linux-kernel - Re: [RFC/PATCH RESEND -next 01/21] Add kernel address sanitizer infrastructure.

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Message-id: <53BE8EA5.2030402@samsung.com>
Date:	Thu, 10 Jul 2014 17:01:25 +0400
From:	Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@...sung.com>
To:	Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@...cle.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:	Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>,
	Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@...gle.com>,
	Alexey Preobrazhensky <preobr@...gle.com>,
	Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@...il.com>,
	Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@...il.com>,
	Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@...il.com>,
	Michal Marek <mmarek@...e.cz>,
	Russell King <linux@....linux.org.uk>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
	Christoph Lameter <cl@...ux.com>,
	Pekka Enberg <penberg@...nel.org>,
	David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
	Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@....com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
	linux-kbuild@...r.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org,
	x86@...nel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC/PATCH RESEND -next 01/21] Add kernel address sanitizer
 infrastructure.

On 07/10/14 15:55, Sasha Levin wrote:
> On 07/09/2014 07:29 AM, Andrey Ryabinin wrote:
>> Address sanitizer for kernel (kasan) is a dynamic memory error detector.
>>
>> The main features of kasan is:
>>  - is based on compiler instrumentation (fast),
>>  - detects out of bounds for both writes and reads,
>>  - provides use after free detection,
>>
>> This patch only adds infrastructure for kernel address sanitizer. It's not
>> available for use yet. The idea and some code was borrowed from [1].
>>
>> This feature requires pretty fresh GCC (revision r211699 from 2014-06-16 or
>> latter).
>>
>> Implementation details:
>> The main idea of KASAN is to use shadow memory to record whether each byte of memory
>> is safe to access or not, and use compiler's instrumentation to check the shadow memory
>> on each memory access.
>>
>> Address sanitizer dedicates 1/8 of the low memory to the shadow memory and uses direct
>> mapping with a scale and offset to translate a memory address to its corresponding
>> shadow address.
>>
>> Here is function to translate address to corresponding shadow address:
>>
>>      unsigned long kasan_mem_to_shadow(unsigned long addr)
>>      {
>>                 return ((addr - PAGE_OFFSET) >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT)
>>                              + kasan_shadow_start;
>>      }
>>
>> where KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT = 3.
>>
>> So for every 8 bytes of lowmemory there is one corresponding byte of shadow memory.
>> The following encoding used for each shadow byte: 0 means that all 8 bytes of the
>> corresponding memory region are valid for access; k (1 <= k <= 7) means that
>> the first k bytes are valid for access, and other (8 - k) bytes are not;
>> Any negative value indicates that the entire 8-bytes are unaccessible.
>> Different negative values used to distinguish between different kinds of
>> unaccessible memory (redzones, freed memory) (see mm/kasan/kasan.h).
>>
>> To be able to detect accesses to bad memory we need a special compiler.
>> Such compiler inserts a specific function calls (__asan_load*(addr), __asan_store*(addr))
>> before each memory access of size 1, 2, 4, 8 or 16.
>>
>> These functions check whether memory region is valid to access or not by checking
>> corresponding shadow memory. If access is not valid an error printed.
>>
>> [1] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@...sung.com>
> 
> I gave it a spin, and it seems that it fails for what you might call a "regular"
> memory size these days, in my case it was 18G:
> 
> [    0.000000] Kernel panic - not syncing: ERROR: Failed to allocate 0xe0c00000 bytes below 0x0.
> [    0.000000]
> [    0.000000] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 3.16.0-rc4-next-20140710-sasha-00044-gb7b0579-dirty #784
> [    0.000000]  ffffffffb9c2d3c8 cd9ce91adea4379a 0000000000000000 ffffffffb9c2d3c8
> [    0.000000]  ffffffffb9c2d330 ffffffffb7fe89b7 ffffffffb93c8c28 ffffffffb9c2d3b8
> [    0.000000]  ffffffffb7fcff1d 0000000000000018 ffffffffb9c2d3c8 ffffffffb9c2d360
> [    0.000000] Call Trace:
> [    0.000000] <UNK> dump_stack (lib/dump_stack.c:52)
> [    0.000000] panic (kernel/panic.c:119)
> [    0.000000] memblock_alloc_base (mm/memblock.c:1092)
> [    0.000000] memblock_alloc (mm/memblock.c:1097)
> [    0.000000] kasan_alloc_shadow (mm/kasan/kasan.c:151)
> [    0.000000] zone_sizes_init (arch/x86/mm/init.c:684)
> [    0.000000] paging_init (arch/x86/mm/init_64.c:677)
> [    0.000000] setup_arch (arch/x86/kernel/setup.c:1168)
> [    0.000000] ? printk (kernel/printk/printk.c:1839)
> [    0.000000] start_kernel (include/linux/mm_types.h:462 init/main.c:533)
> [    0.000000] ? early_idt_handlers (arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S:344)
> [    0.000000] x86_64_start_reservations (arch/x86/kernel/head64.c:194)
> [    0.000000] x86_64_start_kernel (arch/x86/kernel/head64.c:183)
> 
> It got better when I reduced memory to 1GB, but then my system just failed to boot
> at all because that's not enough to bring everything up.
> 

Thanks.
I think memory size is not a problem here. I tested on my desktop with 16G.
Seems it's a problem with memory holes cited by Dave.
kasan tries to allocate ~3.5G. It means that lowmemsize is 28G in your case.


> 
> Thanks,
> Sasha
> 

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