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Message-ID: <CAMuHMdWp1iWm9xLqRN0q3hV72bD8jPRLDW74Cm+Gxp3gB76asQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 11 Aug 2014 22:07:12 +0200
From: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@...ux-m68k.org>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc: Linux-Arch <linux-arch@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: seccomp: add "seccomp" syscall
Hi Kees,
v3.17 is gonna get a lot of new syscalls...
On Wed, Aug 6, 2014 at 6:27 PM, Linux Kernel Mailing List
<linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org> wrote:
> Gitweb: http://git.kernel.org/linus/;a=commit;h=48dc92b9fc3926844257316e75ba11eb5c742b2c
> Commit: 48dc92b9fc3926844257316e75ba11eb5c742b2c
> Parent: 3b23dd12846215eff4afb073366b80c0c4d7543e
> Refname: refs/heads/master
> Author: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
> AuthorDate: Wed Jun 25 16:08:24 2014 -0700
> Committer: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
> CommitDate: Fri Jul 18 12:13:37 2014 -0700
>
> seccomp: add "seccomp" syscall
>
> This adds the new "seccomp" syscall with both an "operation" and "flags"
> parameter for future expansion. The third argument is a pointer value,
> used with the SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER operation. Currently, flags must
> be 0. This is functionally equivalent to prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, ...).
>
> In addition to the TSYNC flag later in this patch series, there is a
> non-zero chance that this syscall could be used for configuring a fixed
> argument area for seccomp-tracer-aware processes to pass syscall arguments
> in the future. Hence, the use of "seccomp" not simply "seccomp_add_filter"
> for this syscall. Additionally, this syscall uses operation, flags,
> and user pointer for arguments because strictly passing arguments via
> a user pointer would mean seccomp itself would be unable to trivially
> filter the seccomp syscall itself.
>
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>
> Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
Is this something that I should enable?
As it depends on CONFIG_SECCOMP, it only makes sense on architectures that
already support CONFIG_SECCOMP, right?
Does it make sense to reserve a syscall slot for it on architectures that
don't support it yet?
Thanks!
Gr{oetje,eeting}s,
Geert
--
Geert Uytterhoeven -- There's lots of Linux beyond ia32 -- geert@...ux-m68k.org
In personal conversations with technical people, I call myself a hacker. But
when I'm talking to journalists I just say "programmer" or something like that.
-- Linus Torvalds
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