linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 10/11] capsicum: prctl(2) to force use of O

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Message-ID: <53D26355.9020809@redhat.com>
Date:	Fri, 25 Jul 2014 16:01:57 +0200
From:	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
To:	David Drysdale <drysdale@...gle.com>,
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
CC:	Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
	Meredydd Luff <meredydd@...atehouse.org>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
	James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
	Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
	Christoph Hellwig <hch@...radead.org>,
	linux-api@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 10/11] capsicum: prctl(2) to force use of O_BENEATH

Il 25/07/2014 15:47, David Drysdale ha scritto:
> @@ -1996,6 +2013,17 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(prctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3,
>  		if (arg2 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
>  			return -EINVAL;
>  		return current->no_new_privs ? 1 : 0;
> +	case PR_SET_OPENAT_BENEATH:
> +		if (arg2 != 1 || arg4 || arg5)
> +			return -EINVAL;
> +		if ((arg3 & ~(PR_SET_OPENAT_BENEATH_TSYNC)) != 0)
> +			return -EINVAL;
> +		error = prctl_set_openat_beneath(me, arg3);
> +		break;
> +	case PR_GET_OPENAT_BENEATH:
> +		if (arg2 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
> +			return -EINVAL;
> +		return me->openat_beneath;
>  	case PR_GET_THP_DISABLE:
>  		if (arg2 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
>  			return -EINVAL;
> 

Why are you always forbidding a change of prctl from 1 to 0?  It should
be safe if current->no_new_privs is clear.

Do new threads inherit from the parent?

Also, I wonder if you need something like this check:

        /*
         * Installing a seccomp filter requires that the task has
         * CAP_SYS_ADMIN in its namespace or be running with no_new_privs.
         * This avoids scenarios where unprivileged tasks can affect the
         * behavior of privileged children.
         */
        if (!current->no_new_privs &&
            security_capable_noaudit(current_cred(), current_user_ns(),
                                     CAP_SYS_ADMIN) != 0)
                return -EACCES;

Paolo
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