linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 1/2] crypto: add support for TLS 1.0 record encryption

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Date:	Fri, 1 Aug 2014 07:44:23 -0700
From:	Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
To:	Cristian Stoica <cristian.stoica@...escale.com>
Cc:	Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
	linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
	"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] crypto: add support for TLS 1.0 record encryption

On Fri, Aug 1, 2014 at 2:06 AM, Cristian Stoica
<cristian.stoica@...escale.com> wrote:
> Hi Andy
>
> On 31.07.2014 23:01, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> On 07/29/2014 02:32 AM, Cristian Stoica wrote:
> ...

>>> +static int crypto_tls_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)
>>> +{

>>> +    /*
>>> +     * Step 2 - Verify padding
>>> +     * Retrieve the last byte of the payload; this is the padding size
>>> +     */
>>> +    cryptlen -= 1;
>>> +    scatterwalk_map_and_copy(&pad_size, req->dst, cryptlen, 1, 0);
>>> +
>>> +    /* RFC recommendation to defend against timing attacks is to continue
>>> +     * with hash calculation even if the padding is incorrect */
>>> +    if (cryptlen < pad_size + hash_size) {
>>> +            pad_size = 0;
>>> +            paderr = -EBADMSG;

If this happens, then pad_size == 0.

>>> +    }

else pad_size is likely to be nonzero.

>>> +    cryptlen -= pad_size;

So now cryptlen depends on the result of the decryption, which means
that this part is not constant time:

>>> +
>>> +    /* Now compute and compare our ICV with the one from the packet */
>>> +    err = crypto_tls_genicv(hash, req->dst, cryptlen, req);
>>> +    if (!err)
>>> +            err = crypto_memneq(hash, ihash, hash_size) ? -EBADMSG : 0;
>>
>> This looks like it's vulnerable to the Lucky 13 attack.
>
> Digest is always calculated and in this particular case memneq should
> help with some of the timing leaks. ICV calculation is expected to pass
> and any failures should be only for internal reasons. There are maybe
> some other problems that I've never thought of. Did you have something
> else in mind when you mentioned this attack?
>
> Cristian S.

If I understand it correctly, the issue is that cryptlen depends on
the padding.  I added some notes inline above.  See here, too:

https://www.imperialviolet.org/2013/02/04/luckythirteen.html

--Andy
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