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Message-ID: <2891603.xs6W2pOOfS@tauon>
Date: Thu, 03 Jul 2014 16:10:07 +0200
From: Stephan Mueller <stephan.mueller@...ec.com>
To: Neil Horman <nhorman@...driver.com>
Cc: Jarod Wilson <jarod@...hat.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Rusty Russell <rusty@...tcorp.com.au>,
linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] crypto/fips: only panic on bad/missing crypto mod signatures
Am Donnerstag, 3. Juli 2014, 07:18:06 schrieb Neil Horman:
>On Wed, Jul 02, 2014 at 03:37:30PM -0400, Jarod Wilson wrote:
>> Per further discussion with NIST, the requirements for FIPS state
>> that
>> we only need to panic the system on failed kernel module signature
>> checks for crypto subsystem modules. This moves the fips-mode-only
>> module signature check out of the generic module loading code, into
>> the crypto subsystem, at points where we can catch both algorithm
>> module loads and mode module loads. At the same time, make
>> CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS dependent on CONFIG_MODULE_SIG, as this is
>> entirely necessary for FIPS mode.
>>
>> v2: remove extraneous blank line, perform checks in static inline
>> function, drop no longer necessary fips.h include.
>>
>> CC: Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>
>> CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>
>> CC: Rusty Russell <rusty@...tcorp.com.au>
>> CC: Stephan Mueller <stephan.mueller@...ec.com>
>> CC: linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org
>> Signed-off-by: Jarod Wilson <jarod@...hat.com>
>
>Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@...driver.com>
Acked-by: Stephan Mueller <stephan.mueller@...ec.com>
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