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Message-ID: <CAGXu5jKDZc+V+=LD-yN5_PCcorXMx6B+AMeL7rMSfTXFRKqj+A@mail.gmail.com>
Date:	Tue, 12 Aug 2014 19:39:16 -0700
From:	Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To:	Stephen Boyd <sboyd@...eaurora.org>
Cc:	LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	Nicolas Pitre <nicolas.pitre@...aro.org>,
	Rob Herring <robh@...nel.org>,
	Laura Abbott <lauraa@...eaurora.org>,
	Liu hua <sdu.liu@...wei.com>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
	Tomasz Figa <t.figa@...sung.com>,
	Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@...driver.com>,
	Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>,
	Leif Lindholm <leif.lindholm@...aro.org>,
	Doug Anderson <dianders@...gle.com>,
	Rabin Vincent <rabin@....in>,
	Nikolay Borisov <Nikolay.Borisov@....com>,
	Mark Salter <msalter@...hat.com>,
	Russell King - ARM Linux <linux@....linux.org.uk>,
	"linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org" 
	<linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 3/7] arm: use fixmap for text patching when text is RO

On Tue, Aug 12, 2014 at 5:27 PM, Stephen Boyd <sboyd@...eaurora.org> wrote:
> On 08/12/14 14:47, Kees Cook wrote:
>> On Tue, Aug 12, 2014 at 2:39 PM, Stephen Boyd <sboyd@...eaurora.org> wrote:
>>> On 08/12/14 11:24, Kees Cook wrote:
>>>> diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/patch.c b/arch/arm/kernel/patch.c
>>>> index 07314af47733..03dd4e39c833 100644
>>>> --- a/arch/arm/kernel/patch.c
>>>> +++ b/arch/arm/kernel/patch.c
>>>> @@ -13,21 +16,69 @@ struct patch {
>>>>       unsigned int insn;
>>>>  };
>>>>
>>>> -void __kprobes __patch_text(void *addr, unsigned int insn)
>>>> +static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(patch_lock);
>>>> +
>>>> +static void __kprobes *patch_map(void *addr, int fixmap, unsigned long *flags)
>>>> +{
>>>> +     unsigned int uintaddr = (uintptr_t) addr;
>>>> +     bool module = !core_kernel_text(uintaddr);
>>>> +     struct page *page;
>>>> +
>>>> +     if (module && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX))
>>>> +             page = vmalloc_to_page(addr);
>>>> +     else if (!module && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA))
>>>> +             page = virt_to_page(addr);
>>>> +     else
>>>> +             return addr;
>>>> +
>>>> +     if (flags)
>>>> +             spin_lock_irqsave(&patch_lock, *flags);
>>>> +
>>>> +     set_fixmap(fixmap, page_to_phys(page));
>>>> +
>>>> +     return (void *) (__fix_to_virt(fixmap) + (uintaddr & ~PAGE_MASK));
>>>> +}
>>>> +
>>>> +static void __kprobes patch_unmap(int fixmap, unsigned long *flags)
>>>> +{
>>>> +     clear_fixmap(fixmap);
>>>> +
>>>> +     if (flags)
>>>> +             spin_unlock_irqrestore(&patch_lock, *flags);
>>>> +}
>>> Has the kbuildbot complained about this one yet?
>>>
>>>   CHECK  arch/arm/kernel/patch.c
>>>   arch/arm/kernel/patch.c:47:39: warning: context imbalance in
>>> 'patch_unmap' - unexpected unlock
>>>
>>> I guess we're going to ignore it.
>> No, nothing yet from buildbot, let me do a sparse run -- I think we
>> can just add annotation and we'll be okay.
>>
>>
>
> Ok. I tried to move code around but sparse still complains because of
> conditional locking.

Oh, sorry! I should have mentioned I fixed this already. It just
requires some declarations. Here's how it looks now:

https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux.git/commit/?h=arm/ro-nx&id=847a4a489d31b76797e7c7a78cd3e98c7948df4b

+static void __kprobes *patch_map(void *addr, int fixmap, unsigned long *flags)
+ __acquires(&patch_lock)
+{
...
+ if (flags)
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&patch_lock, *flags);
+ else
+ __acquire(&patch_lock);

etc.

Thanks for poking at this!

-Kees

>
> ---8<---
>
> diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/patch.c b/arch/arm/kernel/patch.c
> index 03dd4e39c833..f6d4de3826a0 100644
> --- a/arch/arm/kernel/patch.c
> +++ b/arch/arm/kernel/patch.c
> @@ -18,33 +18,17 @@ struct patch {
>
>  static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(patch_lock);
>
> -static void __kprobes *patch_map(void *addr, int fixmap, unsigned long *flags)
> +static struct page __kprobes *patch_page(void *addr)
>  {
>         unsigned int uintaddr = (uintptr_t) addr;
>         bool module = !core_kernel_text(uintaddr);
> -       struct page *page;
>
>         if (module && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX))
> -               page = vmalloc_to_page(addr);
> +               return vmalloc_to_page(addr);
>         else if (!module && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA))
> -               page = virt_to_page(addr);
> -       else
> -               return addr;
> +               return virt_to_page(addr);
>
> -       if (flags)
> -               spin_lock_irqsave(&patch_lock, *flags);
> -
> -       set_fixmap(fixmap, page_to_phys(page));
> -
> -       return (void *) (__fix_to_virt(fixmap) + (uintaddr & ~PAGE_MASK));
> -}
> -
> -static void __kprobes patch_unmap(int fixmap, unsigned long *flags)
> -{
> -       clear_fixmap(fixmap);
> -
> -       if (flags)
> -               spin_unlock_irqrestore(&patch_lock, *flags);
> +       return NULL;
>  }
>
>  void __kprobes __patch_text_real(void *addr, unsigned int insn, bool remap)
> @@ -54,10 +38,18 @@ void __kprobes __patch_text_real(void *addr, unsigned int insn, bool remap)
>         bool twopage = false;
>         unsigned long flags;
>         void *waddr = addr;
> +       struct page *page = NULL;
>         int size;
>
> -       if (remap)
> -               waddr = patch_map(addr, FIX_TEXT_POKE0, &flags);
> +       if (remap) {
> +               page = patch_page(addr);
> +               if (page) {
> +                       spin_lock_irqsave(&patch_lock, flags);
> +                       set_fixmap(FIX_TEXT_POKE0, page_to_phys(page));
> +                       waddr = (void *)(__fix_to_virt(FIX_TEXT_POKE0) +
> +                               (uintaddr & ~PAGE_MASK));
> +               }
> +       }
>
>         if (thumb2 && __opcode_is_thumb16(insn)) {
>                 *(u16 *)waddr = __opcode_to_mem_thumb16(insn);
> @@ -69,15 +61,25 @@ void __kprobes __patch_text_real(void *addr, unsigned int insn, bool remap)
>                 u16 *addrh1 = waddr + 2;
>
>                 twopage = (uintaddr & ~PAGE_MASK) == PAGE_SIZE - 2;
> -               if (twopage && remap)
> -                       addrh1 = patch_map(addr + 2, FIX_TEXT_POKE1, NULL);
> +               if (twopage && remap) {
> +                       struct page *page2;
> +
> +                       page2 = patch_page(addr + 2);
> +                       if (page2) {
> +                               set_fixmap(FIX_TEXT_POKE1, page_to_phys(page));
> +                               addrh1 = (u16 *)(__fix_to_virt(FIX_TEXT_POKE1) +
> +                                               (uintaddr & ~PAGE_MASK));
> +                       } else {
> +                               addrh1 = addr + 2;
> +                       }
> +               }
>
>                 *addrh0 = __opcode_to_mem_thumb16(first);
>                 *addrh1 = __opcode_to_mem_thumb16(second);
>
>                 if (twopage && addrh1 != addr + 2) {
>                         flush_kernel_vmap_range(addrh1, 2);
> -                       patch_unmap(FIX_TEXT_POKE1, NULL);
> +                       clear_fixmap(FIX_TEXT_POKE1);
>                 }
>
>                 size = sizeof(u32);
> @@ -91,9 +93,10 @@ void __kprobes __patch_text_real(void *addr, unsigned int insn, bool remap)
>                 size = sizeof(u32);
>         }
>
> -       if (waddr != addr) {
> +       if (page) {
>                 flush_kernel_vmap_range(waddr, twopage ? size / 2 : size);
> -               patch_unmap(FIX_TEXT_POKE0, &flags);
> +               clear_fixmap(FIX_TEXT_POKE0);
> +               spin_unlock_irqrestore(&patch_lock, flags);
>         }
>
>         flush_icache_range((uintptr_t)(addr),
>
> --
> Qualcomm Innovation Center, Inc. is a member of Code Aurora Forum,
> hosted by The Linux Foundation
>



-- 
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security
--
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