Message-ID: <CALZtONC5w2Ys5cX3dZQGLvhd8wkSgHoJhY_1cK3jqObhUz3e5w@mail.gmail.com>
Date:	Fri, 8 Aug 2014 21:46:40 -0400
From:	Dan Streetman <ddstreet@...e.org>
To:	Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc:	Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
	Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
	linux-kernel <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	Seth Jennings <sjennings@...iantweb.net>,
	Minchan Kim <minchan@...nel.org>,
	Nitin Gupta <ngupta@...are.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@...cle.com>,
	Linux-MM <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
	Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@...nwall.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] mm/zpool: use prefixed module loading

On Fri, Aug 8, 2014 at 8:06 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> wrote:
> On Fri, Aug 8, 2014 at 10:11 AM, Dan Streetman <ddstreet@...e.org> wrote:
>> On Fri, Aug 8, 2014 at 3:53 AM, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> wrote:
>>> To avoid potential format string expansion via module parameters,
>>> do not use the zpool type directly in request_module() without a
>>> format string. Additionally, to avoid arbitrary modules being loaded
>>> via zpool API (e.g. via the zswap_zpool_type module parameter) add a
>>> "zpool-" prefix to the requested module, as well as module aliases for
>>> the existing zpool types (zbud and zsmalloc).
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
>>> ---
>>>  mm/zbud.c     | 1 +
>>>  mm/zpool.c    | 2 +-
>>>  mm/zsmalloc.c | 1 +
>>>  3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/mm/zbud.c b/mm/zbud.c
>>> index a05790b1915e..aa74f7addab1 100644
>>> --- a/mm/zbud.c
>>> +++ b/mm/zbud.c
>>> @@ -619,3 +619,4 @@ module_exit(exit_zbud);
>>>  MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
>>>  MODULE_AUTHOR("Seth Jennings <sjenning@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>");
>>>  MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Buddy Allocator for Compressed Pages");
>>> +MODULE_ALIAS("zpool-zbud");
>>
>> If we keep this, I'd recommend putting this inside the #ifdef
>> CONFIG_ZPOOL section, to keep all the zpool stuff together in zbud and
>> zsmalloc.
>>
>>> diff --git a/mm/zpool.c b/mm/zpool.c
>>> index e40612a1df00..739cdf0d183a 100644
>>> --- a/mm/zpool.c
>>> +++ b/mm/zpool.c
>>> @@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ struct zpool *zpool_create_pool(char *type, gfp_t gfp, struct zpool_ops *ops)
>>>         driver = zpool_get_driver(type);
>>>
>>>         if (!driver) {
>>> -               request_module(type);
>>> +               request_module("zpool-%s", type);
>>
>> I agree with a change of (type) to ("%s", type), but what's the need
>> to prefix "zpool-"?  Anyone who has access to modify the
>> zswap_zpool_type parameter is already root and can just as easily load
>> any module they want.  Additionally, the zswap_compressor parameter
>> also runs through request_module() (in crypto/api.c) and could be used
>> to load any kernel module.
>
> Yeah, the "%s" should be the absolute minimum. :)
>
>> I'd prefer to leave out the "zpool-" prefix unless there is a specific
>> reason to include it.
>
> The reason is that the CAP_SYS_MODULE capability is supposed to be
> what controls the loading of arbitrary modules, and that's separate
> permission than changing module parameters via sysfs
> (/sys/modules/...). Which begs the question: maybe those parameters
> shouldn't be writable without CAP_SYS_MODULE? Greg, any thoughts here?
> kobjects don't seem to carry any capabilities checks.

For the current implementation in zswap, those parameters are only
settable at boot time - zswap isn't buildable (currently) as a module,
and those parameters are only processed during zswap init.

So I don't think there's currently any issue, as far as the zswap
module params, with any user being able to loading arbitrary modules.
Besides a user modifying the bootloader configuration, of course.

Even when/if zswap gets updated to be buildable as a module, passing
those parameters during zswap module load would, in itself, require
CAP_SYS_MODULE, since the params are only processed during module
init.

> This is certainly much less serious than letting a non-root user load
> an arbitrary module, but it would be great if we could have a clear
> path to making sure that arbitrary module loading isn't the default
> case here (given this new ability). In the past (netdev module
> loading), a CVE was assigned for a CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege being able
> to load arbitrary modules, so I don't see this as much different.
>
> Ugh, yes, I didn't see the call to crypto_has_comp. Other users of
> this routine use const char arrays, so there wasn't any danger here.
> This would be the first user of the crypto API to expose this via a
> userspace-controlled arbitrary string.
>
> Herbert, what do you think here? I'm concerned we're going to get into
> a situation like we had to deal with for netdev:
>
> http://git.kernel.org/linus/8909c9ad8ff03611c9c96c9a92656213e4bb495b
>
> I think we need to fix zswap now before it gets too far, and likely
> adjust the crypto API to use a module prefix as well. Perhaps we need
> a "crypto-" prefix?

Since (I think) this would only become a problem if/when zswap is
modified to process either zswap_compressor or zswap_zpool_type
outside of module init, maybe a comment would be enough clarifying
that restriction?  To just check CAP_SYS_MODULE if processing either
param outside of module init, if their value doesn't match the
default?


>
> -Kees
>
>>
>>>                 driver = zpool_get_driver(type);
>>>         }
>>>
>>> diff --git a/mm/zsmalloc.c b/mm/zsmalloc.c
>>> index 4e2fc83cb394..36af729eb3f6 100644
>>> --- a/mm/zsmalloc.c
>>> +++ b/mm/zsmalloc.c
>>> @@ -1199,3 +1199,4 @@ module_exit(zs_exit);
>>>
>>>  MODULE_LICENSE("Dual BSD/GPL");
>>>  MODULE_AUTHOR("Nitin Gupta <ngupta@...are.org>");
>>> +MODULE_ALIAS("zpool-zsmalloc");
>>> --
>>> 1.9.1
>>>
>>>
>>> --
>>> Kees Cook
>>> Chrome OS Security
>>>
>>> --
>>> To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in
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>
>
>
> --
> Kees Cook
> Chrome OS Security
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