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Message-ID: <20140703111806.GE9748@hmsreliant.think-freely.org>
Date: Thu, 3 Jul 2014 07:18:06 -0400
From: Neil Horman <nhorman@...driver.com>
To: Jarod Wilson <jarod@...hat.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Rusty Russell <rusty@...tcorp.com.au>,
Stephan Mueller <stephan.mueller@...ec.com>,
linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] crypto/fips: only panic on bad/missing crypto mod
signatures
On Wed, Jul 02, 2014 at 03:37:30PM -0400, Jarod Wilson wrote:
> Per further discussion with NIST, the requirements for FIPS state that
> we only need to panic the system on failed kernel module signature checks
> for crypto subsystem modules. This moves the fips-mode-only module
> signature check out of the generic module loading code, into the crypto
> subsystem, at points where we can catch both algorithm module loads and
> mode module loads. At the same time, make CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS dependent on
> CONFIG_MODULE_SIG, as this is entirely necessary for FIPS mode.
>
> v2: remove extraneous blank line, perform checks in static inline
> function, drop no longer necessary fips.h include.
>
> CC: Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>
> CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>
> CC: Rusty Russell <rusty@...tcorp.com.au>
> CC: Stephan Mueller <stephan.mueller@...ec.com>
> CC: linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Jarod Wilson <jarod@...hat.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@...driver.com>
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