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Date:	Sun, 20 Jul 2014 22:00:02 +0200
From:	Richard Weinberger <>
To:	Joakim Tjernlund <>
CC:	LKML <>,
	Andreas Schwab <>
Subject: Re: ls -l /proc/1/exe -> Permission denied

Am 20.07.2014 21:15, schrieb Joakim Tjernlund:
> Richard Weinberger <> wrote on 2014/07/20 14:05:41:
>> Am 20.07.2014 13:51, schrieb Andreas Schwab:
>>> Richard Weinberger <> writes:
>>>> Do you have an example?
>>> proc symlinks are special because they actually resolve to the inode.
>> Ah. If an attacker manages the kernel to follow the symlink he could
>> indirectly access that file.
>> Thanks for pointing this out!
> That is a big if, I read this as you don't trust the kernels impl.
> of proc sym links so paper over this with denying all other to read 
> trivial
> data such as the exe sym link.

Feel free to propose a solution for that. :-)

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