linux-kernel - Re: [PULL] seccomp update (3.17)

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Date:	Sat, 19 Jul 2014 07:49:55 -0700
From:	Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To:	"Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
	James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
	linux-security-module <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>,
	Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>,
	Julien Tinnes <jln@...omium.org>,
	David Drysdale <drysdale@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: [PULL] seccomp update (3.17)

On Fri, Jul 18, 2014 at 11:16 PM, Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu> wrote:
> On Fri, Jul 18, 2014 at 12:19:08PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
>> Hi James,
>>
>> Please pull these seccomp changes for 3.17.
>>
>> (And if I should base off something other than security-next, please
>> let me know. Or if there are any things I should be doing differently
>> with this tree.)
>
> One note; there is a (interim) syscall number collision with the new
> getrandom(2) system call.  I'm sure Linus will be able to handle it,
> and fix it up, but I just wanted to give a heads up that depending on
> which pull request hits mainline first, the syscall number for either
> the new seccomp(2) or getrandom(2) may end up changing.
>
> I've been warning people not to try to use getrandom(2) or check
> anything into LibreSSL, et. al., until the patch is finalized and in
> Linus's tree, but if you have userspace users already using the
> syscall assignments in this patch series, please let me know and I can
> try to make adjustments on my side.

No worries -- the only user of the seccomp syscall that I know of is
the seccomp regression testing suite, and that'd be trivially to fix.

I would note that the seccomp series includes adding the syscall also
to ARM and MIPS, so from a collision fixing perspective, it may be
fewer edits to fix getrandom instead. :)

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security
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