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Message-Id: <1405721239-2630-1-git-send-email-tytso@mit.edu>
Date: Fri, 18 Jul 2014 18:07:19 -0400
From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: hannes@...essinduktion.org, davej@...hat.com, price@....EDU,
Greg Price <price@....edu>, Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>
Subject: [PATCH] random: check for increase of entropy_count because of signed conversion
From: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@...essinduktion.org>
The expression entropy_count -= ibytes << (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3) could
actually increase entropy_count if during assignment of the unsigned
expression on the RHS (mind the -=) we reduce the value modulo
2^width(int) and assign it to entropy_count. Trinity found this.
[ Commit modified by tytso to add an additional safety check for a
negative entropy_count -- which should never happen, and to also add
an additional paranoia check to prevent overly large count values to
be passed into urandom_read(). ]
Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@...hat.com>
Cc: Greg Price <price@....edu>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@...essinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>
---
drivers/char/random.c | 17 ++++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index 0a7ac0a..003f744 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -641,7 +641,7 @@ retry:
} while (unlikely(entropy_count < pool_size-2 && pnfrac));
}
- if (entropy_count < 0) {
+ if (unlikely(entropy_count < 0)) {
pr_warn("random: negative entropy/overflow: pool %s count %d\n",
r->name, entropy_count);
WARN_ON(1);
@@ -981,7 +981,7 @@ static size_t account(struct entropy_store *r, size_t nbytes, int min,
int reserved)
{
int entropy_count, orig;
- size_t ibytes;
+ size_t ibytes, nfrac;
BUG_ON(r->entropy_count > r->poolinfo->poolfracbits);
@@ -999,7 +999,17 @@ retry:
}
if (ibytes < min)
ibytes = 0;
- if ((entropy_count -= ibytes << (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3)) < 0)
+
+ nfrac = ibytes << (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3);
+ if (entropy_count < 0) {
+ pr_warn("random: negative entropy count: pool %s count %d\n",
+ r->name, entropy_count);
+ WARN_ON(1);
+ entropy_count = 0;
+ }
+ if ((unsigned) entropy_count > nfrac)
+ entropy_count -= nfrac;
+ else
entropy_count = 0;
if (cmpxchg(&r->entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig)
@@ -1376,6 +1386,7 @@ urandom_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos)
"with %d bits of entropy available\n",
current->comm, nonblocking_pool.entropy_total);
+ nbytes = min_t(size_t, nbytes, INT_MAX >> ENTROPY_SHIFT);
ret = extract_entropy_user(&nonblocking_pool, buf, nbytes);
trace_urandom_read(8 * nbytes, ENTROPY_BITS(&nonblocking_pool),
--
2.0.0
--
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