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Message-ID: <20140715151130.GK6758@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net>
Date: Tue, 15 Jul 2014 17:11:30 +0200
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
To: kan.liang@...el.com
Cc: andi@...stfloor.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
kvm@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH V6 1/2] perf ignore LBR and extra_rsp
On Mon, Jul 14, 2014 at 12:25:56PM -0700, kan.liang@...el.com wrote:
Close enough.
> +#define EVENT_EXTRA_REG(e, ms, m, vm, i, a) { \
> + .event = (e), \
> + .msr = (ms), \
> + .config_mask = (m), \
> + .valid_mask = (vm), \
> + .idx = EXTRA_REG_##i, \
> + .extra_msr_access = (a), \
> }
>
> #define INTEL_EVENT_EXTRA_REG(event, msr, vm, idx) \
> - EVENT_EXTRA_REG(event, msr, ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_EVENT, vm, idx)
> + EVENT_EXTRA_REG(event, msr, ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_EVENT, vm, idx, true)
>
> #define INTEL_UEVENT_EXTRA_REG(event, msr, vm, idx) \
> EVENT_EXTRA_REG(event, msr, ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_EVENT | \
> - ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_UMASK, vm, idx)
> + ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_UMASK, vm, idx, true)
>
> #define INTEL_UEVENT_PEBS_LDLAT_EXTRA_REG(c) \
> INTEL_UEVENT_EXTRA_REG(c, \
> @@ -318,7 +320,7 @@ struct extra_reg {
> 0xffff, \
> LDLAT)
>
> -#define EVENT_EXTRA_END EVENT_EXTRA_REG(0, 0, 0, 0, RSP_0)
> +#define EVENT_EXTRA_END EVENT_EXTRA_REG(0, 0, 0, 0, RSP_0, false)
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_uncore.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_uncore.h
> index 90236f0..d860e26 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_uncore.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_uncore.h
> @@ -366,11 +366,11 @@
> NHMEX_M_PMON_CTL_FLAG_MODE)
> #define MBOX_INC_SEL_EXTAR_REG(c, r) \
> EVENT_EXTRA_REG(MBOX_INC_SEL(c), NHMEX_M0_MSR_PMU_##r, \
> - MBOX_INC_SEL_MASK, (u64)-1, NHMEX_M_##r)
> + MBOX_INC_SEL_MASK, (u64)-1, NHMEX_M_##r, true)
> #define MBOX_SET_FLAG_SEL_EXTRA_REG(c, r) \
> EVENT_EXTRA_REG(MBOX_SET_FLAG_SEL(c), NHMEX_M0_MSR_PMU_##r, \
> MBOX_SET_FLAG_SEL_MASK, \
> - (u64)-1, NHMEX_M_##r)
> + (u64)-1, NHMEX_M_##r, true)
>
> /* NHM-EX Rbox */
> #define NHMEX_R_MSR_GLOBAL_CTL 0xe00
Since nobody ever treats EVENT_EXTRA_END as an actual event, the value
of .extra_msr_access is irrelevant, this leaves the only 'possible'
value 'true' and we can delete all those changes.
Which, combined with a few whitespace cleanups, gives the below patch.
---
Subject: x86, perf: Protect LBR and extra_regs against KVM lying
From: Kan Liang <kan.liang@...el.com>
Date: Mon, 14 Jul 2014 12:25:56 -0700
With -cpu host, KVM reports LBR and extra_regs support, if the host has
support.
When the guest perf driver tries to access LBR or extra_regs MSR,
it #GPs all MSR accesses,since KVM doesn't handle LBR and extra_regs support.
So check the related MSRs access right once at initialization time to avoid
the error access at runtime.
For reproducing the issue, please build the kernel with CONFIG_KVM_INTEL = y
(for host kernel).
And CONFIG_PARAVIRT = n and CONFIG_KVM_GUEST = n (for guest kernel).
Start the guest with -cpu host.
Run perf record with --branch-any or --branch-filter in guest to trigger LBR
Run perf stat offcore events (E.g. LLC-loads/LLC-load-misses ...) in guest to
trigger offcore_rsp #GP
Cc: andi@...stfloor.org
Signed-off-by: Kan Liang <kan.liang@...el.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1405365957-20202-1-git-send-email-kan.liang@intel.com
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.c | 3 +
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.h | 12 +++---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel.c | 66 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
3 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.c
@@ -118,6 +118,9 @@ static int x86_pmu_extra_regs(u64 config
continue;
if (event->attr.config1 & ~er->valid_mask)
return -EINVAL;
+ /* Check if the extra msrs can be safely accessed*/
+ if (!er->extra_msr_access)
+ return -ENXIO;
reg->idx = er->idx;
reg->config = event->attr.config1;
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.h
@@ -295,14 +295,16 @@ struct extra_reg {
u64 config_mask;
u64 valid_mask;
int idx; /* per_xxx->regs[] reg index */
+ bool extra_msr_access;
};
#define EVENT_EXTRA_REG(e, ms, m, vm, i) { \
- .event = (e), \
- .msr = (ms), \
- .config_mask = (m), \
- .valid_mask = (vm), \
- .idx = EXTRA_REG_##i, \
+ .event = (e), \
+ .msr = (ms), \
+ .config_mask = (m), \
+ .valid_mask = (vm), \
+ .idx = EXTRA_REG_##i, \
+ .extra_msr_access = true, \
}
#define INTEL_EVENT_EXTRA_REG(event, msr, vm, idx) \
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel.c
@@ -2182,6 +2182,41 @@ static void intel_snb_check_microcode(vo
}
}
+/*
+ * Under certain circumstances, access certain MSR may cause #GP.
+ * The function tests if the input MSR can be safely accessed.
+ */
+static bool check_msr(unsigned long msr, u64 mask)
+{
+ u64 val_old, val_new, val_tmp;
+
+ /*
+ * Read the current value, change it and read it back to see if it
+ * matches, this is needed to detect certain hardware emulators
+ * (qemu/kvm) that don't trap on the MSR access and always return 0s.
+ */
+ if (rdmsrl_safe(msr, &val_old))
+ return false;
+
+ /*
+ * Only change the bits which can be updated by wrmsrl.
+ */
+ val_tmp = val_old ^ mask;
+ if (wrmsrl_safe(msr, val_tmp) ||
+ rdmsrl_safe(msr, &val_new))
+ return false;
+
+ if (val_new != val_tmp)
+ return false;
+
+ /* Here it's sure that the MSR can be safely accessed.
+ * Restore the old value and return.
+ */
+ wrmsrl(msr, val_old);
+
+ return true;
+}
+
static __init void intel_sandybridge_quirk(void)
{
x86_pmu.check_microcode = intel_snb_check_microcode;
@@ -2271,7 +2306,8 @@ __init int intel_pmu_init(void)
union cpuid10_ebx ebx;
struct event_constraint *c;
unsigned int unused;
- int version;
+ struct extra_reg *er;
+ int version, i;
if (!cpu_has(&boot_cpu_data, X86_FEATURE_ARCH_PERFMON)) {
switch (boot_cpu_data.x86) {
@@ -2577,6 +2613,34 @@ __init int intel_pmu_init(void)
}
}
+ /*
+ * Access LBR MSR may cause #GP under certain circumstances.
+ * E.g. KVM doesn't support LBR MSR
+ * Check all LBT MSR here.
+ * Disable LBR access if any LBR MSRs can not be accessed.
+ */
+ if (x86_pmu.lbr_nr && !check_msr(x86_pmu.lbr_tos, 0x3UL))
+ x86_pmu.lbr_nr = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < x86_pmu.lbr_nr; i++) {
+ if (!(check_msr(x86_pmu.lbr_from + i, 0xffffUL) &&
+ check_msr(x86_pmu.lbr_to + i, 0xffffUL)))
+ x86_pmu.lbr_nr = 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Access extra MSR may cause #GP under certain circumstances.
+ * E.g. KVM doesn't support offcore event
+ * Check all extra_regs here.
+ */
+ if (x86_pmu.extra_regs) {
+ for (er = x86_pmu.extra_regs; er->msr; er++) {
+ er->extra_msr_access = check_msr(er->msr, 0x1ffUL);
+ /* Disable LBR select mapping */
+ if ((er->idx == EXTRA_REG_LBR) && !er->extra_msr_access)
+ x86_pmu.lbr_sel_map = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
/* Support full width counters using alternative MSR range */
if (x86_pmu.intel_cap.full_width_write) {
x86_pmu.max_period = x86_pmu.cntval_mask;
Content of type "application/pgp-signature" skipped
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