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Message-ID: <20140715060932.GJ11317@js1304-P5Q-DELUXE>
Date: Tue, 15 Jul 2014 15:09:32 +0900
From: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@....com>
To: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@...sung.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>,
Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@...gle.com>,
Alexey Preobrazhensky <preobr@...gle.com>,
Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@...il.com>,
Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@...il.com>,
Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@...il.com>,
Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@...cle.com>,
Michal Marek <mmarek@...e.cz>,
Russell King <linux@....linux.org.uk>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
Christoph Lameter <cl@...ux.com>,
Pekka Enberg <penberg@...nel.org>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
linux-kbuild@...r.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org,
x86@...nel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org
Subject: Re: [RFC/PATCH RESEND -next 15/21] mm: slub: add kernel address
sanitizer hooks to slub allocator
On Wed, Jul 09, 2014 at 03:30:09PM +0400, Andrey Ryabinin wrote:
> With this patch kasan will be able to catch bugs in memory allocated
> by slub.
> Allocated slab page, this whole page marked as unaccessible
> in corresponding shadow memory.
> On allocation of slub object requested allocation size marked as
> accessible, and the rest of the object (including slub's metadata)
> marked as redzone (unaccessible).
>
> We also mark object as accessible if ksize was called for this object.
> There is some places in kernel where ksize function is called to inquire
> size of really allocated area. Such callers could validly access whole
> allocated memory, so it should be marked as accessible by kasan_krealloc call.
>
> Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@...sung.com>
> ---
> include/linux/kasan.h | 22 ++++++++++
> include/linux/slab.h | 19 +++++++--
> lib/Kconfig.kasan | 2 +
> mm/kasan/kasan.c | 110 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> mm/kasan/kasan.h | 5 +++
> mm/kasan/report.c | 23 +++++++++++
> mm/slab.h | 2 +-
> mm/slab_common.c | 9 +++--
> mm/slub.c | 24 ++++++++++-
> 9 files changed, 208 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/kasan.h b/include/linux/kasan.h
> index 4adc0a1..583c011 100644
> --- a/include/linux/kasan.h
> +++ b/include/linux/kasan.h
> @@ -20,6 +20,17 @@ void kasan_init_shadow(void);
> void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order);
> void kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order);
>
> +void kasan_kmalloc_large(const void *ptr, size_t size);
> +void kasan_kfree_large(const void *ptr);
> +void kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *s, const void *object, size_t size);
> +void kasan_krealloc(const void *object, size_t new_size);
> +
> +void kasan_slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object);
> +void kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object);
> +
> +void kasan_alloc_slab_pages(struct page *page, int order);
> +void kasan_free_slab_pages(struct page *page, int order);
> +
> #else /* CONFIG_KASAN */
>
> static inline void unpoison_shadow(const void *address, size_t size) {}
> @@ -34,6 +45,17 @@ static inline void kasan_alloc_shadow(void) {}
> static inline void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order) {}
> static inline void kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order) {}
>
> +static inline void kasan_kmalloc_large(void *ptr, size_t size) {}
> +static inline void kasan_kfree_large(const void *ptr) {}
> +static inline void kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *s, const void *object, size_t size) {}
> +static inline void kasan_krealloc(const void *object, size_t new_size) {}
> +
> +static inline void kasan_slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object) {}
> +static inline void kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object) {}
> +
> +static inline void kasan_alloc_slab_pages(struct page *page, int order) {}
> +static inline void kasan_free_slab_pages(struct page *page, int order) {}
> +
> #endif /* CONFIG_KASAN */
>
> #endif /* LINUX_KASAN_H */
> diff --git a/include/linux/slab.h b/include/linux/slab.h
> index 68b1feab..a9513e9 100644
> --- a/include/linux/slab.h
> +++ b/include/linux/slab.h
> @@ -104,6 +104,7 @@
> (unsigned long)ZERO_SIZE_PTR)
>
> #include <linux/kmemleak.h>
> +#include <linux/kasan.h>
>
> struct mem_cgroup;
> /*
> @@ -444,6 +445,8 @@ static __always_inline void *kmalloc_large(size_t size, gfp_t flags)
> */
> static __always_inline void *kmalloc(size_t size, gfp_t flags)
> {
> + void *ret;
> +
> if (__builtin_constant_p(size)) {
> if (size > KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE)
> return kmalloc_large(size, flags);
> @@ -454,8 +457,12 @@ static __always_inline void *kmalloc(size_t size, gfp_t flags)
> if (!index)
> return ZERO_SIZE_PTR;
>
> - return kmem_cache_alloc_trace(kmalloc_caches[index],
> + ret = kmem_cache_alloc_trace(kmalloc_caches[index],
> flags, size);
> +
> + kasan_kmalloc(kmalloc_caches[index], ret, size);
> +
> + return ret;
> }
> #endif
> }
> @@ -485,6 +492,8 @@ static __always_inline int kmalloc_size(int n)
> static __always_inline void *kmalloc_node(size_t size, gfp_t flags, int node)
> {
> #ifndef CONFIG_SLOB
> + void *ret;
> +
> if (__builtin_constant_p(size) &&
> size <= KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE && !(flags & GFP_DMA)) {
> int i = kmalloc_index(size);
> @@ -492,8 +501,12 @@ static __always_inline void *kmalloc_node(size_t size, gfp_t flags, int node)
> if (!i)
> return ZERO_SIZE_PTR;
>
> - return kmem_cache_alloc_node_trace(kmalloc_caches[i],
> - flags, node, size);
> + ret = kmem_cache_alloc_node_trace(kmalloc_caches[i],
> + flags, node, size);
> +
> + kasan_kmalloc(kmalloc_caches[i], ret, size);
> +
> + return ret;
> }
> #endif
> return __kmalloc_node(size, flags, node);
> diff --git a/lib/Kconfig.kasan b/lib/Kconfig.kasan
> index 2bfff78..289a624 100644
> --- a/lib/Kconfig.kasan
> +++ b/lib/Kconfig.kasan
> @@ -5,6 +5,8 @@ if HAVE_ARCH_KASAN
>
> config KASAN
> bool "AddressSanitizer: dynamic memory error detector"
> + depends on SLUB
> + select STACKTRACE
> default n
> help
> Enables AddressSanitizer - dynamic memory error detector,
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/kasan.c b/mm/kasan/kasan.c
> index 109478e..9b5182a 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/kasan.c
> +++ b/mm/kasan/kasan.c
> @@ -177,6 +177,116 @@ void __init kasan_init_shadow(void)
> }
> }
>
> +void kasan_alloc_slab_pages(struct page *page, int order)
> +{
> + if (unlikely(!kasan_initialized))
> + return;
> +
> + poison_shadow(page_address(page), PAGE_SIZE << order, KASAN_SLAB_REDZONE);
> +}
> +
> +void kasan_free_slab_pages(struct page *page, int order)
> +{
> + if (unlikely(!kasan_initialized))
> + return;
> +
> + poison_shadow(page_address(page), PAGE_SIZE << order, KASAN_SLAB_FREE);
> +}
> +
> +void kasan_slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)
> +{
> + if (unlikely(!kasan_initialized))
> + return;
> +
> + if (unlikely(object == NULL))
> + return;
> +
> + poison_shadow(object, cache->size, KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE);
> + unpoison_shadow(object, cache->alloc_size);
> +}
> +
> +void kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)
> +{
> + unsigned long size = cache->size;
> + unsigned long rounded_up_size = round_up(size, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
> +
> + if (unlikely(!kasan_initialized))
> + return;
> +
> + poison_shadow(object, rounded_up_size, KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE);
> +}
> +
> +void kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object, size_t size)
> +{
> + unsigned long redzone_start;
> + unsigned long redzone_end;
> +
> + if (unlikely(!kasan_initialized))
> + return;
> +
> + if (unlikely(object == NULL))
> + return;
> +
> + redzone_start = round_up((unsigned long)(object + size),
> + KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
> + redzone_end = (unsigned long)object + cache->size;
> +
> + unpoison_shadow(object, size);
> + poison_shadow((void *)redzone_start, redzone_end - redzone_start,
> + KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE);
> +
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(kasan_kmalloc);
> +
> +void kasan_kmalloc_large(const void *ptr, size_t size)
> +{
> + struct page *page;
> + unsigned long redzone_start;
> + unsigned long redzone_end;
> +
> + if (unlikely(!kasan_initialized))
> + return;
> +
> + if (unlikely(ptr == NULL))
> + return;
> +
> + page = virt_to_page(ptr);
> + redzone_start = round_up((unsigned long)(ptr + size),
> + KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
> + redzone_end = (unsigned long)ptr + (PAGE_SIZE << compound_order(page));
> +
> + unpoison_shadow(ptr, size);
> + poison_shadow((void *)redzone_start, redzone_end - redzone_start,
> + KASAN_PAGE_REDZONE);
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(kasan_kmalloc_large);
> +
> +void kasan_krealloc(const void *object, size_t size)
> +{
> + struct page *page;
> +
> + if (unlikely(object == ZERO_SIZE_PTR))
> + return;
> +
> + page = virt_to_head_page(object);
> +
> + if (unlikely(!PageSlab(page)))
> + kasan_kmalloc_large(object, size);
> + else
> + kasan_kmalloc(page->slab_cache, object, size);
> +}
> +
> +void kasan_kfree_large(const void *ptr)
> +{
> + struct page *page;
> +
> + if (unlikely(!kasan_initialized))
> + return;
> +
> + page = virt_to_page(ptr);
> + poison_shadow(ptr, PAGE_SIZE << compound_order(page), KASAN_FREE_PAGE);
> +}
> +
> void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order)
> {
> if (unlikely(!kasan_initialized))
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/kasan.h b/mm/kasan/kasan.h
> index be9597e..f925d03 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/kasan.h
> +++ b/mm/kasan/kasan.h
> @@ -6,6 +6,11 @@
> #define KASAN_SHADOW_MASK (KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE - 1)
>
> #define KASAN_FREE_PAGE 0xFF /* page was freed */
> +#define KASAN_PAGE_REDZONE 0xFE /* redzone for kmalloc_large allocations */
> +#define KASAN_SLAB_REDZONE 0xFD /* Slab page redzone, does not belong to any slub object */
> +#define KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE 0xFC /* redzone inside slub object */
> +#define KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE 0xFB /* object was freed (kmem_cache_free/kfree) */
> +#define KASAN_SLAB_FREE 0xFA /* free slab page */
> #define KASAN_SHADOW_GAP 0xF9 /* address belongs to shadow memory */
>
> struct access_info {
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/report.c b/mm/kasan/report.c
> index 6ef9e57..6d829af 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/report.c
> +++ b/mm/kasan/report.c
> @@ -43,10 +43,15 @@ static void print_error_description(struct access_info *info)
> u8 shadow_val = *(u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(info->access_addr);
>
> switch (shadow_val) {
> + case KASAN_PAGE_REDZONE:
> + case KASAN_SLAB_REDZONE:
> + case KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE:
> case 0 ... KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE - 1:
> bug_type = "buffer overflow";
> break;
> case KASAN_FREE_PAGE:
> + case KASAN_SLAB_FREE:
> + case KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE:
> bug_type = "use after free";
> break;
> case KASAN_SHADOW_GAP:
> @@ -70,7 +75,25 @@ static void print_address_description(struct access_info *info)
> page = virt_to_page(info->access_addr);
>
> switch (shadow_val) {
> + case KASAN_SLAB_REDZONE:
> + cache = virt_to_cache((void *)info->access_addr);
> + slab_err(cache, page, "access to slab redzone");
We need head page of invalid access address for slab_err() since head
page has all meta data of this slab. So, instead of, virt_to_cache,
use virt_to_head_page() and page->slab_cache.
> + dump_stack();
> + break;
> + case KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE:
> + case KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE:
> + case 1 ... KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE - 1:
> + if (PageSlab(page)) {
> + cache = virt_to_cache((void *)info->access_addr);
> + slab_start = page_address(virt_to_head_page((void *)info->access_addr));
> + object = virt_to_obj(cache, slab_start,
> + (void *)info->access_addr);
> + object_err(cache, page, object, "kasan error");
> + break;
> + }
Same here, page should be head page.
Thanks.
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