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Message-ID: <20140803164452.GA14626@redhat.com>
Date: Sun, 3 Aug 2014 18:44:52 +0200
From: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>
To: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@...temov.name>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Sasha Levin <levinsasha928@...il.com>,
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...nvz.org>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH, RESEND] procfs: silence lockdep warning about read vs.
exec seq_file
Sorry for delay,
On 08/02, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
>
> +/*
> + * proc_pid_personality() and proc_pid_stack() take cred_guard_mutex via
> + * lock_trace()
And at first glance they lock_trace() can die. But lets temporary ignore,
m_start() is trickier.
> +static struct lock_class_key pid_maps_seq_file_lock;
> +
> void task_mem(struct seq_file *m, struct mm_struct *mm)
> {
> unsigned long data, text, lib, swap;
> @@ -242,6 +254,7 @@ static int do_maps_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file,
> ret = seq_open(file, ops);
> if (!ret) {
> struct seq_file *m = file->private_data;
> + lockdep_set_class(&m->lock, &pid_maps_seq_file_lock);
Perhaps lockdep_set_subclass() would be better... But this doesn't matter.
The question is, why m_start() calls mm_access(). This is not even
strictly correct if the task execs between m_stop() + m_start().
Can't we do something like below? The patch is obviously horrible and
incomplete, just to explain what I meant. Basically this is what
proc_mem_operations does.
Oleg.
diff --git a/fs/proc/internal.h b/fs/proc/internal.h
index 3ab6d14..c16b70e 100644
--- a/fs/proc/internal.h
+++ b/fs/proc/internal.h
@@ -267,6 +267,7 @@ extern int proc_remount(struct super_block *, int *, char *);
struct proc_maps_private {
struct pid *pid;
struct task_struct *task;
+ struct mm_struct *mm;
#ifdef CONFIG_MMU
struct vm_area_struct *tail_vma;
#endif
diff --git a/fs/proc/task_mmu.c b/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
index cfa63ee..9b88248 100644
--- a/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
+++ b/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
@@ -165,9 +165,9 @@ static void *m_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos)
if (!priv->task)
return ERR_PTR(-ESRCH);
- mm = mm_access(priv->task, PTRACE_MODE_READ);
- if (!mm || IS_ERR(mm))
- return mm;
+ mm = priv->mm;
+ if (!mm || !atomic_inc_not_zero(&mm->mm_users))
+ return NULL;
down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
tail_vma = get_gate_vma(priv->task->mm);
@@ -231,6 +231,27 @@ static void m_stop(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
put_task_struct(priv->task);
}
+// TODO: change __mem_open() to use this helper
+static struct mm_struct *xxx(struct inode *inode, struct file *file, unsigned int mode)
+{
+ struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(inode);
+ struct mm_struct *mm = ERR_PTR(-ESRCH);
+
+ if (task) {
+ mm = mm_access(task, mode);
+ put_task_struct(task);
+
+ if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(mm)) {
+ /* ensure this mm_struct can't be freed */
+ atomic_inc(&mm->mm_count);
+ /* but do not pin its memory */
+ mmput(mm);
+ }
+ }
+
+ return mm;
+}
+
static int do_maps_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file,
const struct seq_operations *ops)
{
@@ -239,17 +260,38 @@ static int do_maps_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file,
priv = kzalloc(sizeof(*priv), GFP_KERNEL);
if (priv) {
priv->pid = proc_pid(inode);
+ priv->mm = xxx(inode, file, PTRACE_MODE_READ);
+
+ // XXX cleanup me
+ if (IS_ERR(priv->mm)) {
+ ret = -EACCES;
+ goto free;
+ }
+
ret = seq_open(file, ops);
if (!ret) {
struct seq_file *m = file->private_data;
m->private = priv;
} else {
+ // XXX cleanup me
+ if (priv->mm)
+ mmdrop(priv->mm);
+ free:
kfree(priv);
}
}
return ret;
}
+static int xxx_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ struct seq_file *seq = file->private_data;
+ struct proc_maps_private *priv = seq->private;
+ if (priv->mm)
+ mmdrop(priv->mm);
+ return 0;
+}
+
static void
show_map_vma(struct seq_file *m, struct vm_area_struct *vma, int is_pid)
{
@@ -399,14 +441,14 @@ const struct file_operations proc_pid_maps_operations = {
.open = pid_maps_open,
.read = seq_read,
.llseek = seq_lseek,
- .release = seq_release_private,
+ .release = xxx_release,
};
const struct file_operations proc_tid_maps_operations = {
.open = tid_maps_open,
.read = seq_read,
.llseek = seq_lseek,
- .release = seq_release_private,
+ .release = xxx_release,
};
/*
@@ -682,14 +724,14 @@ const struct file_operations proc_pid_smaps_operations = {
.open = pid_smaps_open,
.read = seq_read,
.llseek = seq_lseek,
- .release = seq_release_private,
+ .release = xxx_release,
};
const struct file_operations proc_tid_smaps_operations = {
.open = tid_smaps_open,
.read = seq_read,
.llseek = seq_lseek,
- .release = seq_release_private,
+ .release = xxx_release,
};
/*
--
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