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Message-ID: <CAGXu5jJZ7mhmq1BrdTP5Ww15+C2iLQKjLy1Xh0=9qZvVK5E9Cw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 25 Jul 2014 10:10:35 -0700
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
Julien Tinnes <jln@...gle.com>
Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@...gle.com>,
Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
LSM List <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>,
Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
Meredydd Luff <meredydd@...atehouse.org>,
Christoph Hellwig <hch@...radead.org>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 11/11] seccomp: Add tgid and tid into seccomp_data
On Fri, Jul 25, 2014 at 8:59 AM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net> wrote:
> On Jul 25, 2014 6:48 AM, "David Drysdale" <drysdale@...gle.com> wrote:
>>
>> Add the current thread and thread group IDs into the data
>> available for seccomp-bpf programs to work on. This allows
>> installation of filters that police syscalls based on thread
>> or process ID, e.g. tgkill(2)/kill(2)/prctl(2).
>>
>> Signed-off-by: David Drysdale <drysdale@...gle.com>
>> ---
>> include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h | 10 ++++++++++
>> kernel/seccomp.c | 2 ++
>> 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h b/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h
>> index ac2dc9f72973..b88370d6f6ca 100644
>> --- a/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h
>> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h
>> @@ -36,12 +36,22 @@
>> * @instruction_pointer: at the time of the system call.
>> * @args: up to 6 system call arguments always stored as 64-bit values
>> * regardless of the architecture.
>> + * @tgid: thread group ID of the thread executing the BPF program.
>> + * @tid: thread ID of the thread executing the BPF program.
>> + * The SECCOMP_DATA_TID_PRESENT macro indicates the presence of the
>> + * tgid and tid fields; user programs may use this macro to conditionally
>> + * compile code against older versions of the kernel. Note also that
>> + * BPF programs should cope with the absence of these fields by testing
>> + * the length of data available.
>> */
>> struct seccomp_data {
>> int nr;
>> __u32 arch;
>> __u64 instruction_pointer;
>> __u64 args[6];
>> + __u32 tgid;
>> + __u32 tid;
>> };
>> +#define SECCOMP_DATA_TID_PRESENT 1
>>
>> #endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_SECCOMP_H */
>> diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
>> index 301bbc24739c..dd5146f15d6d 100644
>> --- a/kernel/seccomp.c
>> +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
>> @@ -80,6 +80,8 @@ static void populate_seccomp_data(struct seccomp_data *sd)
>> sd->args[4] = args[4];
>> sd->args[5] = args[5];
>> sd->instruction_pointer = KSTK_EIP(task);
>> + sd->tgid = task_tgid_vnr(current);
>> + sd->tid = task_pid_vnr(current);
>> }
>
> This is, IMO, problematic. These should probably be relative to the
> filter creator, not the filtered task. This will also hurt
> performance.
Yeah, we can't change the seccomp_data structure without a lot of
care, and tgid/tid really should be encoded in the filter. However, it
is tricky in the forking case.
>
> What's the use case? Can it be better achieved with a new eBPF function?
Julien had been wanting something like this too (though he'd suggested
it via prctl): limit the signal functions to "self" only. I wonder if
adding a prctl like done for O_BENEATH could work for signal sending?
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security
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