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Message-Id: <1406067727-19683-63-git-send-email-kamal@canonical.com> Date: Tue, 22 Jul 2014 15:21:13 -0700 From: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@...onical.com> To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, stable@...r.kernel.org, kernel-team@...ts.ubuntu.com Cc: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@...ux-iscsi.org>, Kamal Mostafa <kamal@...onical.com> Subject: [PATCH 3.8 062/116] iscsi-target: Reject mutual authentication with reflected CHAP_C 3.8.13.27 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@...ux-iscsi.org> commit 1d2b60a5545942b1376cb48c1d55843d71e3a08f upstream. This patch adds an explicit check in chap_server_compute_md5() to ensure the CHAP_C value received from the initiator during mutual authentication does not match the original CHAP_C provided by the target. This is in line with RFC-3720, section 8.2.1: Originators MUST NOT reuse the CHAP challenge sent by the Responder for the other direction of a bidirectional authentication. Responders MUST check for this condition and close the iSCSI TCP connection if it occurs. Reported-by: Tejas Vaykole <tejas.vaykole@...softinc.com> Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@...ux-iscsi.org> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@...onical.com> --- drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c b/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c index b54f6ec..cbb04f3 100644 --- a/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c +++ b/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c @@ -342,6 +342,16 @@ static int chap_server_compute_md5( goto out; } /* + * During mutual authentication, the CHAP_C generated by the + * initiator must not match the original CHAP_C generated by + * the target. + */ + if (!memcmp(challenge_binhex, chap->challenge, CHAP_CHALLENGE_LENGTH)) { + pr_err("initiator CHAP_C matches target CHAP_C, failing" + " login attempt\n"); + goto out; + } + /* * Generate CHAP_N and CHAP_R for mutual authentication. */ tfm = crypto_alloc_hash("md5", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); -- 1.9.1 -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
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