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Message-ID: <87oawa740c.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org>
Date: Sun, 27 Jul 2014 16:53:23 -0700
From: ebiederm@...ssion.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>, linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org,
Henrique de Moraes Holschuh <hmh@....eng.br>,
"linux-kernel\@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>,
LSM List <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
Julien Tinnes <jln@...gle.com>,
"Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
David Drysdale <drysdale@...gle.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Meredydd Luff <meredydd@...atehouse.org>,
Christoph Hellwig <hch@...radead.org>
Subject: Re: General flags to turn things off (getrandom, pid lookup, etc)
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net> writes:
> On Jul 27, 2014 5:06 PM, "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@....edu> wrote:
>>
>> On Fri, Jul 25, 2014 at 11:30:48AM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> >
>> > There is recent interest in having a way to turn generally-available
>> > kernel features off. Maybe we should add a good one so we can stop
>> > bikeshedding and avoid proliferating dumb interfaces.
>>
>> I believe the seccomp infrastructure (which is already upstream)
>> should be able to do most of what you want, at least with respect to
>> features which are exposed via system calls (which was most of your
>> list).
>
> Seccomp can't really restrict lookups of non-self pids. In fact, this
> feature idea started out as a response to a patch adding a kind of
> nasty seccomp feature to make it sort of possible.
>
> I agree that that seccomp can turn off GRND_RANDOM, but how is it
> supposed to do it in such a way that the filtered software will fall
> back to something sensible? -ENOSYS? -EPERM? Something else?
>
> I think that -ENOSYS is clearly wrong, but standardizing this would be
> nice. Admittedly, adding something fancy like this for GRND_RANDOM
> may not be appropriate.
Andy you seem to be arguing here for two system calls.
get_urandom() and get_random().
Where get_urandom only blocks if there is not enough starting entropy,
and get_random(GRND_RANDOM) blocks if there is currently not enough
entropy.
That would allow -ENOSYS to be the right return value and it would
simply things for everyone.
Eric
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