmb in the secure_computing call before checking mode, >> it sounds like I run the risk of racing an out-of-order TIF_SECCOMP vs >> mode and filter. This seems unlikely to me, given an addition of the >> smp_mb__before_atomic() during the seccomp_assign_mode()? I guess I >> don't have a sense of how aggressively ARM might do data caching in >> this area. Could the other thread actually see TIF_SECCOMP get set but >> still have an out of date copy of seccomp.mode? >> >> I really want to avoid adding anything to the secure_computing() >> execution path. :( > > Hence my suggestion to make the ordering not matter. No ordering > requirement, no barriers. I may be misunderstanding something, but I think there's still an ordering problem. We'll have TIF_SECCOMP already, so if we enter secure_computing with a NULL filter, we'll kill the process. Merging .mode and .filter would remove one of the race failure paths: having TIF_SECCOMP and not having a mode set (leading to BUG). With the merge, we could still race and land in the same place as have TIF_SECCOMP and mode==2, but filter==NULL, leading to WARN and kill. I guess the question is how large is the race risk on ARM? Is it possible to have TIF_SECCOMP that far out of sync for the thread? -Kees -- Kees Cook Chrome OS Security -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
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